established marriage relation decrease precisely as that development goes on. An agitation placing all its emphasis on purely physical conditions must of necessity turn back the wheel of progress and break down the barriers which restrain the inherent animal tendency toward promiscuity.

ment was made in good faith as a conclusion from evidence, the attorney should not be compelled to make it at his peril. But the reason for disbarring an attorney for improper criticism of a court is said to be that his conduct shows that he has not the good moral character requisite to continued membership in the profession. In re Hilton, Ann. Cas. 1918A 271. If the derogatory statement is not in fact made in good faith, it argues nothing in favor of the moral status of the attorney that it is pertinent to a litigated issue. A view contrary to that of the Pennsylvania court was strongly stated in People v. Green, 9 Colo. 506, wherein the court said: "Neither the letter nor the spirit of the attorney's privilege permits him to enter our courts and spread upon judicial records charges of a shocking and felonious character against brother attorneys, and against judges engaged in the administration of justice, upon mere rumors, coupled with facts which should, of themselves, create no suspicion of official corruption in a just and fair mind. And although, in actions of libel and slander, it has been thought wise to exempt them from liability for defamatory words, published or spoken, in the course of judicial proceedings, provided such words are material, in a disbarment proceeding the recognition of such a privilege could neither secure justice nor advance the independence of the bar."

Eugenics in Practice.

THE

HE world has looked on with tolerant amusement while the devotees of "eugenics" exploited their theory that marriage should be founded primarily on the considerations which govern scientific horse breeding. The trouble with theories is that they tend to break into practice in unexpected ways, and eugenics has proved no exception to the rule. In Fullen v. Fullen (N. Mex.) 153 Pac. 294, an action for divorce, the court said, referring to the defendant: "She has what she calls advanced ideas upon this subject. She testified that plaintiff was not the father of the boy; that he was physically unfit for such purpose. She says that in New York she and the plaintiff jointly selected a man who possessed the necessary physical qualifications (this is denied by plaintiff), and that she assumed sexual relations with him with the result that she gave birth to this child; that afterwards she returned to New York and resumed the same relations for the purpose of bearing another child. Without comment, we will simply say that such standards are not the present accepted legal standards of marital conduct." The danger inhering in this propaganda, of which the case cited in an illustration, goes deeper than appears on the surface. The transition from indiscriminate sex relationship to monogamy has resulted from a slow development in which the physical aspect of the relation is subordinated to its moral and spiritual aspects. Offenses against the

Dealer's Talk.

of his wares or exaggerated praise of their value or quality does not give rise to a warranty. This is a somewhat cynical rule of the common law, apparently recognizing that a certain amount of lying is incidental to a mercantile transaction, and results quite logically in the maxim "caveat emptor." It legalizes those practices which made an English laureate ask: "Who would believe in that the uniform sales act has recognized this sordid a tradesman's wares or his word?" It is to be regretted standard of morals by enacting (section 12) that no affirmation of the value of goods by the seller shall be if false or misleading, is beneath the modern standard of construed as a warranty. Certainly such an affirmation, sedulously avoid any misleading affirmation of value in their advertisements, and the statement of value as distinct from price is deprecated by many. It is the function of law to enforce on the dishonest the observance of the and a codification of law designed for uniform adoption moral standards to which the upright voluntarily conform, disdain to take advantage. Recognizing that law should should not perpetuate a rule of which honorable merchants keep pace with the advance of ethical standards, the federal supreme court declined in U. S. v. New South Farm, etc., Co., 241 U. S. 64, Ann. Cas. 1917C 455, to commit itself unnecessarily to the proposition that mere "puffing" does not constitute fraud. Certainly the time for a legislative recognition of a zone of legalized falsehood in commercial transactions is long past.

business ethics. The better class of merchants now

AMERICANIZATION.

THE melting pot of the nations is a beautiful and sublime symbol for the United States, but it is a fiction of an idealistic imagination. an idealistic imagination. It is not the personification of observed experience. It has neither melted nor fused. The fault is not in the crucible but in its equipment and its operation. It has been fed at the top without selective process; fuel and fluxes have been disregarded and the reactions have been complex. Tapped at the bottom it has run into the American mold not only a stream of pure sound metal but also its scoria, slag and dross. The war has destroyed many illusions and it has taught many truths. It has taught us many things with respect to American citizenship and naturalization. We, in common with France and England, have experienced the truth of Horace's dictum, Calum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt.

nations and every civilized state grants naturalization in some form to proper applicants. Expatriation requires great courage. The ties that bind one to the land of his birth, or to the land of his fathers, through strains of blood and through tradition, are sacred. Their solemn abjuration marks not only a legal but a moral change. There can be no more serious step, no greater event in the mental life of an individual. And since in the United States a naturalized citizen is placed on precisely the same footing as a native citizen and all his rights are as fully protected as if he were a citizen by birth, his adoption by the state and his absorption into the body politic is of no less serious moment to the state itself. If he is moved by no higher motive than to evade home duties, military service or taxation; if his base object is to bask in the golden smiles of Dame Fortune, reap all the benefits and share in none of the responsibilities of citizenship, the Voice of a free People calling loud "on the wind of the Western Sea" can have no call for him. Naturalization must be made to mean Americanization. There must be a new birth. And when the motive is worthy and pure, the benediction of the new citizenship, as if by grace of miracle, will work the change. No man can forget his ancestry. Perhaps he cannot wholly erase from his mind the traditions of the country from which he sprang; he may cherish its loftiest ideals and even seek to interpret them to our advantage, but if he be a true American he will not feel a shred of instinctive or traditional loyalty for some land beyond the sea nor will he seek, independently or as one of a clan, to revive in the free air of the new world the traditions of the old, or to impose upon this nation the nationality and the ideals of some other. American citizenship must mean American loyalty and American loyalty means, in heart and mind and aspiration, the predominance of America.

The hour has come when America must stand guard on the walls surrounding the sanctities of its citizenship. That the nation is awake to this fact is evidenced by the rapidly multiplying organizations with Americanization programs. A bill has been introduced in Congress to provide a federal subsidy to enable the states to encourage the teaching of English to the foreign born. The FourMinute-Men, the Red Cross, the Bureau of Education of the Department of the Interior, the Council of National Defence, the Department of Labor, the Bureau of Public Information, each comes forward with a scheme for the Americanization of the foreigner. Political parties embody the subject in their platforms, defense societies include it in their work as a war measure, social organizations, lodges, churches, chambers of commerce, the public schools and universities all are pledged to it. Employers of labor have opened Americanization classes in their work shops, merchants' associations have done likewise in their stores. "Americanization" is on the lips of everyone. There is little harmony in the many schemes advanced for the production of a more significant Americanism. Some are very practical, others highly idealistic; but all will prove both quixotic and abortive if we do not go back to the root of the difficulty. We must deliver ourselves of the body of living death found in our national life and we must keep the source of our citizenship pure. First, there should be a forfeiture of traitorous, disloyal, unpatriotic and tainted citizenship. Second, the proceeding for naturalization of an alien should be an adversary

proceeding. Third, the naturalization law should be amended to meet new conditions and especially so with respect to the German Empire and its Delbrueck law.

First, an alien has no moral or constitutional right to retain the privileges of citizenship if by false evidence or through mental reservations an imposition has been practiced upon the court without which the certificate of citizenship could not and would not have been issued. Section 15 of the present Naturalization Act of 1906 authorizes a direct attack upon certificates of citizenship in an independent proceeding and the federal district courts have sustained the action for cancellation on the ground of fraud or illegal procurement, as for false testimony, false statements as to residence and false evidence as to character. Cancellation because of mental reservation has also been sustained, as where one admitted to citizenship did not intend in good faith to become a permanent citizen and made his oath with a mental reservation to that effect, he was guilty of fraud in procuring the decree and its cancellation was authorized. U. S. v. Ellis, 185 Fed. 546. A recent case, of great interest as one of first impression and squarely in point with this discussion, is that of a German, residing in the United States for many years, for thirty-five years a duly naturalized citizen, and holding office by Presidential appointment, who was by proceedings in the Federal Court of New Jersey deprived of the citizenship which he had betrayed. U. Š. v. WursterS. barth, 249 Fed. 908. The proceeding was instituted under section 15 of the Naturalization Act on the ground that the respondent declared under oath that he absolutely and entirely renounced and abjured all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign sovereignty and particularly to the Emperor of Germany, whereas in fact he did not do so, but, on the contrary, retained an allegiance to Germany and its ruler. Upon the hearing the government proved, in substance, that within a few days after the outbreak of the present war between the United States and the German Empire, the respondent was approached by two ladies interested in a local chapter of the American Red Cross, in an effort to induce him to contribute money to that organization, upon which appeal the respondent became angry, and replied in substance that he would not do so; that he would do nothing to injure the country in which he had been born, brought up, and educated. Subsequently, in the month of June following, another woman, who was likewise interested in the same chapter of the American Red Cross, visited him, and asked him to become a member. He angrily refused to do so, stating that he would give no money to send soldiers to the country where he was born and educated, and, in reply to some arguments which the solicitor advanced, stated that she did not know what it meant to be born in a country, and then have men go over and fight against that country. In the month of November, 1917, the respondent was approached by two gentlemen, in an effort to induce him to subscribe to the fund which the Young Men's Christian Association. was then raising for war work. At that time he stated that he would do nothing to help defeat Germany, and in response to a question whether he did not want America to win the war he replied that he did not; that he had relatives in Germany. He made the same rejoinder to the question whether he did not want the American soldiers in camps and cantonments to be well taken care of; and, in reply to a statement made to him that he was

better off than most Americans, he replied that he came to this country only on a vacation or visit.

The respondent did not attempt to refute or explain any of these facts, which clearly indicated that he bore an allegiance to the country of his origin, superior to that which he recognized to this country. While his present state of mind could not be the main fact in issue, yet if at the time the certificate of citizenship was granted to him he retained the allegiance to Germany manifested by his present state of mind, the certificate of course would have been procured by fraud. The question therefore on which the decision depended was whether it might be legitimately inferred as a fact from his present state of mind that he was of the same mind at the time he took the oath of allegiance and renunciation. Judge Haight said: "As the years succeeding his naturalization passed, coupled with the fact that he continued to dwell in our midst, associate with our citizens, receive the benefits which this nation and its institutions have conferred upon him, acquire property here, and hold public office (as the proofs show that he did), it is natural to presume that his affection and feeling of loyalty and allegiance to this country would increase, and that any ties which bound him to the country from which he came would correspondingly decrease. If, therefore, under such circumstances, after thirty-five years, he now recognizes an allegiance to the sovereignty of his origin, superior to his allegiance to this country, it seems to me that it is not only permissible to infer from that fact, but that the conclusion is irresistible, that at the time he took the oath of renunciation, he did so with a mental reservation as to the country of his birth, and retained towards that country an allegiance which the laws of this country required him to renounce before he could become one of its citizens. Indeed, for the reasons just stated, his allegiance to the former must at that time have been stronger than it is at present. Whatever presumption might otherwise arise in his favor from the apparent fact that during the intervening years he has lived as a good citizen of this country is of no weight, when it is considered that nothing has happened during that time to call forth a manifestation of his reserved allegiance, and that as soon as something did hap-| pen-i. e., the war between this country and Germanyhe immediately manifested it."

In reply to the argument that it was not legitimate to presume that the respondent's mental attitude was the same as it was thirty-five years ago, because as a general rule presumptions do not "run backwards," the court, calling attention to the fact that there are many cases in which it is permissible to infer the existence of one fact from proof of subsequent facts, said: "If the natural and probable inference to be drawn from a proven fact is the existence of another fact, it makes no difference whether the latter fact be before or after, in point of time, the fact from which the inference is to be drawn. The decisive point is whether the inference is a natural and probable one. . . . For instance, if this respondent had been naturalized in the month of March, 1917, and had expressed himself in April, June, and November of the same year, as the proofs in this case show that he did, it could scarcely be doubted that he had reserved an allegiance to the country of his origin at the time that he took the oath of renunciation in the naturalization proceedings; yet in such a case it would be necessary to find his state

of mind at that time from his subsequent state of mind, as manifested by what he said. Many similar examples might be cited. The state of the respondent's mind at the time he was naturalized is, of course, a question of fact. If, instead of making the remarks which are relied upon by the government in this proceeding, he had then frankly stated that, at the time he received his certificate of naturalization, he reserved an allegiance to Germany, it could not be questioned that he had procured his certificate through fraud. The only difference between such a case and that actually presented is in the manner in which his state of mind thirty-five years ago is to be proved. In the one case the proof would be direct; in the other, it would rest on inference."

The foregoing is a just and righteous decision. It is inconceivable that a man who has acquired citizenship in good faith and who has enjoyed the blessings of that citizenship should not grow in a love and a devotion to the country and its liberties, but it is not inconceivable that a man should take an oath of allegiance and yet nullify that oath by a mental reservation and still "reconcile it to his conscience" when the country of his origin provides for and sanctions the preservation of original nationality. This proceeding should be followed by others of a similar nature. There should be a revocation of naturalization in every instance where it has been forfeited by traitorous, seditious or disloyal utterances or acts or by any form of mental reservation.

Second, the proceeding for the naturalization of an alien should be an adversary proceeding. Prior to the present act of 1906 the proceeding was in a sense judicial, being conducted in a court of record and made a matter of record therein, yet it was not in any sense an adversary proceeding. The alien applied for admission, made the necessary declaration, adduced the requisite proofs and renounced and abjured his foreign allegiance. He sought great political rights, but he was not required to make the government a party or to give any notice to its representatives. Under section 11 of the present act, the United States has the right to appear for the purpose of crossexamining the petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of his petition and has the right to call witnesses, produce evidence and be heard in opposition to the granting of naturalization. Now under this section the government has such an interest as entitles it to raise an issue upon an alien's application for admission to the privileges of citizenship and the right should be exercised in every instance. The writer does not mean to imply that the proceeding should be adversary in spirit. The nation cordially welcomes and admits to its citizenship aliens having the qualifications prescribed by law, but it restricts the privilege to those whose sentiments are compatible with a true allegiance to the government, and upon every application the government should be represented, not by an advocatus diaboli to urge every possible objection, but by a promotor fidei to expose imposition, dual citizenship heresy and past or present hostility to our form of government and to the principles of the constitution.

Third, the naturalization law should be amended to meet present conditions and especially so in respect to the German Empire in view of the Delbrueck law. It is the theory of this law that German nationality is not necessarily lost by transference of allegiance to a foreign state.