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CHAPTER VII.

SECONDARY FACULTIES.

Understanding.

THROUGH the faculty of Sense, and a consciousness of sensations, we have, as we have seen, intuitions of the qualities of external material substances; phenomena, such as are expressed by the terms extension, form, resistance, color, taste, smell, and sound. By Consciousness, we have similar intuitions of the operations of our own minds, such as thinking, feeling, and willing. Through Reason, on condition of the perceptions of Sense and Consciousness, we have the intuitions of time, space, personal identity, substance, and cause. These intuitions being given, another and secondary intellectual process occurs, a process, in which these intuitions, necessary and contingent, are united into notions of particular things. Thus, our notion of body, for example, is complex, and when analysed into its distinct elements, is found to be constituted exclusively of intuitions given by the faculties above referred to. We conceive of it as a substance, in which the qualities above named inhere, a substance existing in time and space, and sustaining certain relations to other substances, of which we have notions similarly compounded. The same holds true of our notions of all substances whatever. They are all complex, and constituted exclusively of intuitions given by the primary faculties.

A notion, then, is a complex intellectual phenomenon, composed of intuitions. The faculties, or functions of the Intelligence, which give us the latter, we have already considered. What shall we call that which gives us the former? In other words what shall we call the notion-forming power of the mind? In conformity to a usage which has, since the time of Coleridge, extensively obtained, we denominate

this faculty of the Intelligence, the Understanding. In strict conformity to this specific application, will the term Understanding, when special notice to the contrary is not given, be employed throughout this Treatise. It will be employed, not as Locke uses it, as designating the general Intelligence, but to designate a special function of that Intelligence, a function in which intuitions contingent and necessary, given by the primary faculties, are combined into notions or conceptions of particulur objects, or classes of objects.

Notions Particular and General.

Notions are of two kinds, particular and general. Particular notions are such as we form of individuals, and designate by terms which are applicable to such individuals only-such as John, Samuel. General notions appertain to classes of individuals, and are designated by terms of corresponding application, such as man, mountain. The formation of the notions last mentioned, will be considered in a subsequent Chapter.

ELEMENTS OF WHICH NOTIONS ARE CONSTITUTED.

The elements of which all notions are constituted, are, as we have seen, of two kinds-contingent and necessary. A proper philosophical analysis of notions would lead us to contemplate them in the light of these two distinct classes of elements.

Contingent Elements.

The contingent elements entering into every notion are all expressed by the general term phenomenon. Now, phenomena present themselves under the following entirely distinct relations.

1. That of inherence, or that which inheres in particular substances, irrespective of other substances. Thus whiteness, for example, inheres in snow, sweetness in sugar, and form belongs to all bodies. This class of phenomena we designate by the term quality.

2. That which results from the action and reaction of one substance upon another, or the phenomena of dependence. Thus, fluidity in metals results from the action of heat upon metallic substances. All such phenomena we designate by the term effect.

3. That relation of phenomena which results from the external connection of substances with one another, or the phenomena of coherence. Thus individuals sustain to each other the relations of employer and agent, physician and patient, teacher and pupil, &c.

4. The fourth class of phenomena may be denominated accidental. Thus the fact that an individual now existing, is born of a woman, constitutes an essential element of our conception of him as a man. But the fact that he was born in Paris instead of London, in France instead of America, is what is called an accidental element of our conception of him, because, such an element is not essential to our conception of him as a man.

5. The relation of phenomena pertaining to place. Thus, when any phenomena appears, we ask, where is it? If one individual, for example, who is ignorant of the facts, should hear others speaking of the Astor House, he would at once ask after its location. The particular place where the house is located, is a contingent element of our conception of it. The same holds true of all other substances.

6. Phenomena present themselves under one other relation still, that of antecedence, and succession. When any event is announced to us as having occurred, we ask the question, when did it occur? The answer to this question, that is, the particular time of the event, enters as a contingent element into our conceptions of it.

As far as my present investigations extend, the above present a complete enumeration of the contingent elements of all our notions. Whenever we contemplate an object, we always think of it in relation to what is intrinsic in the object, irrespective of other objects—to what we have witnessed in regard to the effects resulting from the action of other powers upon it, or from its action upon them to its external relations to other objects—to accidental circumstances connected with it-to the place where it is located, or its phenomena have appeared, and the time of such occurrences. I have hesitated considerably in respect to the question whether the last two classes should not be ranged under the fourth, and classed as accidents. To me, however, they appear sufficiently distinct to justify the arrangement above made.

Necessary Elements.

Of the necessary elements which enter into, and determine

the characteristics of all our notions, a complete enumeration, in the present state of mental science, is hardly to be expected. We may hope, however, to make an approach somewhat near to that result.

Substance and Cause the fundamental elements of all Notions. One fact, pertaining to this department of our inquiries is quite evident. It is this: The fundamental elements which enter into all our notions, and which, as laws of thought, determine the character of such phenomena, are two, substance and cause. If we make inquiries respecting any object for the purpose of perfecting our notions or conceptions of it, it is as substance or cause, that such object is contemplated. All our inquiries are but different forms in which these two ideas evolve themselves in the Intelligence.

Evolution of these Laws not Arbitrary.

A careful analysis will also convince us, that the forms in which these two laws of thought evolve themselves, are by no means arbitrary. On the other hand, their principles of evolution are perfectly fixed. Whenever we would make inquiries respecting substances or causes, for the purpose of perfecting our notions of them, we, on reflection, find that certain specific inquiries we do and must put, and that none others we can make. In the light of the answers obtained to such inquiries, are all our notions of substance and cause determined. An elucidation of these laws of thought, and as a consequence, an evolution of the direction of the Understanding in all legitimate inquiries after right notions of substances, constitutes one of the great problems in philosophy. A developement of these laws, in other words, of the Categories of the Understanding, will now be attempted. Whether that development shall be complete or incomplete, the result will determine.

Time and Space.

These are

I begin with the categories of time and space. entirely distinct from each other. As the same remarks, however, are equally applicable to each, I shall consider them together.

Whenever any substances or phenomena are thought of, two inquiries arise in respect to them, When and where do, or did they exist or occur? When we think of the world,

for example, we naturally raise the inquiries, When was it created? how long has it stood? what place does it occupy in the universe? So also when we think of any occurrence in, or on the earth, we raise inquiries precisely similar, to wit, When and where did they occur? The same holds true in respect to all objects of the Understanding. All substances, all causes, all phenomena are thought of in relation to time and space. The ideas of time and space, as laws of thought, enter into all our notions, or Understanding-conceptions.

ERRORS OF KANT.

1. In respect to the relation of Phenomena and Noumena to Time and Space.

Kant makes a distinction obviously correct, between the impressions which objects make upon us, and the causes of these impressions, or the objects themselves. The former he denominates phenomena. The latter, that is, what he regards as the unknown objects which produce impressions in us, he calls noumena. Now phenomena, he says, we necessarily conceive of, as in time and space. Noumena, on the other hand, have no such relation, indeed, no relation whatever, to either time or space. Here a great mistake of this profound analyzer of the human mind presents itself. Reason affirms absolutely, that noumena have as real a relation to time and space as phenomena do. Whatever is to

In the

us an object of thought, whether it be an object, as it exists in itself, or whether it be a phenomenon of such object, we do, and must, put the questions, When ?-how long?-and where?-in respect to it. Noumena, as well as phenomena, do and must have their locations in time and space. language of Dr. Murdoch, we may triumphantly ask, "How can physical effects be limited to time and space, and not also the physical causes which produce them? Can a material thing operate or produce effects, where it is not present to produce them? Or can Reason any more conceive, a priori, of a necessity for phenomena to exist only in time and space, than for noumena to exist in the same manner? If then, Reason decides a priori, or intuitively, that phenomena must so exist, does she not equally decide a priori, or intuitively, that noumena must so exist?". The overlooking of this obvious and undeniable fact, led this great philosopher to

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