pression is made on the Sensibility, or a sensation is excited, by the action of some object on the physical organization. In Consciousness, the mind not only apprehends the impression, but itself, as its subject, and not as its cause. For this reason, the mind is led to seek for the cause of the sensation out of itself. Hence the spontaneous apprehension of the object, and the direction of the organ of perception towards it. Thus it is, that we originally find ourselves and all things else, in Consciousness. If the phenomena of our minds were not originally given us, as objects of Consciousness, we could never know ourselves as the subjects of these phenomena. And if, when we know ourselves, as subjects of phenomena produced by external objects, we could not know that every phenomenon must have a cause, and that the cause of the particular phenomenon given, is not within ourselves, how could we be led to seek, and recognize that cause without ourselves?

Organs of Sense, and the knowledge conveyed by each.

In regard to the particular organs of Sense, of which five are commonly reckoned, to wit, sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, organs through which a knowledge of the particular qualities of material substances are conveyed to the mind, but little need be said. One remark, however, may be deemed of some importance. It is this. Each organ pertains exclusively to the particular quality or qualities which are the objects of that particular organ. The peculiar qualities given by sight, for example, are given by no other sense. The relation of objects, such as distance, which is a mere relation, and not a quality at all, we learn, by experience, to determine by various senses, as sight, touch, hearing, and smelling even in some instances. But the existence and

qualities of such objects are given, as causes and objects of particular sensations and perceptions in us, by each of the senses alike, each sense, or each organ of the general faculty giving the quality, or qualities, which are the objects of that particular organ.

Error of Dr. Brown.

Here a very palpable error of Dr. Brown deserves a passing observation. According to him, we derive a knowledge of external substances from one sense only, that of touch, or rather muscular action. "But for our previous belief of the

existence of a permanent and independent system of external things, acquired from other sources, we should have classed," he says, "the greater number of the feelings, which we now refer to Sense, among those which arise spontaneously in the Mind, without any cause external to the Mind itself." Thus, unless the muscular system had fortunately or unfortunately come in contact with some external or resisting cause, the Mind might have had a consciousness of the sensations of smell, taste, hearing, sight, and touch, without the idea of any cause whatever, without itself. Of one fact the Mind could not have been ignorant, to wit, that these phenomena must have been produced by some cause. Consciousness would have forbidden the supposition that the Mind itself was both the subject and cause of such phenomena. The only other supposition possible is the certain knowledge of a cause external to the Mind-a cause, the nature of which corresponds with the character of the phenomena of which the Mind is conscious. Further, the sensation produced by resistance is first given in Consciousness, as a simple phenomenon of which the Mind knows itself, not as the cause, but as the subject. If, while the Mind knows itself as the subject of that phenomenon, it could not know that it is not both subject and cause, it would never seek for the cause of this or of any other phenomenon out of itself.

Objects of Perception.

The objects of perception (external perception) are the qualities of material substances. The qualities perceived are resistance, extension, form, color, taste, smell, sound, &c. Such qualities are to us the index, and the only index we have, of their respective subjects. In the consciousness of thought, feeling, and mental determinations, we know ourselves as thinking, feeling, and acting beings. So in the experience of sensations and perceptions produced in us by external material substances, we know them as the powers which produce these perceptions and sensations; in other words, we know them as substances possessed of the qualities of resistance, extension, form, color, &c.

Common and Philosophic Doubts in respect to the comparative validity of the affirmations of Sense and Consciousness. While the mass of mankind appear to exercise more confidence, theoretically, in the testimony of Sense than in that

of Consciousness, the case seems, in many instances, to be reversed in respect to philosophers. The testimony of Consciousness the latter appear to regard as valid in respect to subjective, while that of Sense is not, in their estimation, equally so in respect to objective phenomena. Now the reason of the presence of these philosophic doubts, as Coleridge would call them, in the latter instance, and of their absence in the former, arises, as I suppose, from the fact that philosophers have attempted to explain the quo modo of external perception, and not that of internal. This is the very reason for the doubts under consideration, assigned by Coleridge himself. "As this," he says [to wit, the belief that there exist things without us], "on the one hand, originates neither in grounds nor arguments, and yet, on the other hand, remains proof against all attempts to remove it by grounds or arguments (ratura furca expellas tamen usque redebit); on the one hand, lays claim to IMMEDIATE certainty as a position at once indemonstrable and irresistible; and yet, on the other hand, inasmuch as it refers to something essentially different from ourselves, nay, even in opposition to ourselves, leaves it inconceivable how it could possibly become a part of our immediate Consciousness (in other words, how that which is ex hypothesi continues intrinsic and alien to our being); the philsopher, therefore, compels himself to treat this faith as nothing more than a prejudice, innate indeed and connatural, but still a prejudice." Now why does this philosopher compel himself to treat as a groundless prejudice and an untruth that which himself acknowledges to be an innate, connatural belief, an irresistible affirmation of his own and of the universal Intelligence? Simply because he cannot explain the quo modo of external perception-cannot see how an object not ourselves, and wholly unlike ourselves, as matter is universally conceived to be, should be to us an object of knowledge. If that is a reason why we should compel ourselves to treat as false what we know to be true, it should certainly induce us to treat his theory as equally false. For how can we explain the manner in which that which is intrinsic and a part of ourselves, should be presented to us, by our Intelligence, as wholly extrinsic and foreign, and even opposed to ourselves-how it can present that which is exclusively subjective, as wholly objective—that which is purely spiritual, as wholly material-that, in short, which is "without form and void," as possessed of a definite

form? The quo modo of knowledge, according to this last theory, would be found quite as difficult of explanation as in conformity to any other whatever.

Let us now suppose that philosophers should undertake to explain the quo modo of knowledge by Consciousness. How, for example, can I perceive and attend to an object external to myself, and yet have, at the same time, a consciousness equally distinct of the act of perception itself? Suppose they should attempt to explain such mysterious acts of the Intelligence as these, and at the same time compel themselves to treat as a prejudice all mental affirmations, the mode of origination of which they cannot explain, would not their philosophic doubts be quite as strong in respect to the validity of Consciousness, as with regard to that of any other function of the Intelligence?

The Province of Philosophy.

Philosophy, it should be borne in mind, has to do with facts as they are, with the nature of the powers revealed in those facts, and with the laws in conformity to which those powers act. With the mode of their action further than

this, it has nothing to do. In the fall of heavy bodies to the earth, for example, we learn that attraction is a property of all material substances. We then set ourselves to determine the law which controls the action of this property. Here we are within the legitimate domain of philosophy. But suppose we attempt to explain the mode in which the attractive power acts. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for us. It is high, we cannot attain unto it." Philosophy, well satisfied with her own legitimate and wide domain, resigns such things to the Eternal One, who created all the powers of the universe, and consequently understands the mode of their action. All that philosophy can say in regard to the mode of action of any power is, that such is its nature. Comparative validity of the affirmations, of Sense and Con

sciousness.

We are now prepared to contemplate the comparative validity of the affirmations of these two functions of the Intelligence, Sense and Consciousness. I will suppose that I have a perception of some external object, as possessed of the qualities of extension, form, and color. In Consciousness I recognize the existence of this perception as a phenomenon

of my own mind. Which of these affirmations are, in reality, the most valid, and which would a wise and sound philosophy impel me to esteem and treat as such-the affirmation of Sense, in respect to the qualities of the external object, or of Consciousness, in regard to the existence and character of the affirmation of the former faculty, as a phenomenon of the Mind itself? Neither, surely. Each faculty pertains alike to its object, by direct and immediate intuition. The affirmation of each is alike positive and absolute in respect to its object. The action of one is, in reality, no more a mystery than that of the other. The quo modo of the action of each is alike inexplicable, and no more inexplicable than the mode of action of every other power in existence. It is a sage remark of Dr. Brown, when speaking of the mode in which causes produce their respective effects, that" everything is mysterious, or nothing is." When philosophy leads us to doubt the real affirmations of any faculty of the Intelligence, then philosophy itself becomes impossible, and the attempt to realize it, the perfection of absurdity.

Theory of External Perception.

The way is now prepared for an enunciation of the theory of external perception, taught in this Treatise. Knowledge implies two things; an object to be known, and a subject capa-* ble of knowing. Between the nature of the subject and object there must be such a mutual correlation, that, when certain conditions are fulfilled, knowledge arises, as a necessary result of this correlation. Between matter and mind this correlation exists. The latter knows the former, because the one is a faculty, and the other an object of knowledge. Mind perceives the qualities of matter, because the former has the power of perception, and the latter is an object of perception.

Mind also exists in a tri-unity, consisting, as we have seen, of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will. To each of these departments of our nature, the external world is correlated. Certain conditions being fulfilled, particular qualities of material substances become to the Intelligence, direct objects of knowledge. Other conditions being fulfilled, they affect our Sensibility, producing in us certain sensations either pleasurable, painful, or indifferent. Our Will then acts upon these substances, controlling their movements, and modify