reason, why we should rest with less assurance in the truth of that of which we are conscious, than in that which is perceived and affirmed by the external senses?

The visionary speculations, and dreamy theories of many of the most distinguished mental philosophers of ancient and modern times, has no doubt contributed (and rightly, too, if mad speculations are the legitimate results of the principles of the science), to the impression on the minds of many, that the Scotchman's definition of Metaphysics must be the true one, to wit: "Metaphysics is, when he that is listening dinna ken what he that is speaking means, and he that is speaking dinna ken what he means himself." It should be borne in mind, however, that up to the time of Bacon, a remark precisely similar would have been equally applicable to the speculations of natural philosophers; and that while the principles of physical science have, since that period, been settled upon the right foundation, the true method in mental science is of comparatively recent development. I will here drop the suggestion, whether posterity will not regard itself as almost as much indebted to Victor Cousin for the annunciation of the true method in mental science, as to Bacon for announcing the same in respect to physical? Mental philosophy, just emerging from the darkness of ages, seems now to have gained the high road to truth, with its laws of investigation correctly settled. If we would make sure and rapid progress, two things are indispensable-that we enter upon our investigations with implicit confidence in the validity of the facts of Consciousness, as the basis of the science of mind—and that we adhere with equally assured confidence to all conclusions to which those facts legitimately conduct

us.

Consciousness, a distinct function or faculty of the Intellect. We are now prepared to answer the question, whether Consciousness is a distinct function, or faculty of the Intelligence? All philosophers, when speaking of it, without reference to any pre-formed theory, agree in speaking of it, as a function as distinct and real as any other, Sense and Reason, for example. Yet, by some, the fact that it is such a faculty has been denied. Consciousness, says the translator of Cousin's Psychology, "is not to be confounded either with the Sensibility (external nor internal) nor with the Understanding, nor with the Will; neither is it a distinct and

special faculty of the Mind; nor is it the principle of any of the faculties; nor is it, on the other hand, the product of them." It would be somewhat difficult, after so many negations, to put anything very positive into a definition of the subject. Yet the learned author has himself given to this something a "local habitation and a name." "Consciousness," he says, "is a witness of our thoughts and volitions." Now as this witness has a special function distinct from every other function of the Intelligence, ought we not to conclude that it is a special faculty of that Intelligence?

The act of knowing also implies the power of knowledge. A knowledge unlike all other knowledges, implies a special faculty of knowledge, a faculty distinct from every other. Is not the knowledge obtained by Consciousness, thus distinct from all other knowledges? Does it not, therefore, imply a special faculty distinct from every other function of the Intelligence?

Consciousness also, must be a special faculty, or it must be a peculiar function of some other faculty, or of the whole together. From Sense and Reason, it is as clearly distinguishable, as either of those is from the other. No one will pretend, that it is a special function of any of the secondary faculties hereafter to be named, nor of all the Intellectual faculties together. What shall we regard it then but a special function of the Intelligence?

One other consideration which I present, is, as it appears to me, quite decisive of the question under consideration. The exercise of Consciousness is dependent on the Will, in the same sense, that that of the other special functions of the Intelligence is. When, for example, an external object makes an impression upon one or more of the organs of Sense through this faculty, there is an instant and spontaneous apprehension of the cause of that impression. Before that cause is distinctly perceived, however, the perceptive faculty must, by a voluntary act of attention, be directed particularly to the object. The specific control which the Will thus exercises over this faculty, clearly indicates it, as a special function of the Intelligence. Now a relation precisely similar, as shown above, in respect to its spontaneous, and reflective determinations, does the Will exercise over Consciousness. We have the same evidence that it is a special faculty, or . function of the Intelligence, that we have that Sense is.

Theory of Dr. Brown.

I will close my remarks upon the subject of Consciousness, by a reference to the theory of Dr. Brown in respect to it. Consciousness, according to this philosopher, is simply a general term expressive of all the phenomena or states of the mind. "Sensation," he says, for example, "is not an object of Consciousness differing from itself, but a particular sensation is the consciousness of the moment, as a particular hope, or fear, or grief, or resentment, or simple remembrance, may be the actual consciousness of the next moment."

A single example will fully demonstrate the incorrectness of this theory. I affirm (what is actually true), to myself, or some other individual, that I am in pain. This affirmation implies three things-the existence of the feeling as a state of the Sensibility-an apprehension of pain in general, together with that of the particular feeling referred to-and a reference of that feeling to myself as the subject, this apprehension and reference being exclusively states of the Intelligence. Now this knowledge of the feeling under consideration, with its reference to myself as the subject, is an act of Consciousness; an exercise of the Intelligence which accompanies all mental states, and which differs as much from sensation, or any other state of the Sensibility, as thought differs from such states. Sensation then is an object of Consciousness differing from itself. The same holds true in respect to all mental exercises. The state itself is one thing. The knowledge of that state, and reference of it to ourselves is quite another. This last exercise of the Intelligence is Consciousness, an exercise as distinct from the state of which it takes cognizance, as that state is from the object which causes it.

CHAPTER VI.

SENSE.

SENSE has been defined, as that faculty or function of the Intelligence, by which we apprehend the phenomena, or qualities, of external, material substances.

To be distinguished from Sensation.

The exercise of this faculty should be carefully distinguished from those states of the Sensibility which always accompany it, but which are, notwithstanding, none the less, for that reason, distinct from it, to wit, sensation. Sensation is the state of the Sensibility which immediately succeeds any impression made upon our physical organization, by some material substance. In the exercise of the faculty of Sense, the Intelligence apprehends the object, or the quality in the object, which caused the sensation. Sensation is exclusively a state of the Sensibility. Sense is no less exclusively a function of the Intelligence. Of these distinctions we should never lose sight, when reasoning upon this department of mental science.

Spontaneous and voluntary determination of Sense.

Sense, like Consciousness, is, in its primitive developments, a simple spontaniety of the Intelligence. Its action, in this state, is, in no sense, conditioned on the Will. Perception, in its distinct forms, is conditioned on attention, which is nothing but the perceptive faculty, directed by the Will; and hence, for the want of a better term or phrase, called the Voluntary determination of the faculty. Attention, in the direction of Consciousness-that is, when directed to mental

phenomena is called reflection. When in the direction of the faculty of external perception-that is, towards the phenomena of material substances—it is called observation.

The necessity of observation, that is, of attention, in the voluntary direction of the perceptive faculty towards phenomena obscurely given in the spontaneous developments of that faculty, may be readily illustrated. A portion of a congregation, for example, who have been listening to a certain speaker, have fallen into a state of slumber. The speaker suddenly stops, and immediately all are aroused. Now, if the audience had not, in some form, heard the voice which broke upon their ears, why were they aroused? Yet, if inquired of, in respect to what had been spoken to them, they would, for the obvious and exclusive reason, that they had not attended to it, be wholly unable to answer. How often do we hear the remark, I gained no distinct conception of that part of a discourse. My attention happened, at the time, to be directed to something else.

The attention may, in some instances, be so fixed upon some object in one direction, that the Sensibility and Intelligence both may be almost, if not quite, totally isolated from what would otherwise deeply affect us in another direction. A gentleman, for example, who was employed about the machinery in a factory, had one of his fingers entirely cut off, by the sudden and unexpected starting of a portion of that machinery which carried, with great velocity, a circular saw. So intensely did his attention instantly become occupied with the prevention of the destruction of the whole machinery, that he was not aware of the injury done to his own person, nor was he sensible of the least pain from it, till the accident was pointed out to him by another who stood by. As soon, however, as the injury was discovered, the pain from it became intense.

The basis of attention is the spontaneous action of the Sensibility and Intelligence-action which always occurs, when the proper conditions are fulfilled, and when the mind is not isolated from objects in other directions, by its intense action upon some object, (as in the case above cited) in some specific direction.

Mental process in Perception.

The process of the mind, in the perception of external objects, is doubtless originally something like this. An im