with. Such a fact marks the doctrine of future retributions, as one of the primary intuitions of universal Reason.

2. All our ideas of moral fitness are met in this doctrine, and are perfectly reversed by every other hypothesis. No individual can contemplate a life of self-sacrificing virtue, and of flagrant wickedness and crime unattended with repentance, as terminating in the same condition hereafter, and retain his sentiments of moral esteem for the "Judge of all the earth." Every individual does as fatal violence to his moral nature, who entertains the sentiment, that God does not, in eternity, hold deserved retributions in readiness for the virtuous and vicious, as the man does who denies the soul's Immortality. I feel perfectly safe in venturing the affirmation, that there is not an individual on earth, who holds that God has prepared the same rewards hereafter for the virtuous or the vicious here, that does, or can, in the depths of his own mind, entertain feelings of esteem and reverence, and is inspired with feelings of delight and praise, for the Eternal One.

3. I mention one other very decisive fact bearing upon this question. Every observer of the facts that lie all around him in the universe, cannot have failed to notice an invariable tendency, common to the practice of both virtue and vice; it is a tendency to changeless fixedness of character in the one specific direction in which an individual accustoms himself to act. Now, what does such an unvarying and universal fact indicate, in respect to the character of the future destiny of moral agents? Certainly this, and this only, that the moral universe is advancing, not only in the line of immortal existence, but to a state of fixed and changeless moral retributions. What other convictions do such considerations tend to impress upon the mind of all who seriously throw their thoughts upon the eternal future before them? How thoughtfully, then, does it become us to walk along the borders of that " undiscovered country," across whose bourne we are so soon to pass.

CHAPTER XXI I.

THE IDEA OF GOD.

WE come now to a consideration of the last and most important subject to be investigated in the present Treatisethe idea of God. In the remarks which I shall make upon this subject, I shall take for granted two important facts:

1. That there are, in the universe around us, two orders of existences-matter and spirit.

2. That there is in our minds the idea of a Being of infinite perfections, who sustains to all conditional existences the relation of an unconditioned and absolute cause. We not only conceive of such a being as possible, but really existing. This may be assumed as the conviction of the race; at least, wherever the Intelligence exists in any considerable degree of development. My object in the present chapter is to elucidate the ground of this conviction.

Preliminary Considerations.

In the commencement of my remarks upon this subject, special attention is invited to the following preliminary considerations:

1. The idea of God, like that of Immortality, is in all minds in whom Reason is in any considerable degree developed. This will be admitted by all who are at all acquainted with the history of the race. The idea of God is a common phenomenon of the universal Intelligence.

2. Like the doctrine above named, it is not in the mind as the result of logical deduction: yet it is there with such weight of conviction, that every one feels that he involves himself in infinite guilt, in denying, or entertaining a doubt of its objective validity. This is evident from the fact, that every sceptic, in the depths of his own mind, believes that,

if there is a God, he has forfeited His eternal favor in the denial of His existence, a fact most clearly indicating the consciousness, that in doubting, instead of adoring and worshipping, he has done fatal violence to the laws of his own being.

3. This idea is in the mind with such weight of conviction, as to be apparently incapable of increase or diminution from any process of logical deduction. It may be doubted whether all the proposed demonstrations of the past and present century, have added any considerable weight to the conviction already existing upon the mind, of the reality of the Divine. existence. Nor have all professed arguments to the contrary, erased this conviction from the mind of the sceptic himself; a fact fully evident from the force with which the consciousness of the fearful reality often leaps upon such minds, in moments of solemn thought, or of sudden calamities, or unexpected exposure to death.

4. As this conviction is not in the mind, as the result of logical deduction, it must be ranked among the primary intentions or principles of Reason; primary, as opposed to convictions resulting from processes of reasoning.

5. As a first truth of Reason, the Divine existence is susceptible, in the first instance, of the kind of proof common to all first truths, and in the second, of that which is peculiar to all necessary intuitions. In the light of the above observations, we will now proceed to a consideration of the ground of the universal conviction of the reality of the Divine existtence.

There are two fundamental forms in which the idea of God is developed in the human Intelligence, to wit. God the unconditioned and absolute cause of all that conditionally exists, and God the Infinite and Perfect. I design to consider this subject in each of these forms.

GOD THE UNCONDITIONED AND ABSOLUTE CAUSE OF ALL THAT CONDITIONALLY EXISTS.

The ground of the belief of the existence of God, considered as the cause, unconditioned and absolute, of all that conditionally exists, that is, of all things whose existence can be conceived of only on the condition of admitting the reality of something else as the condition and cause of their existence, the ground, I say, of the convictions of the reality of

the existence of God, contemplated in this light, is simply the apprehension of the reality of the conditioned. The reality of a cause unconditioned and absolute of all that exists conditionally follows, as the logical antecedent, of the conception of the conditioned. This is evident from the fact, that we can no more conceive of the opposite as true, that is, that something conditioned may exist, without a cause unconditioned and absolute, than we can conceive of an event without a cause. Indeed the principle that the conditioned supposes the unconditioned as its logical antecedent, is only one form of announcing the principle of causality. These two principles, which in reality are not two but one, must stand or fall together. The reality of the Divine existence therefore, contemplating God as the cause, unconditioned and absolute of all that conditionally exists, is just as evident as the principle of causality, to wit, the proposition that no event exists without a cause. The conditioned, as a matter of fact, does exist. This we know absolutely from Consciousness. Our mental states, as well as our own existence and that of the reality and condition of the external world, we necessarily conceive of, as conditioned. God, the unconditioned and absolute cause, therefore, must be. It is impossible even to conceive of the opposite, any more than we can conceive of body without space, succession without time, an event without a cause, or phenomena without substance. No individual does or can, in thought, deny the reality of something conditioned, that is, of something caused by something else. It is impossible therefore even to conceive the non-reality of a cause, unconditioned and absolute, of that which we necessarily conceive of as conditioned.

This Principle holds, whether the conditioned be conceived of as finite or infinite.

The principle under consideration holds, in whatever light the conditioned may be contemplated, whether as finite, or infinite. Let X represent the conditioned. Now if every element in X be conceived of as conditioned, that is, depending upon something out of itself, as its cause, the whole of X must depend upon something unconditioned and absolute, out of itself. Even to conceive of the opposite is an absolute impossibility. The idea of God, therefore, contemplating him as the cause, unconditioned and absolute, of all that exists conditionally, is an idea absolutely universal and neces

sary.

LOGICAL CONSEQUENTS OF THE PRINCIPLE ABOVE ELUCIDATED.

Now all that will follow as the logical consequents of the form of the idea of God above elucidated, must be true of him. One inquiry of fundamental importance with the philosopher and theologian is, What are these consequents? To a consideration of some of them, special attention is now invited. What, then, are the attributes which we necessarily ascribe to God, contemplated as the cause, unconditioned and absolute, of all that conditionally exists, and in view of the character of his works, contemplating him as such a cause? Among these, I specify the following:

Eternity.

As such a cause, God must be eternal in his existence. If his existence is not from eternity, then it is an effect of some other cause, and God would not be the cause unconditioned and absolute of all that conditionally exists.

Freedom as opposed to Necessity.

God, as the cause unconditioned and absolute, is a free, and not a necessary cause. This is absolutely evident from the fact, that the effects of the Divine agency are in time, and not in eternity. A cause that acts of necessity must act, and act to the full extent of its power, as soon as it does exist. If we suppose a necessary cause to exist from eternity, the effects of its action must also be eternal. To suppose the opposite, would be to suppose that a cause did exist from eternity, which must act as soon as it exists, and yet that through the eternity of the past, it did not act at all. The commencement of its action in time, therefore, would not only be unaccountable, but inconceivable. If the human race, the world of mind around us, had their origin in a necessary and not a free cause, their existence would be from eternity, and not have commenced in time. It did commence in time. God, then, the unconditioned and absolute cause of their existence, is a free, and not a necessary cause. This conclusion follows of necessity. Further, to suppose God to be a cause unconditioned and absolute, and yet that he is a necessary and not a free agent, is a palpable contradiction. What is a necessary cause? It is a cause which can act, only as it is acted upon by something out of itself, a something which