There may be selection, but not choice; nor can there be selection such as implies the action of Free Will. (2.) None of the phenomena of brute action necessarily suppose the presence of Free Will in the subject. All such phenomena are just as explicable on the opposite hypothesis as on this. Now a power is never to be supposed, when its presence is not affirmed by positive facts, or necessarily supposed by the known sphere of the subject. No such considerations demand the assumption of Free Will in the brute. Such an assumption therefore is wholly illogical. (3.) All the phenomena of brute action clearly indicate the absence of the power under consideration. Place the brute in any circumstances whatever, and there let particular sensations be generated in him, and his action will be just as fixed and uniform, as that of any mechanical process whatever. As often as the experiment is repeated, it will invariably be attended with the same results. With such facts. before us, how illogical the assumption of Free Will in the brute. (4.) Such a power as that under consideration would be a totally useless appendage to the brute, contemplating him in reference to the sphere for which he is designed. When the intellectual faculties above named are denied him, what a useless appendage to the brute, and how worse than useless to man, in respect to the use to be made of the animal, would such an appendage as Free Will be. The creation of such a power, under such circumstances, would be a wide departure from all the manifestations of wisdom visible in all the divine works beside. (5.) Finally, the power under consideration constitutes one of the most essential elements of the Divine image in which man was created. Why should we suppose an element so fundamental in that image to exist in a creature, in whom all the other elements are totally wanting, and that without any solid basis for that conclusion? Thus, by the most logical deductions, we have determined the powers of the brute, as distinguished from those of man. Taking from the former, what fundamental phenomena require us to do, to wit, the powers of Reason, Self-Consciousness, Understanding, Judgment, Imagination, and Free Will, we leave him with the powers of external perception, with a sensibility, and physical organization, of such a nature, that under the varied circumstances of his being, his action is in necessary harmony with the ends for which the all-wise Creator designed him. All the phenomena of brute action can be accounted for on this hypothesis, and its truth is also affirmed by fundamental phenomena. In this lower creation man stands alone. There is nothing like him "in the heavens above, nor in the earth beneath, nor in the waters under the earth." There he stands, "the image and glory of God." Fallen though he is, "his form has yet not lost Of glory obscured." General Remarks. 1. We are now prepared to explain the ground of the misjudgment so common in respect to the action of the brute. Men judge of brute action in the light of their own consciousness, pertaining to similar actions in themselves. When men and brutes are placed in similar circumstances, and the external actions of both are similar, men often conclude that the brute acts in view of the same conceptions and judgments, in view of which they are conscious of acting themselves. Now such conclusions are wholly unauthorized. The external manifestations of instinctive and rational Intelligence may be, in many important respects, similar, yet there may be a total dissimilarity in the nature of these different kinds of Intelligence. 2. We are also prepared to state the conclusion which the facts connected with brute Intelligence force upon us. It is one of these two: Either the Intelligence of the brute is incomparably more perfect than that of man, or, aside from the power of external perception, he has no Intelligence at all, such as man possesses. The first manifestations of Intelligence in man, how imperfect and feeble! How rude and ill-shaped, for example, the first habitations built by man! How slow the progress of human architecture from such rude beginnings to its present perfection! On the other hand, the first production of the brute bears the stamp of perfection. The first dam built by the beaver, the first nest built by the bird, have never been surpassed. The first cell built by the bee can hardly be improved, even in thought. Now suppose that such actions of the brute are, as is the case with man, the result of the carrying out of an idea, a plan, previously developed in his Intelligence, what must we conclude? Why, that the first race of brutes that ever appeared on earth, had a degree of Intelligence which man, after six thousand years of laborious progress, has hardly reached. This or the opposite one forces itself upon us. A 3. Another consideration to which I would direct attention is this the facts on which the conclusions of individuals have been based, in respect to the existence of the higher powers of Intelligence in the brute, as contrasted with others in the same connection, which have been totally overlooked. distinguished naturalist, for example, states that the wild ass, when he begins to flee from a man, will first turn one ear, and then the other, backwards towards the object of his terror. From this fact, he concludes that the animal is deliberating what course he shall take; and, as a consequence, attributes to it the possession of the powers of deliberation and Free Will. A grave conclusion, surely, to infer from the leering of an ass, the existence of such powers. How often have the actions of the elephant been proclaimed, as proof of the existence of the higher powers of Intelligence in that animal? Now let us contemplate another class of facts in connection with the same animal. Those who have visited menageries are familiar with the dancing of the animal at the "sound of the lyre," actions as indicative of superior Intelligence as any he ever puts forth. How was the creature taught such an act? Did he take lessons, as men do, and thus acquire it? It was by a process very different from this. When the keepers wish to have the animal acquire the art under consideration, they place him upon a floor covered with plates of iron. These plates are gradually heated till the creature, beginning to feel pain in his feet from the heat, lifts first one foot and then the other. As soon as such motions begin, the music commences, which is made to become more and more lively as the animal steps with greater and greater rapidity. When this process has been continued for a sufficient length of time, the music ceases, and the animal is instantly taken from his painful condition. These experiments being repeated a few times, such an association is established between the sound of the lyre, and the Sensibility of the animal, that as soon as he hears the music he begins to dance, and continues the pace till the music ceases. Thus we have the elephant dancing in his wisdom, as many suppose. Now had the animal the real Intelligence possessed by any individual of our race, who is in any degree removed above absolute idiocy, such an imposition could not be practised upon him for a single hour. The actions of the creature, in this case, in conformity to Intelligence, are not, as all perceive, a manifestation of Intelligence in him, but in the keeper. So whatever Intelligence the animal manifests in any instance, is not an indication of Intelligence in him, but in the Creator. The same is true of all other animals. 4. The form in which memory exists in brutes, may now be readily pointed out. Memory, in man, is the recalling of the fact that we were, in particular circumstances, the subjects of such and such thoughts, feelings, &c. In the brute no such recollections can occur. When the brute has been affected in a given manner, in given circumstances, the same sensations are reproduced in him when he comes into similar circumstances again, and hence the same actions are repeated. 5. Finally, we notice the error of some who attempt to account for the diversities of intellectual manifestations between men and brutes, on the ground of diversities of phrenological development. To suppose that the soul of a dog, if placed in connection with the brain of a Newton, would manifest the Intelligence of that great philosopher, is as illogical as to suppose that gold and water will exhibit the same phenomena, when subject to the same influences. The manifestations of substances diverse in their nature will, under the same circumstances, be as diverse as their nature. The brute, in any circumstances, is still a brute, and not a man, nor an angel. Diversities of phrenological development may account for the diverse intellectual manifestations among men; but not for those between man and the brute, The brute must become another being, before he can manifest the intelligence of man. CHAPTER XX. MATTER AND SPIRIT. Principle on which the Argument is based. ALL reasoning which is legitimate, in respect to the nature of any substances, is based upon the intuition that substances really are, as their phenomena; that substances, all of whose phenomena are totally different, are totally diverse in their nature; and that, as far as the fundamental phenomena of any two substances differ, so far is there a corresponding difference in the nature of the substances themselves. Two substances are presented to our Intelligence, as the objects of our present inquiries, matter and spirit. The question is, Are these substances, in their nature, fundamentally diverse, or are they identical? The Soul, how revealed to itself. The principle which reveals the soul to itself, is the principle of substance; the principle of our nature, or law of Reason, by which we affirm that every quality supposes a subject, a substance, a real being, or existence. The unity and identity of the soul is revealed to us by that law of our Intelligence, by which all the phenomena of Memory and Consciousness are necessarily referred to one and the same subject, the I of Consciousness. All the phenomena of the mind, both past and present, are given in Consciousness, not as mere facts, but as affirmations, as propositions, I think, I feel, I purpose or will, or I did think, feel, or will. This I, the subject of these phenomena, the mind necessarily conceives of as a unity, as remaining one and the same amid the ever changing phenomena which it exhibits. |