CHAPTER XIX.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF MAN, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT OF THE BRUTE.

Ir has been very common with philosophers to represent all created existences, from the highest Intelligences in heaven to the crude forms of matter, as successive links in one great chain, each link in the chain, commencing with the lowest, differing mainly in degree from that which immediately succeeds it. The highest forms of brute, and the lowest of rational Intelligence, for example, differ, it is asserted, not in kind, but only in degree. Of late, the reality of orders of existences, as successive links of a great chain, has come to be seriously doubted. The intelligence of man and the brute, it is said, differs not in degree, but in kind. If we conceive of the highest forms of brute intelligence increased to any degree whatever, as far as degree is concerned, still it makes no approach at all to real rationality. The different orders of brute instincts do constitute, it is thought, different links of one chain. Those of rational Intelligences constitute another and totally different chain, a chain none of the links of which are connected, in any form, with any of those of the other. This last is the opinion entertained by the author of this Treatise. I will now proceed to state the grounds of this opinion. I will introduce what I have to say upon this subject by two extracts, somewhat lengthy, from Coleridge. In the first, we have a classification of the different forms of brute Instinct; in the second, we are presented with two instances of Instinctive Intelligence, in their highest manifestations.

Brute Instincts classified.

"It is evident that the definition of a genus or class is an

adequate definition only of the lowest species of that genus: for each higher species is distinguished from the lower by some additional character, while the general definition includes only the characters common to all the species. Consequently it describes the lowest only. Now I distinguish a genus or kind of powers under the name of adaptive power, and give, as its generic definition, the power of selecting and adapting means to proximate ends; and as an instance of the lowest species of this genus, I take the stomach of a caterpillar. I ask myself, under what words I can generalize the action of this organ; and I see that it selects and adapts the appropriate means (i. e. the assimilable part of the vegetable congesta) to the proximate end, i. e. the growth or reproduction of the insect's body. This we call VITAL POWER, or vita propria of the stomach; and this being the lowest species, its definition is the same with the definition of the kind.

"Well, from the power of the stomach I pass to the power exerted by the whole animal. I trace it wandering from spot to spot, and plant to plant, till it finds the appropriate vegetable; and again on this chosen vegetable, I mark it seeking out and fixing on the part of the plant, bark, leaf, or petal, suited to its nourishment; or (should the animal have assumed the butterfly form), to the deposition of its eggs, and the sustentation of the future larva. Here I see a power of selecting and adapting means to proximate ends according to circumstances. And this higher species of adaptive power we call INSTINCT.

"Lastly, I reflect on the facts narrated and described in the succeeding extracts from Huber, and see a power of selecting the proper means to the proximate ends, according to varying circumstances. And what shall we call this yet higher species? We name the former, Instinct; we must call this INSTINCTIVE INTELLIGENCE.

"Here then we have three powers of the same kind, Life, Instinct, and Instinctive Intelligence; the essential characters that define the genus existing in all three. But in addition to these, I find one other character common to the highest and lowest, viz.: that the purposes are all manifestly pre-determined by the peculiar organization of the animals; and though it may not be possible to discover any such immediate dependency in all the actions, yet the actions being determined by the purposes, the result is equivalent: and

both the actions and purposes are all in a necessitated reference to the preservation and continuance of that particular animal or of the progeny. There is a selection, but not choice-volition rather than Will. The possible knowledge of a thing, or the desire to have the thing representable by a distinct correspondent thought, does not, in the animal, suffice to render the thing an object, or the ground of a purpose. I select and adapt the proper means to the separation of a stone from a rock, which I neither can, nor desire to make use of for food, shelter or ornament: because, perhaps, I wish to measure the angles of its primary crystals, or, perhaps, for no better reason than the apparent difficulty of loosening the stone-stat pro ratione voluntas-and thus make a motive out of the absence of all motive, and a reason out of the arbitrary will to act without any reason."

Manifestations of Instinctive Intelligence.

"Huber put a dozen humble-bees under a bell-glass along with a comb of about ten cocoons, so unequal in height as not to be capable of standing steadily. To remedy this, two or three of the humble-bees got upon the comb, stretched themselves over its edge, and with their heads downwards fixed their fore feet on the table on which the comb stood, and so with their hind feet kept the comb from falling. When these were weary others took their places. In this constrained and painful posture, fresh bees relieving their comrades at intervals, and each working in its turn, did these affectionate little insects support the comb for nearly three days, at the end of which they had prepared sufficient wax to build pillars with. But these pillars having accidentally got displaced, the bees had recourse again to the same manœuvre (or rather pedœuvre), till Huber pitying their hard case, &c.

"I shall at present describe the operations of a single ant that I observed sufficiently long to satisfy my curiosity.

"One rainy day, I observed a laborer digging the ground near the aperture which gave entrance to the ant-hill. It placed in a heap the several fragments it had scraped up, and formed them into small pellets, which it deposited here and there upon the nest. It returned constantly to the same place, and appeared to have a marked design, for it labored with ardor and perseverance. I remarked a slight furrow, excavated in the ground in a straight line, representing the

plan of a path or gallery. The laborer, the whole of whose movements fell under my immediate observation, gave it greater depth and breadth, and cleared out its borders: and I saw at length, in which I could not be deceived, that it had the intention of establishing an avenue which was to lead from one of the stories to the under-ground chambers. This path, which was about two or three inches in length, and formed by a single ant, was opened above and bordered on each side by a buttress of earth; its concavity en forme de gouttière was of the most perfect regularity, for the architect had not left an atom too much. The work of this ant was so well followed and understood, that I could almost to a certainty guess its next proceeding, and the very fragment it was about to remove. At the side of the opening where this path terminated, was a second opening to which it was necessary to arrive by some road. The same ant engaged in and executed alone this undertaking. It furrowed out and

opened another path, parallel to the first, leaving between each a little wall of three or four lines in height. Those ants who lay the foundation of a wall, a chamber or gallery, from working separately, occasion now and then a want of coincidence in the parts of the same or different objects. Such examples are of no unfrequent occurrence, but they by no means embarrass them. What follows proves that the workman, on discovering his error, knew how to rectify it. A wall had been erected with the view of sustaining a vaulted ceiling, still incomplete, that had been projected from the wall of the opposite chamber. The workman who began constructing it, had given it too little elevation to meet the opposite partition upon which it was to rest. Had it been continued on the original plan, it must infallibly have met the wall at about one half of its height, and this it was necessary to avoid. This state of things very forcibly claimed my attention, when one of the ants arriving at the place, and visiting the works, appeared to be struck by the difficulty which presented itself; but this it as soon obviated, by taking down the ceiling and raising the wall upon which it reposed. It then, in my presence, constructed a new ceiling with the fragments of the former one.""-Huber's Nat. Hist. of Ants. The facts above cited, every one will acknowledge, may be assumed as representing Instinctive Intelligence, in its highest form. The question to be settled is, In what respects

is this like rationality, as it exists in man? In what respects do these forms of Intelligence agree, and disagree?

Principle on which the Argument is based.

In conducting our inquiries on this subject, the first thing to be settled is, the principle on which our conclusions shall be based. On all hands it is agreed, that there are points of resemblance between the manifestations of Intelligence in the brute and among mankind. At the same time, there are points of dissimilarity equally manifest and important. Now let A represent the mental phenomena which appear in man, and never appear in the brute. If we can find the power or powers in man from which the phenomena represented by A result, we have then determined fully the faculties which man possesses and the brute wants. The faculties thus asserted of man, are to be wholly denied of the brute, and all the manifestations of brute intelligence are to be accounted for by a reference to what remains, after the former have been subtracted. All must admit, that this is the true and the only true principle to be applied in the case. It now remains to apply the principle to the solution of the question before us.

Points of Resemblance between the Man and the Brute.

That brutes, such as are supposed in the present argument, possess the faculty of external perception, such as sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, that such perceptions are followed by feelings of a given character, and that these feelings are followed by external actions which are correlated to the perceptions referred to, and that all these manifestations are common to man and the brute both, will be denied by none who have, however carelessly, observed the facts which have presented themselves to his notice. Such are the phenomena common to man and the brute.

Hypotheses on which these common Facts may be explained. There are two distinct and opposite hypotheses on which these common facts may be explained. When man has an external perception, Reason at once suggests certain fundamental ideas in the light of which he explains to himself the phenomena perceived, and passes certain judgments upon them. Action with him has special reference, not to the phenomena, but to the judgments thus passed. All these