and the external world. The reason or ground of such affirmations we can know only by falling back upon the original spontaneity of the human Intelligence. There no man is or can be a sceptic, and he that makes himself such by observation and reflection, is, in the language of inspiration, a fool. Yes, he is more than a fool; he is supremely wicked. Confidence reposed in the first Truths of Reason, how weakened.

You see how it is, that the confidence of men, in the first truths of human Reason, is often weakened. They expect, by a process of reasoning, to demonstrate the reality of those very truths which must be assumed, or all reasoning becomes impossible; and which, as the ground of such reasoning, have been previously affirmed with absolute certainty, in the primitive spontaneity of the human Intelligence. They expect also to have their convictions strengthened by the demonstration, an expectation not realized, of course. The result is, that the conviction is weakened, instead of strengthened. The man who expects to have his confidence in the reality of his own existence, or in that of the external world, or of God, increased by any process of reasoning, is, in my judgment, seeking for truth in the wrong direction. Whenever we fall back upon the spontaneity of our own Reason, we find ourselves intuitively affirming each of these truths with equal absoluteness, and assuming them as the ground of all our inquiries. When we contemplate our own existence, and that of the external world, as we necessarily do, as conditioned and relative, we never inquire whether there is an existence unconditioned and absolute, to which the former may be referred; but what is the character of that unconditioned and absolute existence, to which, by a previous, spontaneous, intuitive, and absolute affirmation of Reason, all that is conditioned and relative has been referred. Use of the Common Demonstrations of the Divine Existence.

Of what use, then, it may be asked, are the common demonstrations of the existence of God? Of none, I answer, in satisfying our own minds of the reality of the Divine existence. If this is expected from them, our confidence will be rather weakened than strengthened, and that, for this reason: The mind begins the investigation by suspending its belief in the reality of the Divine existence, upon the validity of the demonstration. It also expects and demands, as

above remarked, that the demonstration shall be such as to increase its previous confidence in the reality of the Divine existence. But such expectation will not be realized. Hence the demonstration will, under such circumstances, rather diminish than increase our confidence in this fundamental truth. The most delightful feature of our holy religion, to my mind, is this: its great fundamental truths are all suspended, not upon the validity of demonstrations, but placed at the foundation of all demonstration, among the primitive, absolute, and necessary intuitions and affirmations of Reason; intuitions which no one can deny without violating the fundamental laws of his own being, and rendering himself a fool, not only, but infinitely impious. For no man can possibly become so impious and wicked as the sceptic. The man who enters a family and seduces every female there, but leaves a consciousness of guilt as a foundation for repentance, and reformation to virtue, is a saint, compared with the man who, without actual seduction, annihilates in the minds of such females, all regard to chastity as a virtue, and to its opposite as a sin. This the sceptic does when he has obtained his object. Of what use then, the question returns upon us, are such demonstrations? Of no use but this, to turn the weapons of the enemy against himself. To substantiate his position, he appeals to science. Now science, when pressed into the field, must be shown to be on the side of his opposers. Till thus pressed she remains silent, because her influence is not needed.

Conclusions arrived at by a process of Reasoning, when false.

Every

We see when it is, that any conclusions to which we come by a process of reasoning, are, and must be false. When they contradict any of the necessary and spontaneous intuitions of the human Intelligence, as, for example, the reality our own existence, or that of the external world. step in a process of reasoning must be intuitively certain. Now to bring a conclusion to which we have arrived by a series of intuitions, against another primitive intuition, is to affirm the falsity of one intuition upon the authority of another; and the non-reality of the primitive upon the authority of the derivative. This is precisely what Coleridge has done, or rather, promises to do. He first acknowledges that the belief in the reality of things without us is an intuition, primitive and necessary, and then promises, by a series of

intuitions, to demonstrate the non-reality of such existences. -See Biog. Lit. p. 153.

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Reasons of the Diversity and Difference of the Opinions of Men.

In judgments, men differ, not in the spontaneous, but reflective developments of their Intelligence. In the former state, all put essentially the same inquiries, and all believe the same things. There is no doubt or disbelief here. In this inner sanctuary of the Intelligence, scepticism has no place. In respect to the results of observation and reflection, here diversity and contradiction appear. The reason

is, that in the former state, nothing but the pure affirmations of the Intelligence are met with. In the latter, assumptions mingled with such affirmations, together with the logical consequents of assumptions, present themselves.

Sources of Error.

Error has no place among the spontaneous affirmations of the Intelligence, for the obvious reason, that here nothing. but pure intellectual affirmations appear. The same would be true in the reflective operations, but for the fact, that assumptions are here mingled with such affirmations. When men contemplate one class of facts, for example, various hypotheses may present themselves as grounds of the explanation of the facts, hypotheses none of which are affirmed as true by the Intelligence. The Will, however, may assume some one as true, which is not so. This assumption, together with all its logical consequents, is now mingled with the facts, and all together present a confused mass of error and truth. Here is the source of error of every kind, and in connection with all subjects of thought. Pure thinking, unmingled with assumptions, is never adulterated with error.

CHAPTER XV.

ORIGIN OF IDEAS.

In all our inquiries hitherto, one question has been left almost wholly untouched, the question in respect to the ORIGIN To this question special attention is now in

OF OUR IDEAS. vited.

The two Schools in Philosophy.

Two great schools have, for the last century or two, divided the philosophical world, in respect to the question before us. These schools have been denominated the Sensual, and Ideal or Transcendental school. At the head of the former is Locke. At the head of the latter is Kant. A few remarks explanatory of the principles of these schools, may prepare the way for a more distinct elucidation of the present

subject.

Principles of Locke.

I begin with Locke. According to him, all ideas existing in the mind, are derived from two sources, Sensation, and Reflection. To establish his principles, he first proves that there are no innate ideas in the mind, that is, ideas previous to experience. Having disposed of this question, he starts the following as the great problem in philosophy.

"Let us suppose," he says, "the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas, how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and knowledge? To this I answer," he adds, "in one word, from experience; in that all our

knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself."

In a subsequent section, he shows that the sources of experience are two-fold, as observed above, Sensation, and Reflection or Consciousness.

"Our observation," he says, " employed either about external, sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring." Experience being the watch-word of the school of Locke, and of his system, the system itself has been denominated Empiricism.

It should be borne in mind, that Locke does not speak of experience, as the mere condition of all our knowledge. In that case, his system would be undoubtedly correct. Nor would his principles be doubted by any school in philosophy. On the other hand, he speaks of experience, as furnishing the materials of all our knowledge. All knowledge is exclusively constituted of elements furnished by experience.

Theory of Kant.

In opposition to Empiricism, Kant and the Transcendental school maintain that experience is so far from giving us necessary truths, that these truths themselves lie at the foundation of all experience.

To understand the principles of Kant correctly, it is necessary to keep in remembrance the fact, that he evidently uses the term experience in two senses-in respect to the Sensibility, and the Intelligence. When he says that all our cognition begins with experience; he then refers to the Sensibility; for he speaks of the "faculty of cognition being awakened into exercise," by this experience. To suppose that by experience here, he refers to the action of the Intelligence, would make him say, that the "cognition-faculty is awakened into exercise" by the action of the cognitionfaculty. He supposes, and very correctly, that the condition of the primary action of the Intelligence, is some effect from some cause upon the Sensibility. By the term experience here, he refers to this effect.

On the other hand, when he affirms that a priori or necessary ideas, are the condition and ground of all experience, he