conscious. This is, in fact, the highest kind of proof of which any principle is susceptible.

Statement illustrated by a Reference to the Idea of God.

The idea of God is a first truth of Reason. In reference to the proof of the Divine existence, two errors, as it appears to me, have been committed by philosophers and theologians Some have affirmed, that this truth is wholly insusceptible of any proof of any kind. Others have supposed that it admits of logical demonstration from given premises. Now the truth pertaining to the subject lies between the two errors above named. The Divine existence admits of the same proof that other necessary ideas of Reason do; that is, we may find the contingent phenomena or principles to which this great truth sustains the relation of logical antecedent. This, in common with the kind of proof common to all first truths, is the only kind of which it is susceptible; and when philosophical and theological research takes this direction, we shall find the highest kind of demonstration of the Divine existence. But this subject will claim attention in a subsequent part of this Treatise.

Idea and Principle of Reason distinguished.

An idea of Reason is the pure conception of an object of Reason, irrespective of any other object; as the idea of space, time, substance, cause, &c.

A principle of Reason is the conception of the necessary relation of such objects to some other reality, as the principles, Body supposes space, succession supposes time, phenomena suppose substances, and events causes. Here the relation existing between contingent and necessary ideas is affirmed. This is what is meant by a principle of Reason.

Axioms, Postulates, and Definitions.

An axiom is a first principle of Reason. Axioms which are employed in particular sciences do not belong to those sciences exclusively. On the other hand, they pertain to all sciences, and are only in the form in which they are presented adapted to the particular science to be treated of. The axioms in Geometry, for example, The whole is greater than any of its parts, things equal to the same thing are equal to one another, &c., are not peculiar to Geometry, but are common to all sciences. The last named is the same thought

expressed in a somewhat different form, as the axiom in logic, to wit, Where two terms agree with one and the same thing, they agree with one another.

Postulates are assumed axiomatic principles of Reason, which pertain exclusively to the particular sciences to be treated of. The postulate in Geometry, for example, that a straight line may be drawn between any two points in space, belongs exclusively to this and other cognate sciences.

Definitions, scientifically considered, give the objects, and the qualities of the objects to be investigated in the light of given axioms, and postulates. The conception, for example, of a straight line, a triangle, square, &c., of which the science of Geometry treats, are given by definition.

These principles are applicable to all sciences whatever.

IDEA OF SCIENCE, PURE AND MIXED.

Idea of Science defined.

The idea of Science, which of course is a pure conception of Reason, is knowledge reduced to fundamental ideas and principles; or the properties and relations of objects, systematically evolved in the light of such ideas and principles. Thus in Geometry, we have the properties and relations of particular objects systematically evolved in the light of axioms and postulates, which are, in reality, fundamental ideas of Reason. Whenever this end is accomplished, in reference to any phenomena, or objects, then we have the scientific idea realized.

Pure Sciences.

When the axioms, postulates, and definitions are all alike pure conceptions of Reason, and when the Judgment evolves the properties and relations of the objects of such definitions in the light of such axioms and postulates, then we have what are denominated pure sciences. Such is Geometry, and the mathematics generally.

Mixed Sciences.

When the axioms and postulates are ideas or principles of Reason, and when the definitions pertain to phenomena or objects contingent and relative, as in natural philosophy, and when the Judgment evolves the relations and properties of

such objects in the light of such ideas and postulates, then we have mixed sciences.

FUNCTION OF REASON DENOMINATED CONSCIENCE.

Conscience defined.

Conscience is that function of Reason which pertains to the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, of merit and demerit, &c. It is a testifying function of Reason, pertaining to the relation which ought to exist between the action of the Will and the idea of right and wrong.

General Remarks.

1. Conscience always commands us in the name of God. Her mandates are regarded as the voice of God speaking within us, and when disregarded, we always hold ourselves amenable to the Divine tribunal. Conscience in the heathen is not only a law, but a law of God; and so it is regarded by them.

2. As Conscience is the voice of God within us, it follows that it can never, in its appropriate exercise, put right for wrong, and the opposite. In other words, no man acts conscientiously when doing wrong, nor in opposition to Conscience, when doing right. "Conscience," as Coleridge remarks, "in the absence of direct inspiration, bears the same relation to the will of God, that a good chronometer does to the position of the sun in a cloudy day."

Objection.

In opposition to the principle above stated, it is very common to refer to the contradictory standards of moral obligation adopted by different nations, communities, and individuals. The following considerations are deserving of special attention in reply to this objection :

1. To suppose that the heathen, for example, in all their rites and ceremonies, are endeavoring to realize the idea of right, is as absurd, as to suppose that the savage is endeavoring to realize the idea of the beautiful, when he is tattooing his body.

2. The Bible affirms that the heathen are actuated by fear and not by Conscience: "And deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage

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3. The judgment that a thing is not wrong, is often mistaken for the testimony of Conscience to its rightness.

4. When a reference is made to the intention, the only appropriate object of Conscience, we find a more universal agreement among men than is generally supposed, an agreement of such a nature as to demand the truth of the above proposition, while every shade of difference may be explained in perfect consistency with it.

Term Conscience as used in the Scriptures.

A good conscience, as the words are there used, is the testimony of the mind to the agreement of the Will, or moral action, with the moral law. An evil conscience is the opposite, the testimony of the mind to the fact of the disagreement of the action of the Will with that law.

GENERAL REMARKS PERTAINING TO REASON.

Relation of Reason to other Intellectual Faculties. The relation of Reason to other functions of the Intelligence may now be readily pointed out. Of the phenomena, or truths affirmed by those faculties, Reason gives the logical antecedents. This is its exclusive function. The Judgment, in all its operations, is exclusively analytic. It simply evolves what is embraced in the affirmations of the other faculties. Reason is synthethic. It always adds to the affirmation of the other faculties something not embraced in the affirmation. The element added, however, always sustains to that to which it is added a fixed relation, that of logical antecedent. Thus when Sense or Conscience affirms phenomena, Reason adds to the affirmation an element not embraced in it, that of Substance, an element, however, sustaining to the affirmation a fixed relation, that of logical antecedent.

Through Reason Man is a religious Being.

As possessed of Reason alone is man a religious being. Through this awful power he attains to a knowledge of the soul, of moral obligations and retributions, of immortality, of God, and enters into inter-communion with the Infinite and Eternal One.

Reason common to all Men.

Reason also exists in all men, and equally in all who pos

sess it at all. This is evident from the fact that if an individual knows a truth of Reason at all, he does and must know it absolutely. There are no degrees in such knowledge. The difference, and only difference, between men lies in their perceptive and reflective faculties. Newton differed from other men not because he knew any more absolutely than they that events suppose a cause, that things equal to the same things are equal to one another, &c., but because he possessed powers of perception and reflection which enabled him to see (what they could not discover) the qualities involved in such truths.

Error of Coleridge.

Reason is not, as Coleridge maintains, an organ identical with its appropriate objects." "Thus God, the soul, eternal truth," he adds, "are not the objects of the Reason, but they are the Reason itself." Space and duration he would admit are the objects of the Reason, but are they Reason itself? If God and the soul are the Reason, then they are identical, and Pantheism is eternal truth. Philosophers, as well as others, are accustomed to take many things for granted which need to be proved. We must, if we are not willing to be greatly misled, be careful what assumptions we permit them to make. Otherwise we may find ourselves under the direction of principles which may lead us we know not whither.

Paralogism of Cousin.

In order to do justice to this great philosopher, I must make quite a lengthy quotation from him, on the important point next to be considered. The extract is taken from his remarks on enthusiasm, and commences with a quotation from Locke.

"Intuitive knowledge is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any, this being the highest of all human certainty. In this consists the evidence of all those maxims which nobody has any doubt about, but every man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be true as soon as ever they are proposed to his Understanding. In the discovery of and assent to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence; and such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think that angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect