Thus when certain conditions are fulfilled, Reason evolves the idea of time, space, substance and cause, which we have already considered, together with such as the beautiful, the right, the true, and the good, &c., hereafter to be considered.

Ideal defined.

An Ideal is a form of thought intermediate between an idea, and the conceptions or notions which the Intelligence generates of particular objects, and presents archetypes in conformity to which the elements of such conceptions may be blended in harmony with ideas. In the mind of Milton, for example, the ideas of the beautiful, the grand, and the sublime, &c., existed, as pure conceptions of Reason. When the varied conceptions, the elements of which are blended together in Paradise Lost, lay under the eye of his Consciousness, his Intelligence, brooding over those elements, at last blended them together into that grand conception, of which the poem itself is the external embodiment. This conception was the Ideal after which the poem was formed, to realize his ideas of the grand, the beautiful, and the sublime.

Ideals, Particular and General.

Ideals, like notions, are particular and general. Thus, in the mind of Milton, there existed a general ideal of what a poem should be, in order to realize, in greater or less perfection, the pure ideas of Reason. At the same time, there existed a particular Ideal of the manner in which the elements entering into that poem should be blended, in order in that particular production, to realize those ideas.

Ideals not confined to Ideas of the Beautiful, the Grand, and the Sublime.

Ideals are not confined to any one class of ideas. Every individual, in all departments of human action, has an Ideal of the form to which the objects of his action should be brought into conformity, and in the light of which he judges of all productions which meet his eye. Ideas of fitness, of the true, the perfect, and the good, are archetypes of Ideals, as well as that of the beautiful.

Ideals not fixed and changeless like Ideas.

Ideals, as compared with ideas, may be perfect or imper

fect. They are consequently capable of continued modifications. We often hear it said of individuals, that their Ideals are imperfect or wrong. As intermediate archetypes between conceptions of particular objects, and pure ideas of Reason, Ideals may, in the future progress of the Intelligence, undergo endless modifications, always advancing towards the perfect and absolute, without reaching it.

Ideals the Foundation of Mental Progress.

As intermediate archetypes between particular conceptions, and universal and necessary ideas, Ideals constitute the foundation of endless progression in the development of the mental powers. Every new elevation which the Intelligence gains, presents new conceptions of particular objects, and consequently new elements of thought. Every new element of thought involves a new Ideal, more nearly approaching the perfect and the absolute, and thus lays the foundation for fresh activity, and further progress in the march of mind. Sometimes also Ideals degenerate, and thus the foundation is laid for the backward movements of society.

It is hardly necessary to add that the Imagination is the exclusive organ of Ideals. To form such conceptions is not a function of Reason, nor of the Understanding or Judgment. It remains, then, as the exclusive function of the Imagination.

Ideals in the Divine and Human Intelligence.

In the Divine mind, the action of the Imagination is always in perfect and absolute correspondence to the Reason. As a consequence, there is a similar correspondence between the Divine Ideal and idea. All of God's "works, therefore, are perfect." Not so with the finite. Man may eternally progress towards the infinite and perfect, but can reach it.

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ACTION OF THE JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO THAT OF THE

IMAGINATION.

Taste defined.

Taste is that function of the Judgment by which the characteristics of productions, especially in belles-lettres and the fine arts, are determined in the light of Ideals and ideas of beauty, order, congruity, proportion, symmetry, fitness, and whatever

constitutes excellence in such productions. The Judgment may be exercised upon Ideals relatively to ideas, and upon particular productions relatively to both. Thus Milton, when he apprehended the conception realized in Paradise Lost, might, and doubtless did, often compare that conception with his own idea, to determine the fact whether the former made a near approach to the latter. In filling out the conception, he would continually compare the external embodiment with the internal Ideal. In all such operations, he was exercising those functions of the faculty of Judgment denominated Taste. The existence of good taste depends upon the existence in the Intelligence of correct Ideals, together with a well balanced, and well exercised Judgment pertaining to the ideas of beauty, fitness, &c. If a man's Ideal is false, his Taste is of course vitiated. If his Ideal were ever so correct, and he was not possessed of a well balanced, and well exercised Judgment, pertaining to such productions, he would also lack the characteristics of good Taste.

Productions of the Imagination when not regulated by correct Judgment or good Taste.

In some individuals in whom the Imagination exists and operates with a high degree of energy, its action is not guided and chastened by good Taste, or a well regulated Judgment. In such cases we find the most perfect forms of beauty and sublimity shadowed forth in connection with the grossest deformities. The subject also will, in most instances, be wholly unable to distinguish the one from the other. In listening to such men, we, at one moment, are perfectly electrified with the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity which are shadowed forth to our ecstatic vision; but the next, perhaps, we are equally shocked and disgusted with images worse than grotesque, and forms of speech in strange violation of all the laws of good Taste. Under such circumstances we have special need of two things, Patience and good Judgment. The former will enable us to endure the evil for the sake of the good: the latter to separate the one from the other, that we do not receive the good and the bad, as is too often the case, as alike good, nor reject both as alike bad.

The most perfect of all human productions are the results of genius associated with good Judgment. Of these the productions of Milton may be referred to as striking examples.

Grandeur and sublimity are the permanent characteristics of his genius. And how seldom are his sublime conceptions marred with violations of good Taste.

PRODUCTIONS IN WHICH THE ACTION OF THE FANCY OR IMAGINATION IS MOST CONSPICUOUS.

The productions of different authors, we read with almost equal interest, but for entirely different and opposite reasons. I now refer to two classes of productions only, in one of which the operation of the Fancy is most prominent, and in the other, that of the Imagination. In productions of the former class, there will be an exuberance of metaphor, and beautifully appropriate comparisons and illustrations, and these will be the main source of the interest felt. In contemplating the productions of a creative Imagination, on the other hand, the grand conception will be the chief, and in some instances, the exclusive source of interest.

COMBINATIONS OF THOUGHT DENOMINATED WIT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THOSE RESULTING FROM THE PROPER ACTION OF THE IMAGINATION OR FANCY.

By the Imagination different conceptions are blended on the ground of co-existence with similar feelings. The feeling into which they are blended will be the leading one with which each is associated. By the Fancy different conceptions are associated on precisely the same principle. Now Wit consists in blending and associating conceptions on the ground of remote and generally mere accidental elements, found in them in common. Such combinations and associations therefore surprise and amuse us. When the Irishman,

for example, replied to the question, what he would take to go, on a cold winter's night, a certain distance, in a state of nudity, "That he thought he should take a very bad cold," all recognize the reply as an example of genuine Wit. On an analysis we find that two thoughts are blended here, on the ground merely of an accidental element common to both. The term take is permanently associated with the phrase taking cold, and has a mere accidental association with the question proposed, since some other term (as what will you ask) would have answered just as well. The blending of the two thoughts, in consequence of such an accidental

element, is what surprises and amuses us, and constitutes the real wit involved in the reply.

A clergyman once delivered a discourse on the divine works. In the progress of his remarks, he said that everything God had ma le was perfect in its kind. As the speaker descended from the pulpit, he was accosted at the door by an ill-formed hunchback of a man, who, looking him in the face, with a kind of malicious grin, asked the question, What, sir, do you think of any form? Do you think that to be perfect?"Yes," replied the speaker, "you are a perfect hunchback." Here is genuine Wit. It consists, as every one will perceive, in assuming the idea of a hunchback as a conception of the perfect, and then classing the individual present under it as an embodied realization of that idea.

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A combination, in its nature, not unlike the above, was made by a celebrated convict at Botany Bay, in respect to himself and associates:

"True patriots we,

For, be it understood,
We left our country

For our country's good."

Wit may not inappropriately be denominated shallow sense, being, in most instances, the antithesis of a blunder, or a blunder from design. As two Irishmen were walking together, for example, the one after the other, the individual foremost took hold of the limb of a tree, which extended across the path (the end being broken off), and holding it in his hand as he passed along, as far as his strength would allow, suddenly let it fly back. His companion behind receiving the blow in the forehead, was thereby thrown from a perpendiular to a horizontal position. On recovering his standing, however, as he was rubbing his eyes, he very gravely remarked to his associate, "In faith, it is well you held the limb back as long as you did. Had you not done so, it would probably have killed me." Here was a blunder. Now suppose that a bystander had witnessed the occurrence, and had made a remark precisely similar in respect to it. This would have been genuine Wit. I would here drop the suggestion, whether the most of what is denominated Irish wit, is not, after all, amusing blunders ?