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CHAPTER XI.

IMAGINATION.

THERE is hardly any department of the present Treatise, in respect to which I feel a greater solicitude, than that upon which we are now to enter. I freely acknowledge, that I have not been satisfied with the views given upon the subject by authors held in general repute. It is by no means certain, however, that, when we have discovered real or apparent defects in the productions of others, we can produce anything more perfect ourselves. It not unfrequently happens, also, that the supposed defects lie in our own ideal, and not in that in which we suppose ourselves to have found them. All are aware that there is such a function of the Intelligence as the Imagination. When we meet with any of its real creations also, all recognize them as such. But then, when the questions are asked, What is this power? What are its functions? or, What are the laws of its action? a true answer does not so readily occur, as, at first thought, might be anticipated.

Defininitions of distinguished Philosophers.

In further remarking upon the subject, I will first present some of the definitions of this faculty, given by distinguished philosophers. I begin with the definition of Dr. Brown :-"We not only perceive objects," he observes, "and concieve and remember them as they were, but we have the power of combining them with various new assemblages-of forming, at our will, with a sort of delegated omnipotence, not a single universe merely, but a new and varied universe, with every succession of our thoughts."

"What is Imagination," says Mr. Payne, "but Memory presenting the objects of pure perceptions (in a manner

afterwards to be explained) in groups, or combinations which do not exist in nature?"

"In the exercise of the Imagination," says Abercrombie, "( we take the component parts of real scenes, events, or characters, and combine them anew, by a process of the mind itself, so as to form compounds, which have no existence in nature."

"But we have the power of modifying our conceptions," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, "by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. I shall employ the word Imagination, to express this power."

"Imagination," says Professor Upham, "is a complex exercise of the mind, by means of which various conceptions are combined together, so as to form new wholes."

It will be perceived at once, that, according to most of these definitions, the Imagination has a primary, if not an almost exclusive, reference to the objects of sense; and according to all, its creations are fictions, which have no corresponding realities in nature. They are composed of elements of perceptions of real scenes; but yet these elements are so combined, that the creations, in all instances, have nothing corresponding to them in the universe within or around us.

Objections to the above Definitions.

If these definitions be admitted as correct, and as presenting the entire and appropriate sphere of the Imagination, we must find some other faculty to which to attribute a large portion of the best poetry in existence. I will present a few familiar quotations, as examples.

Take, in the first instance, Wordsworth's description of the White Doe of Rylstone:

"White she is as the lily of June,
And beauteous as the silver moon
When out of sight the clouds are driven,
And she is left alone in heaven;

Or like a ship, some gentle day,
In sunshine sailing far away-

A glittering ship that hath the plain
Of ocean for its wide domain."

Nothing is here presented but what really exists in nature. Yet nothing but a creative Imagination, of a very high order, could have shadowed forth such a beautiful conception.

Take, as another example, the 19th Psalm, as given in our Bibles, or as thrown into verse in our common hymn books:

"The heavens declare thy glory, Lord,
In every star thy wisdom shines."

"Thy noblest wonders here we view,

In souls renew'd, and sins forgiven." &c.

Who will pretend that we have not here the creations of the Imagination, in its purest, highest flights? Yet in the first instance there are no new combinations of sensible objects presented, but a simple statement of facts in regard to objects perfectly familiar. In the second instance, no visible object is referred to, but simple facts in regard to spiritual objects. Again :

"Along the banks where Babel's current flows,

Our captive bands in deep despondence strayed,
While Zion's fall in sad remembrance rose,

Her friends, her children, mingled with the dead.

"The tuneless harp, that once with joy we strung,
When praise employed, and mirth inspired the lay,
In mournful silence on the willows hung,

And growing grief prolonged the tedious day.”

No one, surely, will pretend that here is a combination of objects of perception, which had no existence in nature.

Take the following lines from a poem, designed to present the scene which transpired in the wilderness where Elijah lodged, after he fled from the wrath of Jezebel:

"Amidst the wilderness, alone,

The sad, foe-hunted prophet lay;
And darkened shadows round him thrown,
Shut out the cheerful light of day.

"The winds were laden with his sighs,
As resting 'neath a lonely tree,
His spirit, torn with agonies,

In prayer was struggling to be free."

I make but one other selection, taken from Wordsworth's Boy of Winander Mere :

"Who

Blew mimic hootings to the silent owls,

That they might answer him. And they would shout
Across the watery vale, and shout again

With long halloos, and screams, and echoes loud,
Redoubled and redoubled, concourse wild,

Of mirth, and jocund din. And when it chanced
That pauses of deep silence mocked his skill,
Then sometimes in that silence, while he hung
Listening, a gentle shock of wild surprise
Has carried far into his heart, the voice
Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene
Would enter, unawares, into his mind,
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,

Its woods, and that uncertain heaven, received
Into the bosom of the steady lake."

Surely, in none of these instances, have the poets given to "airy nothing a local habitation and a name." Yet no one fails to notice in all of them the appropriate results of the Imagination.

Another Definition proposed.

It now remains to attempt, at least, an enunciation of the true conception of the Imagination. An object may sometimes be best explained by comparing it with another of which we have distinct apprehensions. Of the Understanding we have such apprehensions. The fundamental elements of all its conceptions are, as we have seen, substance and quality, cause and effect. It combines the elements given by the primary faculties as given, without modifying them at all. It is the faculty, in short, which takes cognizance of realities as they are. Now we have in our minds other ideas than those of substance and quality, cause and effect; such, for example, as the ideas of the beautiful, the grand, and the sublime. These ideas last named, do not respect objects as they really exist (for they may, or may not, exist in harmony with such ideas), but as arranged and combined in a given manner. We have in our minds, therefore, two entirely distinct classes of conceptions—those which respect objects just as they exist in the universe of matter and mind, within and around us, and those in which the elements of such objects are in thought combined, in harmony, more or less perfect, with fundamental ideas in the mind itself; as those of the beautiful, grand, sublime, &c., which do not respect objects as they are, but certain arrangements of such objects. The function of the Intelligence which gives us the former class of conceptions, we have denominated the Understanding. That which gives us the latter, that which "hovering o'er" all the elements of thought

appearing upon the field of Consciousness, combines them into conceptions, more or less perfectly conformed to fundamental ideas, like those referred to above, is the Imagination. By Coleridge it is called the "Esemplastic, or into-one-forming power." It re-combines the elements of thought into conceptions which pertain not to mere existences, but ideas of the beautiful, the perfect, the sublime, &c., in the mind itself. A conception of the Understanding is perfect, when it represents its object as it is, whatever the object may be. A conception of the Imagination is perfect, when it shadows forth forms of beauty, grandeur, sublimity, &c., which correspond with the idea in the mind. Understanding-conceptions are compared with the object. The only standard with which the creations of the Imagination are compared, is the idea.

Imagination and Fancy distinguished.

Mr. Dugald Stewart is the first philosopher that I have met with, who makes a distinction between the Imagination and Fancy. I will give the remarks to which I refer, as it will prepare the way for the distinction which I wish to make. "It is the power of Fancy," he observes, "which supplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allusions. But it is the power of the Imagination, that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the fictitious characters which he delineates." According to the distinction here made, it was the Imagination of Milton, which created the whole scene and the particular characters presented in 'Paradise Lost.' His Fancy, on the other hand, furnished the figurative language, analogies, and illustrations with which it is adorned. Fancy, as thus described, is, as it will readily be perceived, nothing but a particular department of the operation of the principle of Association. It collects the materials from which the Imagination creates its scenes and characters, and then furnishes the attendant embellishments. In conformity to this view of the subject, Fancy is defined by Coleridge, as the "aggregative and associative power." Thus defined, while the Imagination is that function of the Intelligence which is correlated to ideas of the beautiful, the grand, the sublime, &c., the Fancy is that function of the associative principle, which is correlated to the same ideas.

The

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