Others are ready to ask, "Of what consequence is it whether these things are so or not?" Of very great consequence indeed. And so judge others, as appears by the voluminous writings both of Christians and sceptics. Religion is the all-important thing, or else it is a gross imposition on mankind. In either case, it is not an indifferent concern. If it is true, it ought to be maintained; if false, overthrown. Hence, both Christians and sceptics act a more rational part in the interest which they manifest in relation to the subject, than do your gallios, who care for none of these things."

The discussion which appears in this volume, was originally carried on in the columns of the New-York Free Enquirer. It is now republished, with emendations and an appendix and table of contents, and sent out into the world to take its own course, and meet such a reception as mankind shall see fit to give it. ORIGEN BACHELER.

[Robert Dale Owen's Address to the Reader forms the Introduction to the Second Volume of this Discussion.]

EXISTENCE OF GOD.

TO ROBERT DALE OWEN.

LETTER I.

New-York, January 22, 1831.

SIR, Though a believer in the Christian religion myself, I am nevertheless a friend to reason and free inquiry. Indeed, so far am I from thinking that men ought to admit Christianity, or any thing else, without evidence, that I should be among the first to reprehend such blind faith. To me there is nothing terrific in the idea of free inquiry; for, without such inquiry, there cannot be a full and fair investigation of subjects. And the more free it is, the better for the cause of truth; for the more plainly will that be manifested. The Christian, therefore, so far from shrinking from discussion, should be among the foremost to promote it, as an effectual means of advancing what he considers to be all-important truths.

But while, on the one hand, it is not free inquiry, to refuse to examine the evidences in favour of scepticism; on the other, it is not free inquiry, to refuse to examine the evidences of Christianity. Those sceptics who rail against the Bible, and who read only their own side of the question, are as great bigots, and as little entitled to the name of free inquirers, as are those Christians who rail against scepticism, and read only the arguments in favour of Christianity. Those only are free inquirers, and reasonable men, who fully examine subjects, and believe acccording to the evidence which such an examination furnishes. Wherefore, to ascertain whether a man is a free inquirer or not, we are not to ask whether he is a Christian or a sceptic; but whether he fully examines subjects. I do therefore object to the monopolizing of this title by sceptics.

This premised, I am now prepared to enter on a free and a full examination of the evidences in relation to the existence of God, and the authenticity of the Bible. These questions I conceive to be of the highest importance; because, if there is a God, it is reasonable to suppose we are accountable to him; and if the Bible is true, it is fatal to reject it. It is therefore a plain dictate of reason itself, that we should candidly and thoroughly examine these subjects, prepared to follow whithersoever the evidences which on investigation may arise shall

lead. Most assuredly, it cannot be to our interest to be deceived on these points; for if there is a God, and if the Bible is true, our disbelieving therein will not alter the case. Let us therefore, like rational creatures, calmly approach these subjects, not to overthrow or upbuild this, that, or the other, but to examine, to investigate, to see how things are. This is the way to prove all things;" but prejudice and bias prevent proof.

First, then, let us examine the question of the existence of God. And let us consider ourselves equally interested, not to make out our respective theories, but to ascertain whether there is a God or not. I repeat it: Let it be our object to arrive at the truth, and not to vanquish each the other.

The proper inquiry on this point seems to be: Is there reason, all things considered, for believing that there is a Godan intelligent cause of things, infinite and perfect in all his attributes and moral qualities?

When we behold the misery and wickedness abroad in the earth, we very naturally inquire, "Could a being of infinite goodness and power permit such things? Had we the power, we would not permit them." Hence, some conclude at once that there can be no God. But this is certainly a hasty conclusion, because it is formed without full examination. If, in examining a subject, we see difficulties on the one side, we should examine further, and see whether there are any on the other. And if, after having fully examined the case, we find difficulties on both, we should compare them, and see which are the greater, and adopt that side which has the less.

In the case before us, there is at first sight an apparent diffi. culty as to the existence of God, in the circumstance of the existence of sin and misery. But this difficulty rises from a partial consideration of the divine attributes. The sceptic, in making this objection, brings but two of these into view, viz., goodness and power, not once considering that the exercise of both is regulated by wisdom. But then again he inquires, "How can there even be wisdom in the permission of sin and misery ?" Were we omniscient, perhaps we could see: but, limited as we are in knowledge, we are at least unauthorized to say that their permission is unwise. This we cannot know, without infinite wisdom. We cannot be sure, therefore, that what seems in this instance an objection to the divine existence, is in reality so. Yet this, I believe, is the great reason for atheism.

Now I must confess that, on due consideration, this very reason, which atheists consider an objection to the existence of a God, is to me an argument in its favour. Were all things in accordance with the limited wisdom of man, there would be reason to suppose that they were not contrived by wisdom superior to his, and, consequently, that they were not contrived by infinite wisdom, and, therefore, that there is no infinite wisdom-no God. To illustrate this, take the case of a child. His knowledge being less than that of a man, he acts, in some

cases, differently from a man. And where we can see nothing but works similar to those of children, there is reason to suppose that men did not do them. So, if the universe were in accordance with the views of men, it would be reasonable to suppose that it was not contrived by Infinite Wisdom. I do therefore consider the apparent imperfection of things a strong argument in proof of the existence of God, instead of being an objection against it.

I will not enter further into the subject at this time: suffice this for the opening of the discussion.

ORIGEN BACHeler.

TO ORIGEN BACHELER.

LETTER I.

January 29, 1831.

I accede to the proposed discussion, in hopes that it may be conducted with earnestness and candour. All discussions so conducted subserve the interests of truth.

Far am I from objecting to your definition of a free inquirer. If I have considered myself entitled to the character, it is assuredly not because I may happen to believe a little less, or a little more, than my neighbours: but solely because I feel that I am disposed to seek truth, wherever it may be found; within the pale of orthodoxy or without it; in religion or in scepticism; under the form of popular virtue or of moral heresy; in the histories of all ranks as of all countries. My single object is, not to find truth in this creed or in that system-not in the code of one country or the customs of another, but, wherever it be, to find it.

It is idle in me to profess sincerity. The most careless observer must perceive that I can have no motive but an honest one for adhering to opinions which bring me neither riches, honour, a good name, nor any worldly advantage, except that invaluable one, the pleasant consciousness of being free to follow the dictates of conscience, unbiassed and unshackled.

You will find me disposed to plain dealing. I will never choose to misunderstand you. I will quibble at no words, beg no question, take refuge behind no sophism, and evade no encounter. Thus, perhaps, time and temper may be saved to both of us. But enough of professions.

The first question regards the existence of a God.

I perceive no evidence whereby to affirm or deny that one or a million beings superior to man exist throughout space. One may, or a million may, so exist. They may take cognizance of man's actions. They may influence his destiny. I deny it not;

I affirm it not. This is no evasion of the argument There may be inhabitants in the sun; one, or a million, or thousands of millions. I cannot say there are, nor can I assert that there are not. I know as little about the existence and nature of a God or Gods, as I do about the existence and nature of solar beings and I trouble myself as little about the one as the other.

You say it is of vast You say, if there be a God, we

You say I ought to trouble myself. importance for us to know. are accountable to him.

Here, then, we first join issue. Nothing upon earth, not my own existence, is more evident to me than this-that if there be an omnipotent God, it has not been his will that I should know any thing about him. How can I be sure of this? Because I know nothing about him. I have never sought to know him, you will urge? But I have. I have sought to know him anxiously, perseveringly. If he exist, he has concealed himself from me. I may be uncertain of his existence; I am certain that he has concealed it from me. I am certain-and if I could find a stronger word I would employ it-I am certain that he did not intend me to know him. You cannot deny this, except by asserting that this is a subject upon which we may not reason. Then, why bid me approach it? 'Tis not of my seeking. Either we can reason of the intentions of a Deity, or we cannot. If we can, let us reason, and let us decide, as I have done. cannot, let us confess that to speak of Gods befits not men.

If we

Suppose a God. Shall he be angry with me that I know him not? What a strange idea! He holds in his hands the power to reveal himself at any moment-the power to excite belief in my mind, in an instant, by his almighty volition: he holds the power, and exerts it not. And he shall punish me, because he exerts it not! I should consider myself a wretch unworthy to live, if, under similar circumstances, I acted thus toward the meanest reptile that crawls the earth. But we must not judge God, you say, by our human reason. Then, for consistency's sake, let us not talk about him.

But why should a God wish us to know him-to glorify him? I do not pretend to be less fond of praise than my neighbours; but I should be perfectly ashamed of my childishness, if Í insisted upon the crawling caterpillar knowing me, or, supposing that I had created it, glorifying me.* If I wish to be

known, or to be praised at all, it is by my equals only, not by worms of the dust. Man is less than a worm of the dust compared to (the usual conception of) a God.

But we shall be accountable to God! This is the strangest idea of all. If I had created you, Origen Bacheler; if I had made you, bodily, mentally, morally, as you are; had given you

* I would ask you to read on this subject, an imaginary dialogue, originally given in No. 23 of vol. ii. of the Free Enquirer.