I.

ence has the peculiar characters of eternal and SER M. necessary, of which we have but very inadequate Ideas. We are confcious of intelligence in our felves, and the knowledge of fome truths; and we cannot help afcribing the fame to the Deity, notwithstanding the infinite disparity which there is between his knowledge and ours. And in like manner as moral powers and enjoyments are the greatest glory and happiness of our nature, we cannot avoid attributing them to him, tho' he poffeffes them in a manner which transcends our comprehenfion. If however, we conceive benevolence in the Deity to be the great, indeed the sole spring, of his Actions which terminate on other beings, this gives a plain reason why he has an invariable regard to moral rectitude in all his ways and works; namely, because his perfect understanding fees the neceffary connection it always has with the greatest Good in the whole, which is his ultimate end.

Suppofing our neceffary difcernment of moral good with approbation, and moral evil with disapprobation, to be founded in a Senfe

This being the effect of a voluntarily divine Constitution, may be alledged to furnish an objection against our inferring from fuch a fenfe in us, that the fame is in God himself;

as

SERM. as in a feemingly parallel cafe it must be I. acknowledged he has not fuch fenfible

perceptions, nor pleasure and pain from them, as we have by the external fenfes, which are, equally with the moral sense, to be attributed to his appointment. But between these two cafes, however in fome refpects resembling each other, there is a great and manifest difparity. The external fenfes have plain marks. of infirmity upon them, whereby they evidently appear to be below the transcendent excellence and perfection of the fupreme Being: They ferve only the purposes of a weak condition : They convey the notices of things, (and by the frame of our bodily organs they must be very imperfect notices,) to a Spirit which is nearly allied to, and depends in the exercise of its power upon, a frail body. The ideas receiv'd by them are very inadequate; not true and full reprefentations of the nature of things, but fome of their qualities and effects, principally relative to the purposes of our animal constitution. And therefore they cannot, without grofs abfurdity, be attributed to the fupreme most perfect mind, whose knowledge is independent on all occafions and events; who fees not causes by their effects, but effects in their caufes; not the external appearances only, but by immediate

every

intuition, the intimate effences of all things; SER M. and whofe condition is infinitely above I. kind and every degree of weakness or indigence. But on the contrary, a sense of moral rectitude, especially pure benevolence into which it may be ultimately refolved, cannot but appear to have an abfolute excellence in it, worthy of the most perfect nature: Nay, we cannot look upon any Agent as truly amiable without it. It does not fuppofe the least degree of imperfection; nor is to be conceiv'd as ordain'd to a higher end, but constitutes its own chief end; is the immediate foundation of the highest enjoyment we can apprehend any intelligent nature capable of; and esteem'd by all rational beings merely for its own fake: Or as fome learned men fpeak, (tho' I think not very clearly,) it seems to have a neceffary foundation in the eternal reason of things. And upon the whole, so much of this sense as is engraven upon our hearts, may well be accounted the finishing part of the divine image in our nature.

What has been faid may be fufficient to anfwer the objection; but that which was last mention'd concerning the external fenfes, will lead us to a distinct proof of the moral-agency and rectitude of the Deity. Tho' we cannot fay, in general, that whatever fense there is

in

I.

SERM. in us, the fame must be in God; on the contrary, whatever imperfection there is in any of our fenfes, it must not be attributed to him; for there is and neceffarily must be an imperfection in the effect which is not in the voluntary, defigning, caufe; yet this must be allow'd as a true principle, that whatever real perfection, (i. e. capacity either of communicating or enjoying happiness,) there is in man, or any creature, the fame is in God, or a fuperior perfection analogous to it. And therefore it is juftly infer'd even from our external fenfes, that fince We perceive by them, which is a perfection above the state of inanimate nature, He also perceives, tho' in a manner altogether free from the weakness which belongs to our manner of perceiving. He that planted the ear fhall be not hear? be that formed the eye fhall be not fee? be that teacheth man knowledge fhall be not know? * that is, fince God is the author of that knowledge which we have by our fenfes, or otherwife, whatever we can difcern in our imperfect way, he knows more perfectly. In like manner the judgment of moral differences which is in the mind of man, being derived from God the fame is in him more perfectly; and moral rectitude being the highest excellence which

Pfal. xciv. 9, 10.

the

I.

the human nature is capable of, (raifing it not SER M. only above the inanimate, but all the other animal kinds,) it must be in the original fountain of all excellence, without any of the infirmities which cleave to it in us.

It is true, a great part of this reasoning only proves directly and immediately, that God knows and approves moral good, and difapproves moral evil. But as it is that which effentially constitutes moral-agency in general, it is fufficient to establish the rectitude or moTal perfections of the Deity; especially, so far as is neceffary to fettle in our minds a fenfe of indispensable moral obligations from a regard to him. Indeed in imperfect beings, mere approbation of virtue is not enough to make a virtuous character; because we know by experience, that the difpofitions and practice are not always agreeable to it. Men are often hurried by irregular propenfities and paffions into those pursuits which are contrary to the calm dictates of their understandings; and rafhly do, nay fometimes thro' the prevalence of vicious habits continue in doing, what upon reflection their own judgments difapprove. But this can never be the cafe of à perfectly wife Being, infinitely above all intellectual and moral infirmities, above the poffibility of being furpris'd or mifled, or of

any