The immediate step, however, is to investigate what is the best way to proceed, a way that will be affordable, that certainly will increase stability at every step on the way, and one that future Presidents and future Congresses can debate and make a decision about implementation of each stage of it.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for a repetition of the example that was used about the five layers and 85 percent effectiveness? Would you repeat that for the record?

General ABRAHAMSON. Yes, sir. Five layers of a defensive system might well include such a thing as a layer that could reach out and intercept a ballistic missile shortly after it rises off the pad, when it is indeed very vulnerable, if you can project your power that far. It may also then include a layer at the point that the ballistic missile burns out, but before the time that it really separates into many MIRV'd systems and decoys that make it difficult. There could be one or two layers of midcourse and interception out of the atmosphere, and finally, a layer down near the terminal area, similar to what has been talked about before in terminal defenses, perhaps different technology involved.

If each of those layers were, as I indicated, 85 percent effective, very few warheads would be able to get through. And that is, in fact, the basis of that technology investigation.

Now, what the Fletcher Report is not is a specific suggestion of what system it is that we should build in order to achieve that goal. What it has laid out is a series of technical alternatives that need to be evaluated very carefully. Some of those, I am sure, will be effective; some, in the end, may not be effective.

So it is too early to firmly project and say at this point in time we know that we can do this. However, I think many of us with experience in what this country can produce do feel that that is a worthy goal to set out.

Senator TSONGAS. The number that you used was that if all five layers were 85 percent effective, what percent would get through? General ABRAHAMSON. .01 is the statistical number, sir-one onehundredth of 1 percent.

Senator PRESSLER. I shall ask just one more question, and then I will yield my time to members who have to leave.

Dr. Cooper, in September 1982, I believe you testified before this committee that proponents of space-based missile defenses "grossly underestimated" the time involved and the costs associated with these programs. Has your opinion changed?

Dr. COOPER. Not at all. As a matter of fact, I believe that over the past year, the work of the Fletcher Committee and the statements made by the President himself have shown that my judgments on that are held by a large fraction of both the technical and nontechnical community.

You have to realize that the proponents at that time were talking about having systems in space that were effective within 3 to 5 years. The President has said it may not be possible to create systems of this sort in this century. The Fletcher Committee said that we may be able to create options for ourselves to start development of systems in the 1990's. All of those statements, except for the very optimistic ones are consistent, I believe, with my testimony of last year.

Senator PRESSLER. I have some more questions, but I will yield to my colleagues. I do want to put three articles from the magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology which summarize the key conclusions of the Presidential study groups on strategic defense technology into the record. I will also place in the record two articles by Jeffrey Smith in Science which discuss the intergovernmental disputes that have arisen about the prospects and promise of strategic defense.

[The articles referred to follow:]

[From Aviation Week & Space Technology, Oct. 17, 1983]

PANEL URGES DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES

SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP ADVISES STRONG NUCLEAR MISSILE DEFENSIVE EFFORTS COUPLED WITH EARLY DEMONSTRATION PLANS

(By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.)

WASHINGTON.-An Administration senior interagency group recommended to President Reagan late last week that the U.S. embark on early demonstrations of credible ballistic missile defense technologies to its allies and the Soviet Union.

In recommending a technology development plan to the President, the group, represented by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and William P. Clark, assistant to the President for national security affairs, stressed the importance of showing the U.S. is determined to explore and has the competence to develop the required ballistic missile defense technology.

Parallel study

The interagency report melds a Defensive Technologies Study Team's report with a parallel strategy study conducted between June 1 and Oct. 1. It also presents to the President four funding levels for developing an effective ballistic missile defense system. Funding profiles from Fiscal 1985 through Fiscal 1989 range from $27 billion to $18 billion.

The Defensive Technologies Study Team was headed by James C. Fletcher, former administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The parallel strategy group, known as the Future Security Strategy Study, called FS, was headed by Fred S. Hoffman, director, Pan Heuristics, a division of Research and Development Associates.

"With vigorous technology development programs, the potential for ballistic missile defense can be demonstrated by the early 1990s," the interagency report said. It also stressed that the development program will not impinge in the near term on the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty with the USSR.

Maximum flexibility

"Early development programs are configured to provide maximum flexibility and demonstrated capability within treaties, protocols, agreements and political constraints," the interagency report said.

The report said the nation should establish the resolve for a new strategy to defend against nuclear weapons attack.

It added that an advanced technology ballistic missile defense system for the U.S. and its allies will reduce the military effectiveness of a Soviet preemptive attack with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. "By constraining or eliminating effective counterforce options, the utility of strategic and theater nuclear weapons are reduced and the threshold of nuclear war is raised. It undermines the confidence that an attack will succeed."

Early technology demonstrations planned by the interagency group include:

Underground tests at the Nevada nuclear test site leading toward the ability to scale the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's X-ray laser to full military power, to control the laser beam spread, and simultaneously drive multiple lasers from a single power source.

Acqusition and tracking of reentry vehicles using long-wavelength infrared sensors and high-altitude aircraft. This also includes a separate demonstration of intercepting warheads within the atmosphere above 50,000 ft. and nonnuclear kill devices on interceptor missiles.

Ground-based short-wavelength lasers demonstrated against spacecraft in an antisatellite role.

Generic acquisition, tracking and pointing in space against intercontinental ballistic missiles in the boost phase.

Airborne optical system sensor and a low-cost homing interceptor. These technologies are key to terminal and midcourse intercepts in a multilayered system. This demonstration would be within three to five years following optical technology demonstration on interceptor missiles.

Proof of principle to acquire Soviet ballistic missiles and to track the booster, the first step in a high-technology payoff to use directed-energy weapons for boostphase intercepts.

The plan calls for parallel early technology demonstrations in a three-pronged program-infrared chemical lasers, ground-based excimer lasers and shorter wavelength chemical lasers. Tests could be conducted within a few years to determine the effectiveness of these devices against targets such as spacecraft.

A mid-infrared chemical laser spacecraft with 25-megawatt, 15-meter-dia. optics is depicted above for long-range, space-based antisatellite/defensive satellite missions and for boost and midcourse ballistic missile defense applications. The laser platform would weigh 100,000 kg., and have a run time of 100 sec. Scaling to 1023 watts/steerradian is possible. A multilayered ballistic missile defense system designed to permit only a 10% leakage of reentry vehicles in each layer, with overall leakage of 0.1%, is depicted in artist's drawing at right. Two surveillance and battle management platforms are positioned at an orbital altitude of 100,000 km.

A technology assessment conducted by the Defensive Technologies Study Team that formed part of the interagency report called for the following:

Chemical infrared space laser with a 2-megawatt beam generator feasibility demonstration in 1987. The device is scalable almost immediately to 10 megawatts because of breakthroughs in nozzle technology. Beam control of a 4-meter (13.12-ft.)

segmented optical system and mid-infrared beam control could be demonstrated in 1988.

A 1988 demonstration in acquisition, tracking and pointing could be conducted scalable to 50 nanoradians, with inertial reference technology to support 20-nanoradian pointing.

Free electron visible laser in space with a technical feasibility demonstration by 1986 for multimegawatt devices.

Free electron ground-to-space relay, with atmospheric compensation proof of concept by 1985.

Neutral particle beam technical feasibility demonstration/verification by 1985. The technical feasibility of beam sensing would be demonstrated by 1986.

X-ray laser technical feasibility demonstration to 1016 joules/steerradian by 1988. The interagency group report calls for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to rapidly structure the program plan for ballistic missile defense technology for the Fiscal 1985 budget request to Congress, and for the chiefs to help structure the management approach to the program.

Bridging document

The interagency report to the President is also known as a bridging document since it seeks to blend technology and strategy studies with funding profiles and recommendations. The funding for a technology limited effort prepares for early deployment options. It would provide $2.6 billion to Fiscal 1985, a total of $27 billion in Fiscal 1985 through 1989. The total through deployment of single layer of a multilayered defense by the year 2000 would be $92-94 billion. A multilayer system would cost approximately $95 billion.

Without the early deployment option, the funding in Fiscal 1985 would remain the same, but funding in Fiscal 1985 through 1989 would be reduced to $26 billion. Intermediate funding, with no early deployment option and a later full system deployment would be $2.2 billion in Fiscal 1985, and a total of $20 billion from Fiscal 1985 through 1989.

A fiscally constrained program would cost $1.8 billion in Fiscal 1985, and a total of $18 billion in Fiscal 1985 through 1989.

The bridging document from the interagency group calls for centralized management of the ballistic missile defense program within the Defense Dept., "with a carefully chosen leader specifically oriented with interagency management authority similar to space intelligence efforts."

The interagency report, based on input from the Future Security Strategy Study, said advanced ballistic missile defense offers options to enhance deterrence and increase strategic stability. It adds: "Even prior to deployment, the demonstration of U.S. technology would strengthen military and negotiating stances, and options for immediate deployment would play a significant role in deterrence." It could be a hedge against early Soviet Union breakout of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty.

Over the next few years, the interagency report said technologies can move to higher confidence levels for critical ballistic missile defense decisions, while remaining within current treaty/agreement constraints. The program is therefore structured to identify long-range system payoffs and near-term progress demonstrations. The assessment of the U.S. program presented to Reagan determined that while current technology levels can provide an effective counter to current Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles in some important contingencies, the effectiveness of near-term deployment of systems based on present technologies alone could be eroded by Soviet technology advances and operational responses.

"The long-term technology, however, holds particular promise for highly effective and robust counters to Soviet countermeasures," the report said.

Early demonstrations of ballistic missile defensive technologies would help the U.S. in managing relations with the Soviet Union. But to aid in this, the USSR must be convinced of the seriousness of purpose and the inevitability of U.S. success. This would, according to the interagency report, drive up Soviet costs to maintain an effective strategic force, develop the U.S. ability to adjust to emerging Soviet countermeasures and reactive threats, and demonstrate resolve to sustain a measured steady effort by the U.S.

The technology effort, even in its early phases, complicates and confuses Soviet plans to modernize strategic nuclear forces, the report said. "It drives them to try and develop possible countermeasures, increase emphasis on their air-breathing forces and conduct research and development on new families of weapons delivery systems. It drives the USSR away from preferred approaches of updating and proliferating existing strategic forces.'

The program being recommended to the President is designed to increase the Soviets' role in cooperating with a stable strategic environment. It also is designed to "alter the Star Wars fantasy, establish the credibility and then the reality of defensive technologies."

The successful demonstration of the technology required to develop and deploy a defense system will build credibility and confidence, the report said. But the pressure to demonstrate the technology could push for rapid deployment of "marginal or brittle systems based on available technology," and this should be avoided, the report cautioned.

It proposes rapid development of technology that can deal with postulated Soviet countermeasures. This development approach also would provide a hedge against similar Soviet defensive technologies.

The interagency proposal to the President stresses that North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and Japan should be convinced that even research and development for ballistic missile defense will enhance the potential for arms control or reductions, decrease the nuclear threat overall, increase crisis stability and improve long-term relations with the Soviet Union. "It does not alter the commitment by the U.S. to its allies' defense," the report said.

The Soviet Union has over the last decade conducted substantial research and development in this technology area, "and vigorous defensive activity is necessary to counter ballistic missile defense work by the USSR," the report added. The key to effective defense is low leakage with an indepth layered defensive system.

The boost-phase intercept is essential to the system because it destroys the missile before it can deploy multiple warheads. This minimizes the attractiveness to the Soviets of high-throw-weight missiles with large numbers of reentry vehicles.

Even a very effective boost-phase intercept capability would be augmented with post boost, midcourse and terminal interceptor defenses. "All of the concepts use some space-based assets and survivability of these is a critical issue requiring combinations of technology and tactics available or becoming available. X-ray lasers, chemical, excimer and free electron lasers, particle beams and kinetic energy hit-tokill devices all have high potential for boost-phase intercepts," the report said.