As explained in the report, such an agreement would immediately freeze ASAT technology at current levels. The Soviets would be permanently limited to their existing system, which works only half the time and is incapable of threatening the communications and early warning satellites necessary for nuclear retaliation by the United States. Any attempts to improve the device or to build something sharply different would be seriously if not fatally handicapped by enormous operational uncertainties. "Tests or use of lasers or high-powered transmitters to damage satellite sensors or to burn out satellite receivers would [also] be banned." Verification will be straight-forward, according to the UCS report, because the United States has in place or under development a worldwide network of sophisticated cameras, radars, and infrared sensors capable of peering deep into outer space; and also because any illegal ASAT tests would create "a host of telltale signs," including an observable launch; transmissions to and from the test vehicle; and possibly some target debris, heating, or displacement.

One aspect in particular of the UCS proposal sticks in the craw of Reagan Administration weapons officials. As even the UCS acknowledges, a prompt ban on ASAT tests leaves the United States without any data on the success of its fancy new device, while the Soviets would be left with useful results from several years of testing its device. As Adelman noted last spring, "it is an asymmetrical relationship and it becomes a serious obstacle at achieving an equitable space arms control agreement. [We cannot] eliminate the decade of Soviet ASAT experience." UCS panelists respond by noting first that the Soviet tests have hardly been a smashing success, and second that a new and even worse asymmetry will be created if tests of the U.S. ASAT are allowed to proceed, due to its vastly superior capabilities (it is smaller, faster, and capable of hitting more important satellites). Garwin predicts that "the Soviets involved in building their own ASAT's will say . . . 'we have to go one more round'" in order to match the U.S. system, and a new arms race will be under way.

Despite the appeal of this argument to some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the cosponsors of the House resolution, Congress as a whole has listened harder to repeated Administration statements about the disparity in existing U.S. and Soviet ASAT testing experience. During the summer, for example, the House rejected by a wide margin a proposal to delay the initial U.S. test. It also rejected, by a slightly smaller margin, a proposal to delay the purchase of ASAT parts and testing equipment that require a long time to produce. Due to the concerted efforts of a few ASAT opponents, however, both the Senate and the House were persuaded to accept a provision in the annual defense authorization bill that requires a special presidential certification before the U.S. ASAT can be tested against an object in space. Specifically, President Reagan will be required to certify that the United States is endeavoring in good faith to negotiate an ASAT ban and that the initial test is “necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security."

Although this is clearly not a high hurdle for Reagan to leap, it has had the effect of forcing his appointees to develop some evidence that negotiations on ASAT's are actually under consideration. Consequently, there has recently been a flurry of activity in quarters where the topic previously excited little interest. ACDA, for example, has begun to talk up a study of ASAT arms control options being prepared by a group of scholars under the direction of William Durch a research fellow at Harvard University. Durch says that ACDA acceded to his request for research funding last July and that a copy of his report is due on 1 February, shortly before the date of the second ASAT test, which involves a space-based target. ASAT arms control options are also under consideration by a formal interagency government working group, which is chaired by a Pentagon official. Measures under discussion reportedly include a treaty that bans only the use of ASAT's, not their testing or deployment, and a treaty that would limit both countries to systems now in advanced stages of development. Administration critics assert that the former would of course be meaningless in the event of U.S.-Soviet hostilities, and the latter would, for reasons already described, give the United States a substantial strategic advantage. Hardly anyone who desires an ASAT treaty attaches much significance to the working group activity. General Charles Gabriel, the Air Force chief of staff, and Robert Cooper, the director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, have both publicly expressed opposition to an ASAT ban. A former ACDA official who has been following the issue closely asserts that virtually any significant treaty would conflict with the President's desire to conduct research on space-based antiballistic missile systems, which use similar technology. "It will require, at a minimum, a change in administrations" to achieve an ASAT ban, he says.

The proponents of such a ban believe that the United States is now at a critical juncture in its weapons invention, because successful tests of the U.S. ASAT will soon shatter any realistic opportunity for space arms control. Kurt Gottfried says there is a parallel between today's competition in ASAT's and the development of multiple independently targeted warheads, or MIRV's in the 1970's. MIRV's were developed by the United States in order to counter a primitive Soviet antiballistic missile system, and they provided temporary strategic advantage. But the Soviets soon developed MIRV's of their own, which made U.S. land-based missiles vulnera ble to preemptive attack. “Today, at long last, there is general agreement that we would have been far better off had we abstained from introducing MIRV's", Gott fried says. "This lesson applies directly to antisatellite weapons. The Soviets have been both foolish and reckless to spend some 15 years nurturing a clumsy threat against a rather small portion of our satellites. Their major accomplishment has been to provoke us into building a far more sophisticated system. Our ASAT, if de ployed, will give us a temporary advantage. But as with ballistic missiles, an ongo ing competition in space weaponry will, inexorably, reduce the security of both sides. That should be clear to all by now. Or must we wait . . . a decade hence [to learn] that in 1983 the United States blundered once again by upping the ante in this deadly poker game?"

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 4, 1984]

QUEST FOR NUCLEAR SANCTUARY

It is no surprise to find that, a year after its unveiling, the president's bold proposal for a space-based defense against nuclear attack is under fire. The basic charges are that it would make the Soviets fear the United States intended to attack, that the irreducible weak points in even the most successful imaginable system would leave the country devastated and that the eventual costs would be in the hundreds of billions. What is a surprise is that the informed support for the proposal, in the defense bureaucracy and among defense thinkers, is so qualified. This bears on the current question of the direction and pace of research.

It helps to recall how President Reagan defined his goal a year ago. He urged a quest for a shield so effective as to render offensive weapons obsolete. "I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities," he said. "If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that." The secretary of defense and the White House science adviser continue to enunciate the initial goal to move from deterrence to defense so as to afford the country nuclear sanctuary.

But the Pentagon's research chief has testified he cannot foresee the day that defensive weapons will not be "paired with offensive systems." Both blue-ribbon panels appointed by the White House to study the idea concluded that since perfect protection cannot be assured, offensive weapons will remain essential.

As a result, in place of a claim that eventually missile defense will be foolproof, the claim is now made that anyway it will strengthen deterrence by imposing new uncertainties on a would-be attacker. The president's goal of ending the current risk to military targets and civilian populations is being eased offstage. Now the research money is being tipped to lesser "intermediate" objectives-guarding against accidental launches, protecting MX holes, reducing casualties, and so forth

It is widely granted that an American move will induce a Soviet move. The Soviets, one of the reports says, are "better prepared than we" to proceed

"We have a nation that can indeed produce miracles," the new head of the program said the other day. Precisely so. If you believe in miracles, you may wish to consider supporting the president's five-year $18-to-$27 billion research program. Otherwise, you will want to take it easy.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 10, 1984]

COURTING A NEW ARMS RACE

(By Peter A. Clausen)

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.-President Reagan began the year with professions of good faith on arms control. But on a key test of this new conciliatory tone-the control of space weapons-he continues to stonewall.

Hiding behind dubious arguments about verification, the Administration refuses to negotiate with the Soviet Union to restrain anti-satellite weapons. In January, the Air Force began testing an anti-satellite weapon, which could squander future hopes of controlling these weapons. Meanwhile, America is pressing ahead with the President's "Star Wars" program-an implusible quest for weapons to shield the American people from nuclear attack by intercepting Soviet missiles in flight. These ill-advised policies foreshadow a new space arms race at great peril to our security. Anti-satellite weapons are a bad idea whose time, unfortunately, seems to have come. Development of them threatens the satellites we rely on for warning of attack; monitoring arms control agreements; and military command, control and communications. The vulnerability of such satellites to attack would be a highly provocative factor in future United States-Soviet confrontations, and would reduce the chances of bringing hostilities under control if nuclear conflict actually began. The Administration rejects talks on anti-satellite weapons on the pretext that restrictions on them would be impossible to verify. It is true that an absolute ban on them would pose serious verification problems, but such a ban is not critical. A freeze on testing and deployment could readily be monitored and would achieve the key objective of preventing the further development and perfection of these weap

ons.

But the opportunity for such a freeze is fleeting. The Administration's verification argument could become a self-fulfilling prophecy if American testing continues. Our anti-satellite weapon is launched from a small missile carried by an F-15 fighter plane. Once operational, this weapon would be very difficult to monitor, since there are no obvious differences between F-15's equipped with the device and those not In contrast, the Soviet anti-satellite weapon is placed in orbit by a huge booster rocket operating from known launch sites. Its previous tests have been closely watched by America, and such a weapon could not be clandestinely deployed. Neither the American nor the Soviet anti-satellite weapon can now attack the key communications and early warning satellites stationed in high orbits. But this will change if anti-satellite-weapons development continues. A test ban is needed soon to halt development of these weapons while they remain relatively primitive on both sides, and before deployment of our weapons undermines future control possibilities. Why then does the Administration shun negotiations? For two reasons having little to do with verification. The first is straightforward, if shortsighted: The Administration wants the option of attacking Soviet satellites, even if the price is to forfeit any restrictions on Soviet anti-satellite weapons. The second reason is the "Star Wars" connection. Development and testing of the weapon offers a technological stepping stone to missile defense systems operating in space. This tactic is also legally convenient, since missile defenses are banned by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, while anti-satellite weapons remain unrestricted. America plans to exploit this loophole in developing "Star Wars" weapons and is loath to see it closed. The Administration's approach amounts to playing games with the A.B.M. Treaty, the cornerstone of nuclear arms control. It also undercuts recent American accusations that the Soviet Union is violating the treaty, and precludes any serious attempt to resolve that issue. There is a real danger in all this that the A.B.M. Treaty could come unraveled. This outcome would be all the more tragic because it would be in a lost cause: Independent scientists agree that the hope of defending ourselves against devastation in the event of nuclear attack is an escapist fantasy. It is a dangerous fantasy as well, since the development of missile defenses will inevitably stimulate few offensive arms buildups and make the nuclear balance shakier by multiplying fears and suspicions on both sides.

To prevent a new arms race in space, America must shift course. Two steps are critical: Suspend testing of anti-satellite weapons and start negotiations to halt the further development of them, and give up the costly, futile and dangerous pursuit of "Star Wars" missile defenses. These actions would signal to Moscow that Washington stands by the A.B.M. Treaty and would put us in a position to insist-as we should-that Moscow do the same.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 9, 1984]

"STAR WARS" HAS BEEN BADLY OVERSOLD

REAGAN'S VISION OF SUPER DEFENSE NEEDLESSLY SHAKES THE BALANCE

(By Ernest Conine)

President Reagan, though sometimes a clumsy diplomat, is a good politician. Oth erwise he would not have been twice elected governor of California, then gone on to win the nation's highest office. Nor would he now be in such an excellent position to win reelection as President in November.

That being true, it is hard to understand his bungling of the "star wars" issue Both the President and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger have indulged in sometimes careless exaggerated rhetoric about the purpose and prospects of a stepped-up research-and-development program on ballistic-missile defenses. By doing so they have puzzled and frightened America's allies abroad and handed the Soviet Union a propaganda windfall; they have also given additional fuel to critics at home-all unnecessarily, and all without contributing a thing to national security. Keep in mind that a sizable research program on possible defense against nuclearmissile attack has been going on for years before Reagan ever took the oath of office. And properly so.

The 1972 ABM treaty drastically limited the actual deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems by the United States and the Soviet Union. But neither side has been willing to run the risk of being caught flat-footed if the other suddenly scrapped the treaty and began to deploy an ABM system in order to tip the nuclear balance.

So both great powers have continued to do research-and-development work on missile-defense systems. Such activities do not violate the 1972 treaty.

Considering that the Soviets have begun to do things that bend if they do not break the treaty, no one should have blamed Reagan if he had announced an acceleration of the R&D program on ballistic-missile defense and warned the Russians to abide by the ABM agreement. But he went further.

In his March, 1983, speech on the subject, the President conjured up the vision of an America-and ultimately of a world-free of the threat of nuclear destruction. In his words, a strategic defense program could give us the means of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

If the English language means anything, the President was clearly holding out the prospect of a missile-defense system capable of protecting American cities from nuclear destruction in event of a large-scale missile attack.

Weinberger reinforced that impression when he described the Administration's goal as "a thoroughly reliable and total" defense against nuclear missiles.

Any President must feel cold chills at the thought that, as things stand, this country's only defense against missile attack that would kill tens of millions of Americans is the threat to kill tens of millions of Russians in return. The idea of a missiledefense system that would not hold a protective umbrella over our heads should be alluring to us all, not just to the President.

The problem is that in order to protect cities from attack an ABM system must be nearly perfect. If even a small proportion of the Soviet Union's 9,000 strategic nuclear warheads got through, millions of Americans would die. And almost nobody, even among the most enthusiastic proponents, believes that achievements of a leakproof system is likely.

Any serious effort to build such a system, rather than merely to conduct research and development as an insurance policy against a Soviet abrogation of the ABM treaty, will be enormously expensive.

The Pentagon estimates that it will require an expenditure of $26 billion over a five-year period to explore alternative technologies and to enable whoever is President in the early 1990s to decide whether an actual missile-defense system should be built.

If the answer is yes, the ultimate price tag is anybody's guess. Estimates run as high as half a trillion dollars-this for a program that, according to most knowledgeable defense scientists in and out of government, couldn't be relied on to save the American people from nuclear destruction, anyway.

Given a large enough development effort, there is a better chance of developing a system that would stop, say, 40% or 50% of incoming warheads aimed at this country's land-based strategic missiles. That wouldn't protect the populace, but it might introduce enough uncertainty into Soviet calculations to keep the Kremlin deterred from any thought of a surprise attack.

This more limited objective is in fact the most that most of Reagan's own advisers think is possible. But even here there is a downside.

To begin with, the Soviets might try to offset the effectiveness of such a missilesilo protection system by building more missiles which they could do more cheaply than we could improve the ABM system. They could also place more emphasis on submarine-launched cruise missiles that could be countered only by an expensive U.S. air-defense network that does not now exist.

Obviously such a train of events would be inconsistent with the stated U.S. goal in the strategic-arms negotiations, which is to bring about a reduction in numbers of warheads on both sides.

Beyond that, as Weinberger was reminded by this country's allies again last week talk of a limited ABM system disturbs the Europeans on grounds that (1) it smacks of an American attempt to avoid the consequences of a nuclear war in Europe, and, (2) by ensuring that the Soviets would build a comprehensive ABM system of their own, it could erode or destroy the deterrent value of the independent French and British nuclear forces.

Again, Reagan could simply have asked Congress for more money to pursue our expanded research-and-development program as a hedge against Soviet abrogation of the ABM treaty and let it go at that. After all, by the Administration's own optimistic timetable, we are talking about a weapon system that wouldn't be ready before the 21st Century.

By talking prematurely and unnecessarily in terms of changing this country's entire strategy in a way that could introduce new instabilities into the balance of terror, he has done a disservice to himself and to true national security.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Mar. 29, 1984]

LET'S USE CAUTION ON "STARS WARS"

A U.S. MONOPOLY IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY WOULD NOT LAST LONG

(By A. Fenner Milton)

For 20 years we and the soviets have been naked before each other's nuclear arsenals. If the new Soviet party chief, Konstantin U. Chernenko, pushed the button, 8,000 nuclear warheads could rain down on America in 30 minutes-and we couldn't stop a single one. Our only option would be retaliation with our own warheads.

The very fact that we both lie open to massive nuclear assault is one reason nobody has pushed the button. Deterrence has served us well. But will it work forever? This is the first question to ask in any consideration of space-based defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.

A year ago President Reagan offered us a vision of a different world. In his socalled "Star Wars" speech he told us that he was betting on technology to save America from nuclear war. In effect he told scientists that "you gave us nuclear weapons, now make them go away," and called for a national commitment to develop a defense against ballistic missiles.

Spurred by the President's speech, the Pentagon studied the question of whether space-based systems can accomplish this mission, and its findings are embodied in the $24-billion Strategic Defense Initiative now before Congress. The point of this research-and-development package is merely to permit an informed decision in the early 1990s on whether to go ahead with 'an engineering validation phase"-i.e., building real hardware. This package is only a small first step on the very long path toward a meaningful defense of our cities.

The path is long and uncertain because such a defense must deal with all vehicles that could deliver nuclear warheads. Also, the offensive side can use a whole bag of tricks to make defense more difficult. But, given our current vulnerability, no one can deny the appeal of the President's long-term goal of "rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." In fact, the goal is made even more attractive politically by recent progress with techniques that can shoot down missiles in flight without using nuclear explosives.

There may be useful intermediate steps on the path to an effective population defense. Silo defense may be the most cost-effective way to be sure that our land-based missiles will survive. Even an imperfect defense of our command and communication systems could introduce enough uncertainty to make a first strike against them unattractive. And a defense of cities that would never stop a massive Soviet attack could protect them against accidental launches or third-party attacks.