have one or two other systems (as Sen. John Warner asserts, based on classified reports) that would seem to be all the more reason for us to negotiate.

The U.S., of course, has been doing more than refusing to talk where ASATs are concerned. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown announced back in 1977 that the Soviets had attained a limited anti-satellite capacity. Since then, we've developed and successfully tested (against imaginary points in space, not actual targets) an anti-satellite missile mounted on an F-15 fighter. So far, many experts, impressed with the weapon's mobility and technology, rate it superior to the Russian system.

The fact that the Soviets use the same facilities for ASAT testing as for their nonmilitary space program lends credence to the administration's concerns about the difficulty of verifying compliance with an ASAT treaty. But verification problems are inherent in all arms-control negotiations. The point is that it makes sense, as we proceed with our own development, to make a good-faith effort to keep the arms race out of space, provided that a mutually acceptable method of verification can be found.

The result of refusing to take this two-track, develop-and-negotiate approach would probably be the same as has been the case with other strategic systems, from submarine-launched ballistic missiles to MIRVS. Time after time, we thought we could attain superiority; and, time after time, the Soviets responded to a U.S. advantage by seeking to catch up.

It may be possible to avoid this cycle in the ASAT race. The Soviets have suggested that an attempt be made, and, with no illusions at all about the purity of Kremlin motives, we think the president should take them up on the idea.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 16, 1984]

HEPHAESTIAN FOLLY IN SPACE

When Hephaestus forged a cunning net to catch one of his fellow Greek gods in bed with the wrong goddess, the technology was successful-but the embarrassed victim was so enraged he threw the technologist down from heaven, leaving him with a permanent limp.

The Reagan Administration has its share of overweening technologists who cannot foresee the consequences of their actions-most notably, those bent on building a device to shoot down Soviet satellites. They are renewing a race that will eventually destroy the vital sanctuary now enjoyed by American satellites used for military communications and early warning of attack.

American surveillance satellites compensate for the grave disadvantage of an open society menaced by a militarized closed society. They monitor Soviet activities and compliance with arms control treaties. At present the Soviet Union's erratic antisatellite rocket can't reach the most vital American satellites, all in high orbit. Development of a better rocket would give the Russians an important edge.

Fortunately, they now seem of a mind to quit the race. They have offered a moratorium on further antisatellite tests and have proposed an antisatellite treaty that, while unacceptable in present form, provides a basis for serious discussion.

No doubt they've been brought to the table by a novel antisatellite device being developed by the Air Force. So ingenious is the technology of the new weapon that it can be delivered in an 18-foot missile launched from a plane. The antiquated Soviet device is a 150-foot rocket.

Yet instead of seizing on this opening, the Administration, in a rambling report to Congress, asserts that treaty talks would be unproductive because the problem needs more study. The American ambassador to the Geneva disarmament conference last week accused the Soviet Union of trying to preserve a one-sided military advantage in space.

The Air Force, however, is nearing a point of no return. Once its tests are completed, its antisatellite missile will be so far in advance of its Soviet counterpart that the United States will possess a onesided advantage. Soviet interest in a treaty will probably dry up and the race resume.

An agreement that halted further testing of antisatellite weapons would leave the Russians with a cumbersome weapon that threatens only low-orbit photoreconnaissance satellites. That threat could easily be countered, and the vital high-altitude satellites would keep their sanctuary.

Some may oppose a ban on further tests of antisatellite weapons because it would also curtail certain tests needed to develop a Star Wars defense shield against ballistic missiles. That's a foolish reason to put American satellites in jeopardy. The Air

Force says its weapon would be needed to destroy the Soviet satellites that spy on the American fleet. But even if the satellites cannot be countered otherwise, that hardly outweighs the advantage of keeping American satellites inviolate.

High technology can improve or impair defense, depending on the nature of the race. The Air Force's clever new missile for shooting down satellites, and the Administration's refusal to negotiate, threaten to leave American security with a permanent limp

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 13, 1984]

STOP SATELLITE Killers at the NEGOTIATING TABLE

The world stands at a crossroads in its uses of outer space. Decisions the United States and the Soviet Union make now will dictate whether this frontier can be protected or turned into earthlings' next battleground.

One such decision came early this month when President Reagan told Congress he would press ahead with development of weapons, called ASATs, designed to destroy satellites.

Previous U.S.-Soviet talks on ASATs halted in 1979 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1983, the Soviets, despite the breakdown on nuclear arms talks, proposed a treaty dismantling existing ASATs and banning new ones. Congress had required the administration to show "good faith" efforts to negotiate a ban on ASATs, which the Soviets have and the United States is testing. But Mr. Reagan said the United States would not negotiate on an ASAT ban because it would be virtually impossible to verify.

This decision must be reconsidered. For one thing, the impossibility of verification is sharply disputed: Many leading American scientists say a workable ASAT treaty could provide adequate verification safeguards. More important, the very real difficulties of verification should be addressed at the bargaining table, not used as an excuse to avoid it.

Attention has focused on development of satellite-killer weapons because it is at a critical stage. Space satellites have become the nerve center of superpower military operations. But so far neither the Soviets nor the Americans can threaten satellites in high earth orbits where the most important early warning and communications systems are based.

The Soviet anti-satellite weapon at present is slow, ground-based and rather crude; most U.S. satellites are above its range. The United States is developing a swifter, much more sophisticated weapon, launched from an F-15 fighter plane. At its present stage of development the U.S. ASAT would not threaten high orbit satellites but it has the potential to do so. Many experts fear that perfection of the U.S. weapon will spark an unchecked race with the Soviets for better satellite killers. Why is the administration so determined to press ahead with ASAT development? First, because it believes the United States must have a fully tested ASAT to deter the Soviets from using theirs. Second, because it says a ban cannot be verified.

Some experts contend an unmentioned third reason for the administration's push on ASATs is that a treaty banning them would hinder work on President Reagan's equally controversial "star wars" space defense plan.

The merits of tit-for-tat countering an inferior Soviet ASAT (as opposed to blocking its potential use through other forms of military threat), must be measured against the danger of space weapons race. The United States has the most to lose in such a race. America depends on its more technologically advanced satellites more heavily than does the Soviet Union, both for peaceful scientific and commercial uses, and to provide communications, navigation, intelligence and targeting information for the military.

Moreover, while the United States has a lead in space technology, it could evaporate under a determined Soviet effort, as has happened before.

As for verifying a ban, no one would deny the difficulties. Nor can verification ever be perfect. But claims that reasonably effective verification is impossible are challenged by experts like the Union of Concerned Scientists, which includes former top CIA, military and intelligence figures. They say that any secret attempts by the Soviets to upgrade or add to its present system would require testing that would be detectable. They also believe that use of non-ASAT weapons or space vehicles to threaten satellites would be detectable and that a Soviet "breakout" (breaking the treaty and quickly assembling an illegal ASAT system) would be much harder than the administration asserts.

When calling verification “impossible” the administration often refers to a “comprehensive" ASAT ban. Even the most ardent ASAT foes don't demand a total ban because they know it can't be achieved. But there are ways to address the problem short of that as even Mr. Reagan noted. Congress must continue to press him to negotiate on ASATs before the race for satellite killers moves beyond control.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 4, 1984]

INFINITE SHOOTING GALLERY

President Reagan says that he will go ahead with plans to turn outer space into a shooting gallery. His casual rejection of pleas to keep violence out of space is foolhardy in and of itself. What it suggests about the Administration's real views on controlling arms of any kind may be worse.

Reagan told Congress this week that he will not even discuss a proposal by the Soviet Union to negotiate ways to keep satellite-killers out of space. That is no surprise; a Pentagon official said as much two weeks ago. But it is a blow to those who see a virtually clean slate on which to write a two-way prohibition on violence in outer space, a far different picture from the nuclear standoff on Earth and the deadly silence at other arms-control bargaining tables.

The President keeps saying that the United States is willing to resume talks on controlling short- and long-range missiles, of which there now are thousands deployed by both major nuclear powers. His refusal to talk about controlling a handful of weapons that either do not work very well as in the case of the Soviet Union's onagain-off-again anti-satellite program, or have not been fully tested, as with the American satellite-killer, raises serious doubts about the value that the Administration places on arms control of any kind.

The U.S. system, which is about two years from deployment, involves launching small rockets at targets in space from high-flying F-15 fighter planes. The Soviet satellite-killer is more cumbersome, using the space equivalent of floating mines that pull along side targets and blow up, taking the targets with them. Soviet test have not been spectacularly successful.

Reagan's argument for his program depends heavily on a number of straw men. Reagan told Congress that the United States will press ahead with its satellite-killer program in part because there are "significant" difficulties with verifying Soviet compliance with a treaty that would ban weapons capable of destroying satellitesnotably those used by both countries for military reconnaissance.

But nobody else is talking about an absolute ban. Even the strongest advocates of arms control in space acknowledge that no treaty could ban research or possession of such weapons. Without on-site inspection, it would indeed be impossible to know who was designing and building what weapons in secluded laboratories. And there are as may good reasons for our not wanting Soviet inspectors tramping around our bases as there are for their not wanting to let American inspectors in.

But a treaty that banned testing could be effective. One trademark of Soviet military research and development is cautious, plodding progress, never deploying anything new until it has been tested over and over. A ban on tests, which could be spotted from U.S. satellites, could keep Soviet weapons out of space, even if Moscow went ahead with research, as this country undoubtedly would.

The President said that Soviet proposals for a ban on satellite-killers are full of "ambiguities and loopholes." But nobody wants him to whip out a pen and sign the Soviet draft. They want him to try to negotiate a treaty without loopholes.

The message says that the United States must continue to "protect against threatening measures." Again, the Administration system is not designed to fend off Soviet statllite-killers but to kill Soviet satellites. America already is trying to make U.S. satellites less vulnerable-the only way to protect them against threatening

measures.

Congress appropriated $19 million for further work on the U.S. system last year, but there were two strings attached. One required the Administration to spell out its plans to negotiate an arms-in-space treaty before it could spend the money. Even the rejection puts Reagan in technical compliance with that part of the law. The other string, which passed the Senate on a 91-0 vote, requires the Adminsitration to start negotiations on a treaty before it test-fires any missile at a target in space. Reagan obviously will try to cut that string.

Congress must stick with its position. The fact that the President brushed aside the doubts of Congress about satellite-killers this week sets the stage for a full

debate not only on weapons in space but also on arms control generally. No issue in this election year is potentially more important.

[From Science, Oct. 28, 1983]

ADMINISTRATION RESISTS DEMANDS FOR ASAT BAN

ARGUMENTS FOR A BAN ON ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS GAIN AN INCREASINGLY SYMPATHETIC HEARING IN CONGRESS, BUT REAGAN'S APPOINTEES SHOW LITTLE ENTHUSIASM

(By R. Jeffrey Smith)

Five years ago, for principally selfish reasons, the United States proposed to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union that would have stymied the development of weapons capable of efficiently destroying satellites in outer space. The general idea was that such a treaty was needed-in light of technological developments then on the horizon-to ensure the continued survival of satellites that form the basis of strategic deterrence and arms control verification. A subsidiary motivation was economic: such an agreement would close off costly and unnecessary competition in a challenging area of weapons design.

Despite the considerable appeal of such a treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union were unable to come to a quick agreement, and the talks petered out in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a result, the development of efficient satellite killers is now nearly at hand, and no agreement on their abolition is within sight. This autumn, the United States will conduct the first space test of a device that can potentially kill critical early warning and military communications satellites orbited by the Soviet Union (Science, 14 October, p. 140). The Soviets, meanwhile, are experimenting with new kill mechanisms on their existing antisatellite weapon, and are threatening to develop an ASAT identical to that now under construction by the United States. Both nations are also working aggressively on more advanced ASAT's, which could in theory use laser beams to destroy orbiting satellites from a great distance. This contest will cost the United States tens of billions of dollars.

A growing number of scientists have become concerned about the size of these expenditures and fearful about where these endeavors will lead. "We believe that the testing or deployment of any weapons in space-in part by threatening vital satellite assets-significantly increases the likelihood of warfare on earth," says a petition circulated last spring by Richard Garwin of IBM and Carl Sagan of Cornell University. "We join in urging the United States, the Soviet Union and other spacefaring nations to negotiate . . . a treaty to ban weapons of any kind from space, and to prohibit damage to or destruction of satellites of any nation." The petition has been signed by 36 scientists and retired military officers, including Lee Dubridge, science adviser to President Nixon; Noel Gayler, former director of the National Security Agency; James Van Allen, president of the American Geophysical Union; Thomas Donahue, chairman of the Space Science Board at the National Academy of Sciences; and Margaret Burbidge, chairman of the board of AAAS.

Congress is also becoming interested in stemming the migration of weapons to outer space. Lst July, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a resolution, introduced by Senator Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), urging the Reagan Administration to negotiate a prompt moratorium on ASAT tests, followed by a "mutual and verifiable ban" on ASAT's, and then by a more general prohibition on all spacebased or directed weapons systems. "This is a unique opportunity to halt a major arms race before it gets off the ground," says committee chairman Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill.). "Once started, it may prove nearly impossible to stop." A similar resolution introduced in the House by Representative Joe Moakley (D-Mass.) has garnered 124 cosponsors.

So far, these pleas have gone unheeded by the Reagan Administration, which harbors considerable skepticism that a verifiable ASAT ban is possible, much less desirable. Kenneth Adelman, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), noted last May, for example, that "there are difficult technical problems, including verification problems, that constitute fundamental obstacles to progress in this area. These daunting problems have not been resolved, and we should not rush into negotiations on these subjects until we are ready with verifiable proposals that will enhance national security." He also noted that an ASAT ban would severely limit the Pentagon's ability to destroy Soviet satellites that are used to direct weapons against the U.S. forces. "I am not saying there is an overriding concern but

there is a concern. Thus, there is a dilemma as to whether arms control agreement that would restrict our ability to deal with such satellites are in our national inter est.'

To date, the Administration has refused to conduct either bilateral or multilatera negotiations on ASAT's, despite the repeated urgings of various European alliesled by Italy-whose own satellites would be endangered by a shooting war in space Until recently, it was opposed even to the establishment of a formal working grou on outer space arms control under the auspices of the United Nations Committee o Disarmament in Geneva. "We want to ensure that, if established, it could usefull undertake full discussion of the relevant issues," Adelman explained last May. Thi task is of course complicated by the fact that, after studying the matter for severa years, the Administration says that it remains unsure what the relevant issues are The Soviet Union, in contrast, has recently expressed enthusiasm for space arm control negotiations, and has presented a draft treaty to the United Nations tha would require the dismantling of existing ASAT systems and prohibit the develop ment of any future spacebased weapons. In August, at a meeting in Moscow with: delegation from the U.S. Senate, Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov also promised to suspend tests of the Soviet ASAT so long as the United States refrains from "sta tioning in outer space antisatellite weapons of any type"-an ambiguous phrase that may refer to scheduled testing of the new U.S. ASAT stationed on F-15 je fighters.

Independent analysts such as John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists say that these initiatives go a long way toward satisfying earlier U.S. complaints During the formal negotiations in 1978 and 1979, for example, U.S. negotiators were angered by the Soviets' refusal to include satellites orbited by third countries (such as China or the members of NATO), within the scope of a treaty. They also were upset by a Soviet claim that any nation could act against satellite engaging in "hos tile or pernicious acts"-a phrase that was generally considered dangerously ambig. uous. The United States had also objected to language in a previous draft Soviet treaty that could be interpreted as permitting the use of force against space objects unilaterally regarded as out of compliance with the treaty provisions. None of these objectionable ideas survived in the latest Soviet draft, which states clearly that "it is prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force against space objects in orbit around the earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner." Apart from any other considerations, Pike says, "the scope of the new proposals seems to suggest a very real Soviet interest in dealing with the major issues posed by the space weapons competition.'

Despite the apparent improvements, the Administration responded negatively to the diplomatic initiative at a State Department press conference on 25 August. Spokesman Alan Romberg noted that, although it was being given careful study, "our preliminary examination . . . suggests that inadequate verification is one of its major weaknesses." In particular, he said it would be "nearly impossible to verify through national technical means alone the dismantling and destruction of the Soviet ASAT system" because it sits atop a rocket booster, the SS-9, that is frequently used for other missions. "We do not know how many. ASAT interceptors have been manufactured, and it would be relatively easy for the Soviets to maintain a covert supply of interceptors for use in a crisis. Since satellites which serve U.S. and allied national security are very few in number, any Soviet cheating on an ASAT agreement, even on a small scale, could pose a prohibitive risk."

Pike responds by acknowledging that verification of a ban on possession of ASAT's would indeed be difficult, if not impossible. "Clearly, they are correct," he says. "Even if all the personnel of the CIA, the FBI, and even the Post Office were loosed upon the Soviet Union to roam the country at will, the task of hiding a handful of satellites no larger than a small car would still be child's play." But this is a bogus issue, he suggests, because there is actually no need to seek a ban on ASAT possession. Verifiable restrictions on use, testing, and deployment would be sufficient to undermine confidence that even hidden ASAT's could be effectively used, he

says.

Kurt Gottfried, a physicist at Cornell who recently directed a lengthy study of ASAT's for the Union of Concerned Scientists, makes a similar argument. "A treaty that forbids possession presents knotty problems of verification that would require lengthy negotiations," he told a congressional hearing last May. Along with nine other scientists and weapons experts who worked on the UCS report, Gottfried recommends a more modest goal: the United States and the Soviet Union should agree merely to halt all testing of "weapons that can destroy, damage, render inoperable, or change the flight trajectory of space objects."