We are dealing here with a difficult and dynamic subject. In my opinion it will not be possible to deal with this subject effectively by searching for "definitions," except in a few special instances. What is needed is clarity as to facts and purposes, as noted in the Guidelines for this symposium.

Now, having said something about definitions that might seem to some to be unpleasant, I will pause to say something nice and also important. Returning to the International Astronautical Federation, my being invited to be here with you reminded me of the first IAF annual conference I attended. It was held in Rome, in 1956. It was my privilege to present to that conference a paper on Artificial Satellites of the Moon, then viewed by many as a rather remote subject, but experienced just about a dozen years later by Apollo astronauts as a quite practical activity. Well, the high point of this recollection is that the IAF meeting of 1956 included an audience with the Pope at Castel Gandolfo, where I also had the interesting experience of meeting Mr. Sedov, then a prominent official in the space program of the U.S.S.R. The Pope made a brief address, which was a model of simplicity and sound commentary-His Holiness did not seem to need any appeal to definitions to say what he meant to say, that is, that space activities should be encouraged and pursued to the general benefit of mankind. Sedov and I knew even then that serving that purpose would not involve forbidding acts by people in military uniforms-regulated, yes, partly; forbidden, no.

Spacecraft, in many forms, serve quite desirable and stabilizing functions of an essentially military nature; probably the most important being collection of objective intelligence information to guard against surprise-indeed, against unwise reactions in panic-to support verification of compliance with arms control agreements and to suppress excessive military build-ups flowing from simple ignorance or wide ranges of uncertainty about forces of others. Space objects to serve these purposes can be at risk from anti-satellite weapons. Space objects are also now used in routine—and not so routine-ways to support and amplify the effectiveness of terrestrial military forces, with reconnaisance information, communications, meteorologic data, and so on. It is in this area that most motivation is to be found for wanting anti-satellite systems. No responsible national military establishment or alliance system-can simply ignore a potential opponent in possession of space assets for targeting or otherwise enhancing the effectiveness of its terrestrial forces. And it is precisely here that the critical choice lies, to be made by governments in the broad sense: is it better to posses and promote means for doing violence to space objects in readiness to suppress astronautical support to terrestrial forces or is it better to live with this practical problem-and make military adjustments as wit and will can enable-by putting into place effective agreed limitations on anti-satellite capacities and activities? In my personal opinion, the latter would be the better choice. To put it simply, President Eisenhower's goal of a regime of "open skies" is here, thanks to astronautical technology, and represents an asset for such strategic purposes as guarding against surprise attack and needless weapon build-ups and promotion of arms control. That is far more important than catering to the tactical convenience of being ready to poke out the eye of a radar satellite that might occasionally see a ship. Indeed, if such radar satellites become an unbearable nuisance, why not construct an agreement to prohibit them? In short, tactical forces need to evolve in ways which are based on acceptance that they must operate under an "open-skies" environment if the strategic value of "open skies" is to be preserved.

I am in favor of an early anti-satellite agreement. Why do we not have one now? During bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations we came rather close to one; then the whole enterprise went into a suspended state because of U.S. domestic political developments and the entry of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan and other difficulties on the international scene. In my opinion, this suspension should not have happened; but it did this is not the only instance of an event that I found out of harmony with my personal views. Again in my opinion, those bilateral efforts should be resumed at the earliest possible time.

What about draft text for an anti-satellite agreement? With all respect, I am not in sympathy with non-governmental efforts to construct and float such texts. I argued this view with friends who worked on the report of the Union of Concerned Scientists, urging them instead to prepare an illuminating report on the substance

8

7 Robert W. Buchheim; "Artificial Satellites of the Moon"; Associazione Italiana Razzi, Proceedings of the VII International Astronautical Congress; Rome; Sept. 17-22, 1956.

8 "Anti-Satellite Weapons: Arms Control or Arms Race?;" Union of Concerned Scientists; Cambridge, Mass.; June 30, 1983.

of the matter. They took half of my advice, and they wrote a very good essay on substance; but they were not inclined to give up their text-drafting. Why do I not fancy text-drafting? Setting aside details, if I were again to be sent off by my Government to negotiate on this subject, I would not want to be burdened by the existence of such a text, based on no clear government authority and devoid of any negotiating record based on careful discussion with the other side, not to mention agreements on substance between the sides. A unilateral draft submitted by a non-government organization is only that: a unilateral draft of a non-governmental organization, representing no agreement on substance but likely to prejudice the position of the side whose private citizens prepared that draft. I have absolutely no expectation of being sent off to negotiate on anti-satellite matters and surely have no notion as to how the Government of the U.S.S.R. might go about a hypothetical negotiation; but please bear in mind the prejudicial potential of a text, as well as its possible constructive features, when you move toward your conclusions.

What about the U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations of 1978 and 1979? Some of the documentation circulated before this symposium carried an expression of interest in the positions of the two sides during those discussions. The discussions were serious and open, and as I think is usual in serious talks, both sides were learning-a matter of the utmost importance. Both sides brought in a first common position, that is, that the talks would be held in confidence; that common position stands today. I will, therefore, not go much beyond two points-first, the structure of the subject comes down to: agreement on violent acts that will not be carried out against space objects, limitations on testing of means for doing violence to space objects, and provisions to limit or prohibit possession of means for doing violence to space objects; and second, I will, to the extent I can within the existing understanding as to confidentiality, answer questions you might have. Boris Mayorski is here; he was on the Soviet side of the table during 1978-1979 talks, and I would hope that he could join me in replying to your questions.

In my opinion, the critical question to deal with in considering the drafting of an international agreement on anti-satellite matters is that of scope: I think a general anti-satellite agreement dealing with actions, or means for such actions, against space objects and only space objects-is both desirable and possible 3; I think that a general agreement as to actions, and means for such actions, to influence the carrying out of functions through systems using space objects as components can only be dealt with through ad hoc agreements such as the SALT provisions concerning the verification function or the International Telecommunications Convention as to the communications function.3 I will not try to amplify much on this matter just now, but I would be happy to deal with it further if you care to do so during the discussion period.

The outlines of a simple example would be as follows: suppose A wants to try to gather information about military radio emitters of B, and chooses to make this attempt by putting into orbit a satellite which is equipped to pick up radiofrequency fields in its vicinity and then do whatever its master, A, has programed it to dowhich might include repeat transmissions to ground stations of A. The functions of the space object are to detect radiofrequency fields in its vicinity and transmit to ground stations information in accordance with its programing—a party to general anti-satellite agreement might very reasonably undertake not to do violence to the space object. It is, however, unlikely to the point of utter implausibility that any country B would undertake, in an anti-satellite agreement to, in effect, guarantee the free carrying out of the intelligence-collection of the system (made up of the space object plus various kinds of ground facilities and other components)-such an undertaking would involve abandonment of such elementary rights as the right to turn off some of its radio emitters as it might choose.

Now a few positive remarks on definitions. The Guidelines paper for this symposium mentioned a need for a definition of "weapons of mass destruction." There is such a definition. My files did not cough it up in time for this trip, but it exists, from the late 1940's if I recall correctly. It began in a fairly obscure UNGA report on conventional weapons, in which conventional weapons were taken to be weapons other than weapons of mass destruction. There, weapons of mass destruction were defined as nuclear explosive weapons, radiological materials weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, and any new weapons created in the future that would have comparable destructive effects. This definition again came into view when discussions began in the CCD on possible new types of weapons of mass destruction, and was generally acknowledged by participants. It was again referred to in the Letter of August 11, 1981, sent to the United Nations General Assembly by Foreign

Minister Gromyko Concerning a Prohibition on the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space.9

There are too many individual topics to try to get into hardly any in detail, but I do want to mention a few:

1. Arms race in space-what? Judge Lachs mentioned space-based ABM directed at offensive deterrent missiles. Such a development would have implications for ASAT; but their likely nature is still rather opaque. What else? Reconnaissance satellites and satellites to use in control of terrestrial forces are of a military nature but seem desirable and should not be held liable to attack. Some more clear description of the "arms race" idea is needed. This point is noted in the Guidelines for this symposium.

2. The Guidelines also note the need to give attention to hazards to space objects from sources other than weapons. In my opinion, this need is now greatest as to satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Crowding of this uniquely important orbit region is a real prospect, with attendant prospects for accidents and other problems. The International Telecommunications Convention is the proper legal vehicle for dealing with frequencies, powers, antenna characteristics, etc., but more could be done. Examples might be agreed prohibition on explosive extirpation of exhausted satellites, undertakings to hold to a minimum any unnecessary separation into several parts of objects placed in geosynchronous space, undertakings to equip satellites emplaced in geosynchronous space so they can be dispatched out of geosynchronous space when no longer useful, undertakings to co-operate in developing such anticlutter

means.

3. There is no proximate need for drawing an arbitrary line to separate jurisdically air space from outer space.

4. There are some unnecessary flaws in the Registration Convention. For example, it refers to "a space object" (singular) through reference to a launch (singular); however, with rare exceptions, a typical launch will place into outer space more than one object-perhaps 5, 10, 20 or more, all on separate trajectories which cannot be described by any single set of orbit parameters mentioned in the Convention. The paramenters reported to the UN Registry seem to be based on orbits of "active" objects, but this is not sufficient in an era of dormant objects which can be activated later-for example communication satellites "stored in orbit" for rapid activation or non-emitting "space mine" weapons. The registration process is too slow to be of interest with respect to limitations on weapons in space.

5. The Soviet anti-satellite interceptor of current type does go into orbit, so presumably it should be registered when tested. The US anti-satellite interceptor of current type will not go into orbit.

6. Perhaps the Registration Convention could be augmented by an agreement that the Parties will inform one another of the locations of their national registries and description of procedures for examining national registries.

7. An important strengthening of the outer space legal régime occurred in December 1983 when the People's Republic of China became a Party to the Outer Space Treaty.

Ambassador BUCHHEIM. What do I have to say about strategic defense? Not much. I am in favor of exploring it seriously and in depth. I would not be in favor of a military program founded on a premise of success, certainly not a premise of success on some date certain.

There is another way to render long-range ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete, and that is by agreement, as soon as possible, to just eliminate them entirely. Then a strategic defense would need only deal with the small numbers of missiles that might be held in a clandestine way. This might seem like a remote negotiating objective; however, there is an old truth among gamblers: You can't win if you don't try.

Letter dated Aug. 10, 1981 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General; "Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of Thirty-sixth Session: Conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space"; A/36/192, Aug. 11, 1981; United Nations General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session.

What about the significance of the Soviet draft treaty? In my opinion, it has no significance except Soviet recognition of the widely held view that something in the way of space arms control agreement is needed. I do not believe the Soviet draft would make much difference one way or another in specific bilateral negotitions.

In my opinion, a truly vital element in crafting an ASAT agreement is that of scope. I addressed this matter in some detail in testimony before your Arms Control Subcommittee, sir, on September 20, 1982. I remain convinced that understanding on scope is the essence of the matter.

Let me say a few more words on the administration's report of March 31: One positive and of very great importance and a second one of minor importance.

The positive point is this: The administration's report includes the observation that negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on control of antisatellite weapons were held in 1978 and 1979: That those talks involved an extensive discussion of some of the problems of space arms control, and revealed major differences between the two sides.

Now, I don't really care about the use of the word "major." What I do care about is the word "revealed," because this seems to me to be in harmony with what I said in The Hague in March, that is, that in the 1978-79 talks, both sides were learning, a matter of the utmost significance.

Negotiating is a learning process. Anyone who thinks he has it all figured out in advance is bound to fail.

The other side will have good ideas, and also some poor ones. So will we. The essential learning process cannot be carried out by either side all by itself.

As to my minor negative comment on the administration's report of March 31, I think the arguments about residual ASAT capabilities are much overdone. Only a real nut, or someone under extreme provocation, would shoot himself in the foot by setting off a nuclear explosion in space. Use of a ballistic missile as an ASAT instrument would not be so simple as is implied by the report's phrase "with modified guidance logic." The problem is bigger than that.

Concern about "electronic countermeasures of sufficient power to damage satellite functions" was operationally solved in the early days of radio. It was then called "automatic volume control" and it is now routine.

Finally, an optimistic note: A substantial aberration in the international legal regime was removed when the People's Republic of China became a party to the Outer Space Treaty in December 1983.

I would like to add an informal remark about something that has become a bit of an obsession with me. We have heard it again today. It concerns shooting down satellites.

An unhappy fact of physics is that if you shoot at a satellite and even if you hit it, it will not come down. It will stay up there and go its merry way Newtonia leaving the shooter with the puzzle, "What have I accomplished?"

It is a big problem. With an air defense system, if you shoot at an airplane and hit it, it crashes. You know what you have accom

plished. Not in the case of a satellite. The damage assessment task is a big part of the problem.

Thank you, sir.

[Ambassador Buchheim's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT W. BUCHHEIM

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasant honor to be invited to appear before you and your Committee on very important forward-looking matters.

1

In your letter of invitation 1 you expressed a particular interest in-and I quote"your judgment as to progress made in the ASAT negotiations you led and your assessment of the potential now for successful negotiations to limit or ban ASAT's and other space-based and space-directed weapons; the significance of the Soviet draft treaty; and, the Administration's March 31, 1984, report on ASAT arms control." As to your first question, Mr. Chairman, I will repeat, verbatim, what I said on the subject of space arms control on March 12, 1984, at a symposium in The Hague (full text provided for the record): 2 "What about the U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations of 1978 and 1979?... The discussions were serious and open, and as I think is usual in serious talks, both sides were learning-a matter of the utmost importance. Both sides brought in a first common position, that is, that the talks would be held in confidence; that common position stands today. I will, therefore, not go much beyond two points-first, the structure of the subject comes down to: agreement on violent acts that will not be carried out against space objects, limitations on testing of means for doing violence to space objects, and provisions to limit or prohibit possession of means for doing violence to space objects; and second, I will, to the extent I can within the existing understanding as to confidentiality, answer questions you might have. Boris Mayorski is here; he was on the Soviet side of the table during 1978-79 talks, and I hope that he would join me in replying to your questions."

What I said in The Hague 6 weeks ago I stand by today, except that Mr. Mayorski is not here today as he was then and there.

I am fully aware of the constraints on any person or institution having an involvement with U.S. foreign policy; however, it seems to me that somebody, somehow, on the U.S. side, ought to be talking now with the Soviet side about the ASAT matter. Conversations in the Committee on Disarmament are appropriate and important, but they are, in my opinion, no substantial substitute for essential bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. dealings. This is not a question of alternatives; it is a question of combinations. There does need to be a widely-held agreement on space arms control; but such widely-held agreement must include agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The report, dated March 31, 1984, of the U.S. Administration, endorsed the important work of the CD, and I applaud that, but I do not applaud the seeming absence of the essential bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks.

As a part of my statement in The Hague on March 12, 1984, I also said—and again I quote myself "I am in favor of an early anti-satellite agreement. Why do we not have one now? During bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations we came rather close to one; then the whole enterprise went into a suspended state because of U.S. domestic political developments, the entry of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan, and other difficulties on the international scene. In my opinion, this suspension should not have happened; but it did--this is not the only instance of an event that I found out of harmony with my personal views. Again in my opinion, those bilateral efforts should be resumed at the earliest possible time". I stand by those views today, with particular emphasis on the importance of resumption of bilateral U.S.U.S.S.R. negotiations; the suspension of negotiations in 1979 should not have happened. In the context of these hearings, Mr. Chairman, I add the personal expression of opinion that your Committee would do a vital service to our country by seeking more effective ways to interdict any practice of petulance in the place of policy in our dealings with the U.S.S.R., to try to ensure that desirable negotiations on topic A are not terminated just because of problem B-"linkage," which means many things to many people, will never go away, but it ought not get carried to the point of impractical and hopeless national rejection of the plain fact that the

1 Letter; Charles H. Percy to Robert W. Buchheim; Apr. 11, 1984.

2 Robert W. Buchheim; "Anti-Satellite Weapons, and Some Related Matters"; (Prepared remarks before a symposium on Conditions Essential for Maintaining Outer Space for Peaceful Uses, sponsored by the United Nations University and The International Institute of Space Law of The International Astronautical Federation; Peace Palace, The Hague.) Mar. 12, 1984.

3 "Report to the Congress, U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control"; attachment to letter from President Reagan to Hon. George Bush, President of the Senate; Mar. 31, 1984.