But despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less... A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy - Pagina 226door Hao Wang - 1997 - 408 pagina’sGedeeltelijke weergave - Over dit boek
| Paul Benacerraf, Hilary Putnam - 1983 - 600 pagina’s
...comment is in order on Godel's view of mathematical intuition, particularly since he explicitly says, **"We do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory"** (1964: 270) [483-4 in this volume]. This seems to commit Godel to intuition de re. His immediately... | |
| San Diego Philip Kitcher Professor of Philosophy University of California - 1983 - 300 pagina’s
...statement of the position at which we have arrived can be found in a celebrated passage by Kurt Godei. **But, despite their remoteness from sense experience,...should have less confidence in this kind of perception,** ie in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories... | |
| Joan Weiner, Professor of Philosophy Joan Weiner - 1990 - 307 pagina’s
...looks to be a direct response to this worry. In "What Is Cantor's Continuum Problem?" Godei says that **despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...should have less confidence in this kind of perception,** ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception. 8 That is, to the question "What provides... | |
| R.L. Tieszen - 1989 - 210 pagina’s
...their indirect connection with physical experience is very loose...". In a much quoted passage he says **But despite their remoteness from sense experience,...should have less confidence in this kind of perception,** ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception, which induces us to build up physical theories... | |
| A.D. Irvine - 1989 - 366 pagina’s
...Physicalism in Mathematics, 95-120. © 1990 by Kluwer Academic Publishers. And in the same vein: ... **despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...should have less confidence in this kind of perception,** ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.. . 4 In making their position clear, platonists... | |
| James Robert Brown - 1993 - 175 pagina’s
...are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions (1944, 456f.) And in the same vein: **despite their remoteness from sense experience, we...being true. I don't see any reason why we should have** any less confidence in this kind of perception, ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.... | |
| Constantin Virgil Negoita - 1992 - 376 pagina’s
...167). And Kurt Gödel seriously believes that”... we do have something like a perception also of **objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that...should have less confidence in this kind of perception,** ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception. .. . They, too, may represent an aspect of... | |
| Margaret Gilbert - 1992 - 521 pagina’s
...Godel as a distinguished proponent of the view that abstract objects are perceived. (Godel writes: **'we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory',** 1964, pp. 271-2.) 64 I waive questions about the phenomenon of 'blindsight' here. The implications... | |
| Renos Papadopoulos - 1992 - 1750 pagina’s
...mathematical garb. GOdel himself cast his fate with intuition in this statement (Davis and Hersh 1981: 319): **Despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception** of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as... | |
| Michael Kober - 1993 - 429 pagina’s
...nicht anführen 3 - wie etwa Gödels platonistische Versicherung hinsichtlich der Mengenlehre zeigt: **"But, despite their remoteness from sense experience,...should have less confidence in this kind of perception,** ie, in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception [...]." 4 Es gibt freilich ein Argument gegen... | |
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