24. For statements of administration policy, see James L. Buckley, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, and Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Economic, Trade and Security Policy, testimony to Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, in Transfer of United States High Technology, pp. 155-68 and 249-60, respectively. For Department of Defense and other programs, see U.S. Department of Defense, The Technology Transfer Control Program: A Report to the 98th Congress by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, February 1983 (Washington: Department of Defense, 1983); U.S. Department of Defense, The Technology Transfer Control Program. A Report to the 98th Congress, Second Session, by the Secretary of Defense, February 1984 (Washington:

Department of Defense, 1984).

25. Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Pentagon's Wide Role on Exports," New York Times, 21 March 1984, pp. D1, D23. Michael Schrage, "High-Tech Rules Urged for Asians: U.S. Is Seeking Export Controls for Pacific Rim," Washington Post, 15 August 1984, pp. D8, D18.

26. See, for example, Fred Hiatt, "U.S. Firm, Suspecting Soviet Connection, Cancels Computer Deal," Washington Post, 28 January 1984, p. A6.

27. Harvey Brooks, "Notes on Some Issues on Technology and National Defense," Daedalus, Winter 1981, p. 131.

28. U.S. Department of Defense, The Fiscal Year 1985 Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition, p. A-2.

coming.

in our JanuaryFebruary issue

Nukes and the Catholic Bishops

plans to deploy forces or actual force deployments are necessary to motivate Soviet interest in arms control negotiations. According to this theory, the Soviets are quite unlikely to accept arms control constraints unless they are able to obtain useful constraints placed on U.S. weapons programs that particularly concern them. Consequently, since the Soviet Union has a dynamic strategic buildup in progress, U.S. force modernization is said to provide a necessary basis for successful negotiations.2

The implications of these two divergent theories and their respective validity (or lack thereof) are significant. Yet although the theories suggest direct contradictory avenues for success in arms control, there appears to be little historical analysis available to support either of them.

Concentrating on an approach to arms control which follows Winston Churchill's admonition that a country must “arm to parley," one can find that this approach has been effective in several historical instances. These examples do not suggest that weapons deployments (or credible plans for deployment) must always precede success in arms control, but they do indicate that such a linkage does have historical precedent. They also indicate that it is not necessarily inconsistent to pursue arms control negotiations and strategic modernization programs simultaneously. Thus, these historical case studies can provide at least a partial answer to those who question the sincerity of those who support both negotiations and modernization.

Post-World War I Naval Agreements

When World War I ended in November 1918, the United States Navy found itself in an unbalanced posture in regard to ship construction. Having acceded to British arguments during the war, the U.S. Navy had concentrated on building antisubmarine craft, such as destroyers, at the expense of deploying a fleet that included significant numbers of new capital ships (battleships and battle cruisers). Britain,

on the other hand, had continued throughout the war to build all types of ships. The result was that by war's end Great Britain's navy was not only distinctly superior to the American navy in capital ships but numerically stronger than the latter in all categories of warships-a situation that senior American naval officers were determined to remedy.

In November 1918, the U.S. Navy Department issued a planning document which concluded that the calculation of American naval requirements should be made relative to the strength of the British fleet. It also set forth three guiding principles for naval preparation: • Superiority of type (ship for ship).

• Equality in strength in capital ships and cruisers.

• Equality of shore facilities in the essential operating areas.

Congressional approval in 1920 of the Navy's 1916 shipbuilding program, which included funding for significant increases in capital ships, convinced the British government that the United States was determined to achieve parity with the British navy. British leaders were aware that an economically healthy, heavily industrialized United States could afford to expand her naval shipbuilding programs to reach that goal. By this time, however, Great Britain was undergoing increasing economic difficulties. The result was a realization by key British leaders that a U.S.-British naval treaty to prevent an expensive and dangerous naval arms race was vitally important.

Accordingly, at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922, Britain agreed to concede equality to the United States Navy in capital ships. Although she retained overall naval supremacy for the time being, for the first time in the history of the British Empire she had limited herself to numerical equality with another power.

The importance of this early-twentieth-century example of successful arms control is not belied by the fact that in 1919-21 the United

States and Great Britain, recent allies in the "war to end all wars," were peaceful competitors and not strong political antagonists. Britain, recovering slowly from a war that had strained the resources of her empire to the utmost, saw a United States whose industrial and financial might had not only remained unharmed by the war but, in fact, had been increased by it and whose large, modern merchant fleet now threatened to capture an increasing portion of the world trade long dominated by British shipping. The U.S. Navy saw in Britain's continuing alliance with a resurgent Japan the danger of the establishment of a potentially hostile naval superiority in the Pacific. While the level of political enmity (actual or potential) between the two countries was not nearly as high as it has been between the United States and the Soviet Union since 1945, it still was not inconsiderable.

Yet perhaps the most important lesson that can be drawn from events now more than sixty years past is that even negotiations occurring under the auspices of relative political amity required the evidence of a commitment to a strong naval building program to induce the greater naval power to negotiate significant restrictions on the strength of its own fleet. If such an effort was required in an atmosphere where relative political amity existed between the parties, it certainly would appear unlikely that anything less could provide success under present circumstances.

Obviously, there is not a direct analogy between negotiating with such an erstwhile ally. as Great Britain during the post-World War I period and negotiating with the Soviet Union during the current period. The level of political enmity is much higher in current U.S.Soviet relations than in U.S.-British relations following World War I. This fact perhaps underscores an important point. Even in negotiations occurring in the context of relative political amity, the ultimate leverage leading to concessions was a credible and dynamic military modernization program. That such bargain

ing inducements are helpful in the context of hostile political relations is illustrated in a number of instances in U.S.-Soviet parleying.

SALT I and the U.S. ABM Program

The signing of SALT I (including the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement) is perhaps the clearest example of the relationship between American nuclear weapons programs and the successful negotiation of arms control agreements. It is quite clear that congressional authorization for deployment of the U.S. Sentinel ballistic missile defense (BMD) program was the primary stimulus behind Soviet agreement to engage in SALT and Soviet accession to both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement.

It is unlikely that Soviet agreement to "an exchange of opinion on arms limitation, including anti-missile systems" (i.e., SALT) on 27 June 1968, only three days after Congress decided to fund Sentinel, was coincidental. The notion of SALT had been first broached to the Soviets in December 1966. During the negotiations, it became clear that the primary Soviet interest was not in limiting offensive force levels but in countering the ongoing U.S. antiballistic missile (ABM) program. During the first round of SALT in Helsinki (November 1969), Moscow indicated its concern in this regard, reversing the Soviet position that Premier Aleksei Kosygin had presented two and a half years earlier at Glassboro. Then, the Soviet leader had indicated that ABM systems obviously were defensive and should not be restricted; during the initial round of SALT, however, the Soviet Union indicated an interest in limiting ABM systems and opposed discussion of limitation on offensive force qualities.

During the third SALT round in Helsinki, the Soviets revealed that they wanted an agreement on antiballistic missiles only and no limit on offensive weapons. In contrast, the United States sought limitations on offensive strategic systems and particularly the SS-9 ICBM, which

was viewed as a threat to the survivability of Minuteman ICBM launch control centers. This lack of common objectives could have led to a stalemate. The solution, initiated by the United States, was to link offensive limitations to limitations on ABM systems.

There is little doubt that the ongoing U.S. ABM program (which was renamed Safeguard, as announced by President Nixon on 14 March 1969) was the object of Soviet negotiating interest and was the leverage that the United States exploited to gain Soviet agreement to the offensive limitations achieved at SALT I. The causal linkage between the U.S. Sentinel/Safeguard ABM program and the offensive limitations of SALT I was noted by many who participated directly in the negotiations. It was affirmed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, during SALT I congressional hearings.3 Dr. Kissinger noted: "Our experience has been that an on-going program is no obstacle to an agreement and, on the contrary, may accelerate it. That was certainly the case with respect to Safeguard." John Foster (then Director of Defense, Research, and Engineering) and Gerard Smith (then Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) noted the same linkage."

The principle that the deployment of weapon systems is helpful leverage in arms control negotiations is reflected also in U.S. anxieties and in Soviet statements. For example, the U.S. quest for strategic arms limitations was essentially a response to the Soviet strategic offensive buildup of the 1960s. By 1969, the primary U.S. SALT goal was to limit the deployment of counterforce-capable ICBMs such as the Soviet SS-9, which was thought to pose a threat to the Minuteman force. (The primary U.S. negotiating objective at SALT and START has continued to be the limitation or reduction of heavy, "destabilizing" ICBMs, such as the SS-9 and its successors, the SS-18 and SS-19). The U.S. perspective at the time of SALT I was that there existed two distinctly different types of potential responses to the Soviet buildup. The United States could emphasize a renewed de

ployment program of its own; or it could emphasize capping the Soviet buildup through arms control. The United States chose to pursue negotiations and détente. The interesting points are that the United States pursued arms control in response to the Soviet strategic buildup and that U.S. decision makers generally perceived negotiations and modernization programs as distinct and separate alternatives.

Similarly, it is clear that the Soviets believe that it was their own dynamic strategic buildup that "forced" the United States to seek arms control negotiations. As General V. G. Kulikov (then Chief of the Soviet General Staff) observed, the United States was forced to seek the SALT accords after "soberly evaluating" the growth of Soviet military might. This belief reflects the facts of the situation, and perhaps more important, the Soviet perspective concerning what is required for success in the arms control process. As Paul Nitze (now U.S. Representative to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks during the Reagan administration) has noted:

Soviet officials have indicated the view that what they call the "correlation of forces". . . is moving in their favor and that, even though we may today believe that their proposals are one-sided and inequitable, eventually realism will bring us to accept at least the substance of them."

In short, it is the apparent Soviet perspective that dynamic modernization programs are the currency of arms control negotiations. This Soviet view should be a critical factor in U.S. considerations concerning conditions likely to facilitate Soviet agreement in arms control negotiations.

There is little doubt that the Soviet Union required the manifest threat of American ABM deployment before consenting to engage in strategic arms control negotiations, and a quid pro quo in terms of limitations on U.S. weapons programs before agreeing to negotiated restraints on its own forces. This negotiating principle was revealed in the reported response by Soviet academician A. N. Shchukin (member