those words of God' to the Jews,_"Who hath required these things at your hands," -as if every thing were to be condemned concerning which God could say, “Quis requisivit ?" meaning, that'he never had given a commandment to have done it;' it is considerable, that God speaks not of voluntary, but of commanded services; he instances in such things which himself had required at their hands, their sacrifices of bulls and goats, their new-moons and solemn assemblies, their sabbaths and oblations:' but because they were not done with that piety and holiness as God intended, God takes no delight in the outward services: so that this condemns the unholy keeping of a law, that is, observing the body, not the spirit of religion ; but at no hand does God reject voluntary significations of a commanded duty, which proceed from a well-instructed and more loving spirit, as appears in the case of vows and free-will-offerings in the law; which although they were will-worshippings, or voluntary services, and therefore the matter of them was not commanded, yet the religion was approved. And if it be objected that these were not will-worshippings, because they were recommended by God in general; I reply, Though they were recommended, yet they were left to the liberty and choice of our will; and if that recommendation of them be sufficient to sanctify such voluntary religion, then we are safe in this whole question ; for so did our blessed Saviour in the Gospel, as his Father did in the Law, "Qui potest capere, capiat;" and, “He that hath ears to hear, let him hear;"--and so saith St. Pauls, “ He that standeth fast in his heart-(that is, hath perfectly resolved, and is of a constant temper)-having no necessity, but hath power over his own will, and hath judged in his heart that he will keep his virgin, doth well.” But the ground of all is this; all voluntary acts of worship or religion are therefore acceptable, “Quia fundamentum habent in lege divina,” “God's law is the ground of them;"—that is the canon; and these willworshippings are but the descant upon the plain song : some way or other they have their authority and ground from the law of God; for,

26. Whatsoever hath its whole foundation in a persuasion that is merely human, and no ways relies upon the law Isa. i. 11--13.

I Cor. vii. 37.

or the expressed will of God, that is will-worship in the criminal sense, that is, it is superstition.-So the vulgar Latin and Erasmus render the word 101o0onokela, or' will-worship;' and they both signify the same thing, when will-worship is so defined: but if it be defined by “ a religious passion or excess in uncommanded instances relating to, or being founded in, the law and will of God,” then will-worship signifies nothing but what is good, and what is better; it is a free-will-offering, åkpeßeotárn aipeous tñs Sonokelas, like the institution under which St. Paul was educated, “the strictest and exactest sect of the religion;" and they that live accordingly, are érovolasóuevol teộ vóuw, “the voluntary and most willing subjects of the law.” So that although concerning some instances it can be said, Tò jév XOTIV ¿nirayua,“ This is directly a commandment;” and concerning others, Tò di rñs εμής προαιρέσεως κατόρθωμα, «This is a virtuous or a right action of my choice;" yet these are no otherwise opposed than as 'in' and 'super;' for the one are èv rūs ļvtodīs táčel, " in the order and constitution of the commandment,” the other mèo Tv {vroly (as St. Chrysostom expresses it), are

above the commandment:" yet all are in the same form or category: it is within the same limits and of the same nature, and to the same ends, and by the same rule, and of the same holiness, and by a greater love; that is all the differ. ence : and thus it was from the beginning of the world, in all institutions and in all religions, which God ever loved.

27. I only instance in the first ages and generations of mankind, because in them there is pretended some difficulty to the question. Abel offered sacrifice to God, and so did Cain ; and in the days of Enoch “men began to call upon the name of the Lord b;" and a priesthood was instituted in

Multi commentariorum et controversiarum scriptores ex his verbis eliciant, homines illios secali novos ritos, novas ceremonias et religionis formas instituisse; qain scilicet certuin est, ab esordio humani generis homines Deum coluisse, atque adeð

invocasse nomen Domini.' Hoc ergo quod quasi de novo factam recensetur, est institatio novorum rituum, quibus quasi de proprio Deum colere voluerunt. At notandum est in horum verboram sensu, nilil esse certum quod ad hanc rem possit pertinere. Nam passim, in Hebræorum cominentariis, seculum Enoch tauquam impium memoratur: et Hebræi exponere solebant hanc locum quasi sensus esset; tuno chin Enoch natus esset, bomincs, profanasse nomen Domini invocando nomen ejas snper creaturas,' sic enim verbum 50799, derivatura scilicet à voce Colin, i.e. profana, profanasse interpretati sunt: bomines scilicet tunc cæpisse appellare filios bominom, et animalia, et herbas, nomine Dei sancti benedicti. Abenezra aulem et Abrabaneel simpliciorem borom verborum sensum retinucrunt: cæpernnt scilicet' commemorare creatorem suum, et ad nomen ejus opera ct rationes dirigare.'

every family, and the 'major-domo' was the priest, and God was worshipped by consumptive oblations : and to this they were prompted by natural reason, and for it there was no command of God. So St. Chrysostomi: Oủ yào Tepi TIVOS μαθών, ουδε νόμου περί απαρχών διαλεγομένου ταύτα ακούσας αλλ' οίκοθεν και παρά του συνειδότος διδαχθείς, την θυσίαν εκείvnv dvíveyke "Abel was not taught of any one, neither had he received a law concerning the oblation of firstfruits ; but of himself and moved by his conscience he offered that sacrifice:"--and k the author of the Answers 'ad Orthodoxos' in the works of Justin Martyr affirms, Ουδείς των θυσάντων τα άλογα θυσίαν τω θεώ προ του νόμου μετά την θείαν διάταξιν έθυσε, κάν φαίνεται ο θεός ταύτην προσδεξάμενος, τη ταύτης αποδοχή δεικνύων τον θύσαντα ευάρεστον αυτώ, « They who offered to God, before the law, the sacrifice of beasts, did not do it by a divine commandment, though God by accepting it gave testimony, that the person who offered it, was pleasing to him.” What these instances do effect or persuade, we shall see in the sequel; in the meantime I observe, that they are men of differing persuasions used to contrary purposes. Some there are that suppose it to be in the power of men to appoint new instances and manners of religion, and to invent distinct matters and forms of divine worship; and they suppose that by these instances they are warranted to say, 'that we may in religion do whatsoever by natural reason we are prompted to;' for Abel, and Cain, and Enoch, did their services upon no other account. Others that suspect every thing to be superstitious that is uncommanded, and believe all sorts of will-worship to be criminal, saythat if Abel did this wholly by his natural reason and religion, then this religion, being by the law of nature, was also a command of God; so that still it was done by the force of a law, for a law of nature being a law of God, whatsoever is done by that is necessary, not will-worship, or an act of choice and a voluntary religion.

28. Now these men divide the truth between them. For it is not true that whatsoever is taught us by natural reason, is bound upon us by a natural law: which proposition, although I have already proved competently, yet I shall not omit to add some things here to the illustration of it, as being

do Ad Quest. 82.

13 de Staluis.

very material to the present question and rule of conscience. Socinus, the lawyer, affirmed reason to be the natural law, by which men are inclined first, and then determined to that which is agreeable to reason. But this cannot be true, lest we should be constrained to affirm, that God hath left the government of the world to an uncertain and imperfect guide; for nothing so differs as the reasonings of men, and a man may do according to his reason, and yet do very ill. “ Sicut omnis citharædi opus est citharam pulsare, periti vero ac probe docti recte pulsare: sic hominis cujuscunque est agere cum ratione, probi vero hominis est recte cum ratione operari ;” so Aristotle': “ It is the work of every musician to play upon his instrument; but to play well requires art and skill: so every man does according to reason; but to do righteous things, and according to right reason, must suppose a wise and a good man.” The consequent of this is, that reason is not the natural law, but reason when it is rightly taught, well ordered, truly instructed, perfectly commanded; the law is it that binds us to operate according to right reason, and commands us we should not decline from it. He that does according to the natural law, or the law of God, does not, cannot, do amiss : but when reason alone is his warrant and his guide, he shall not always find out what is pleasing to God. And it will be to no purpose to say, that not every man's reason, but right reason, shall be the law. For every man thinks his own reason right, and whole nations differ in the assignation and opinions of right reason; and who shall be judge of all, but God? and he that is the judge must also be the lawgiver, else it will be a sad story for us to come under his judgment, by whose laws and measures we were not wholly directed. If God had commanded the priests' pectoral to be set with rubies, and had given no instrument of discerning his meaning but our eyes, a red crystal or stained glass would have passed instead of rubies: but by other measures than by seeing we are to distinguish the precious stone from a bright counterfeit. As our eyes are to the distinction of visible objects, so is our reason to spiritual, the instrument of judging, but not alone : but as reason helps our eyes, so does revelation inform our reason;

| Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 7.-The words, quoted by Bp. Taylor, seem to be a free paraphrase of the original : see Wilkinson's edition, page 22. (J. R. P.)

and we have no law, till by revelation, or some specific communication of his pleasure God hath declared and made a law.

m Now all the law of God which we call natural, is reason, that is, so agreeable to natural and congenite reason, that the law is, in the matter of it, written in our hearts before it is made to be a law. "Lex est naturæ vis, et ratio prudentis juris atque injuriæ regulæ:” so Cicero". But though all the law of nature be reason: yet whatsoever is reason, is not presently a law of nature. And therefore that I may return to the instances we are discoursing of, it follows not that although Abel and Cain and Enoch did do some actions of religion by the dictate of natural reason, that therefore they did it by the law of nature: for every good act that any man can do, is agreeable to right reason, but every act we do is not by a law; as appears in all the instances I have given in the explication and commentaries on these two last rules. Secondly, on the other side it is not true, that we may do it in religion, whatsoever we are prompted to by natural reason. For although natural reason teaches us that God is to be loved, and God is to be worshipped, that is, it tells us he is our supreme, we his creatures and his servants; we had our being from him, and we still depend upon him, and he is the end of all who is the beginning of all, and therefore whatsoever came from him must also tend to him; and whosoever made every thing, must needs make every thing for himself,--for he being the fountain of perfection, nothing could be good but what is from, and for, and by, and to, that fountain, and therefore that every thing must, in its way, honour and serve and glorify him :-—now I say, although all this is taught us by natural reason, by this reason we are taught

ni Lex Dei mentem nostram incendens, eam ad se perlrahit, conseientiamque nostram vellicat, quæ et ipsa mentis nostræ lex dicitur. Damascen. lib. 4. cap. 23. de Fide. Ubi Clichlovæus sic oxponit, lex mentis uostræ est ipsa naturalis ratio Dei legem habens sibi inditam, impressamque et insitam, quà bonum à malo interno lumine dijudicamus.-S. Hieronymus epist. 151. ad Algasi. q. 8. hanc legem appellat legem intelligentiæ, quain ignorat pueritia, ne scit ipfantia, tanc autem venit et præcipit, quando incipit intelligentia.—B. Masimus, tom. 5. Biblioth. centur. 5. cap. 13. Lex nalaræ est ratio naturalis, quæ captivum tenet sensum ad delendam vim irrationalem. Hoc dixit imperfectè, quia ratio nalaralis, tantùm est materia legis naturalis.Rectins S. Augustinus, lib. 2. de sermone Domini in monte, Nullam animam esso quæ ratiocinari possil, in cujus conscientia non loquatur Deus : quis enim legem nataralem in cordibus hominum scribit nisi Deus ? hoc scilicet innuens non rationem solam, sed Deum loqnentem es principiis nostræ rationis sanxisse legem.--Idem dixit ex. plicatias, lib. 22. contr. Faas. cnp. 27. legem æternam esse divinam rationem rel voluntatem ordinem naturalem conservari jubentem, pertur bari vetantem.

* De Legibus, i. 6. Wagner, p. 27.

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