said St. Jeromed in a like case: "It is your part to obey, and to do what is commanded, and not to judge your judges; but to believe all that to be good which your prelate commands you ;"-meaning, when his command is instanced in the matter of the divine commandment. In things that are plain and easy, every man can be a judge, because indeed there needs none, for there is no question: but in things of difficulty, and where evidently God is not dishonoured, it is very much our duty to obey the church.

5. Thus the church hath power to command us to be devout in our prayers,-to be charitable to our brother, to forgive our enemy,-to be heartily reconciled to him,-to instruct the ignorant,-to follow holiness, and to do justice, and to be at peace with all men; and he that obeys not, does walk disorderly, and may be used accordingly with all the power the church hath intrusted to her, according to the merit of the cause: but it is certain he sins with a double iniquity, that refuses God's commandment and the precept of his spiritual superior; for, in these things, every man can exhort, but the bishop can command; that is, he binds the commandment of God by a new obligation and under a distinct sin, the sin of disobedience.

RULE IV.

The Church hath Power to make Laws in such Things, which are Helps and apt Ministries and Advantages of necessary Duty.

1. THIS rule is expressly taught by St. Basile: "Necessario ea nos in memoriam debemus redigere, quæ dicta sunt ab apostolo, 'prophetias nolite spernere'-Ex his autem intelligitur quod si quid nobis imperatum est, quod idem sit cum mandato Domini, aut adjuvet, illud, tanquam voluntas Dei, studiosius diligentiusque à nobis suscipi debet;" "We must remember what the Apostle said, 'Despise not prophesyings.' But if any thing be commanded us which is all one with the command of God, or may help it, it ought to be undertaken by us with diligence and study as if it were the will of God." -Thus if our bishop, in his precepts and sermons of chastity, e In Regul. Brevior. cap. 14.

d Ad Rusticum Monach.

command that the women go not to the public spectacles, where are represented such things which would make Cato blush, and Tuccia have looser thoughts, they are bound, in conscience, to abstain from those impure societies; and not only from the lust, but from the danger. For in vain is it, that God should intrust the souls of the people to spiritual rulers, and give them wisdom to do it, and commandment to do it with diligence, and gifts of the Holy Spirit to enable them to do it with advantage, if the people were not tied in duty to decline those places and causes, where and whence they do usually perish.

2. And in pursuance of the episcopal authority, in the like instances it was, that St. Chrysostom held his pastoral staff over the disobedient: for the church had declared, that, in the holy time of Lent, the people should live austerely, and therefore he told them, at that time especially, that they should not go to the public shows and theatres; and to the disobedient he adds this threatening f: "Sciant omnes his criminibus obnoxii, si post hanc nostram admonitionem in ea negligentia manserint, non toleraturos nos, sed legibus ecclesiasticis usuros, et magna austeritate docturos ne talia posthac negligant, neve tanto contemptu divina audiant eloquia ;" "Let all that are guilty of such crimes, know, that if after this admonition they persist in this neglect, we will not suffer it, but use the laws of the church against them, and shall teach them with great austerity, that hereafter they do not hear the divine sermons with so great contempt."

3. Upon the same account, the church, in her sermons of repentance, does usually, and hath authority to, enjoin actions of internal and external significations and ministries of repentance. In the primitive church the bishops did indict fasting-days, and public litanies and processions of solemn supplications and prayers to be used in the times of public danger and necessity. This we find in Tertullian"; "Episcopi universæ plebi mandare jejunia assolent, non dico de industria stipium conferendarum, ut vestræ capturæ est, sed interdum et ex aliqua solicitudinis ecclesiasticæ causa:" "The bishops are wont to command fasting-days to all the people, not for secular ends, but for ecclesiastical necessity and advantage."-For when God hath established an office Lib. de Jejunio in Psychicos.

f Honil. 6. in Genes.

and ministry, it is certain he made it sufficient to acquire all the ends of its designation: since therefore the government even of internal actions, and a body or society of men must suppose external acts, ministries, circumstances, and significations, no man can from without govern that which is within, unless he have power to govern that, without which the internal act cannot be done in public, in union and society.

4. And here comes in that rule of the law, 'The accessory follows the nature of the principal;' which hath been so infinitely mistaken and abused by the pretences of Romanists and Presbytery for the establishing an empire ecclesiastical in things belonging to themselves, not to God. For the soul being the principal and the body its instrument, they hence argue that they, to whom the souls are committed, have therefore a right to govern the body, because it is accessory to the soul; and if the body, then also the accessories of the body, actions, circumstances, time, wealth, lands, and houses, in order to the spiritual good of the soul: which proposition because it is intolerable, it can never be the product of truth, and therefore must be derived from a false understanding of this true rule of the lawyers. But because, in its true meaning, it serves to conduct many, and particularly this rule of conscience, it is necessary that we know the true meaning of it.

The Rule The Accessory follows the Nature of the

Principal' explicated.

5. Therefore for the understanding of it so far as can be in order to our design, it is to be inquired, 1. How we shall know, which is the principal and which is the accessory. 2. In what sense the accessory must follow the nature of the principal.

6. (1.) That which is principal to one purpose, is but the accessory to another sometimes. If Titius hires my land and builds a house upon it, the house is but the accessory, because it came, after my land was in possession. But if Titius buys my house standing upon my own land, he buys the land too; for the land is but the accessory, and the house is the principal: because the house being the purchase, it cannot be at all but upon a foundation, and therefore the ground is the accessory, and after the house in the intention of the

buyer. Villa fundum quærat,' is sometimes true; but ordinarily, Fundus quærit villam.'

7. (2.) That which is of the greatest value, is not always the principal, but sometimes is the accessory. The picture of Apollo upon a laurel board is much more precious than the wood; and yet if Apelles should take Lucian's wood and draw the picture, Lucian will make bold with the board, and consequently carry away the picture. A jewel, set in gold, is much better than the gold, but yet the gold is the principal, because it was put there to illustrate and to adorn the gold; according to that of Ulpian", "Semper cum quærimus quid cui cedat, illud spectamus, quid cujus rei ornandæ causa adhibetur." And therefore if Caius, dying, leave me in legacy his black cloth suit, I shall also receive the diamond buttons that adorn it: because these were placed there to adorn it and therefore are the accessory, because they are 'usu minores,' and wholly set there for the ministry of the other. "Quod adhibetur alterius rei causa;" that is principal, for whose sake the other was sent or put. And therefore it is no good argument to conclude, that the body is the accessory, because the soul is more noble. "Cedent gemmæ phialis vel lancibus inclusæ auro argentove." The soul is, indeed, a jewel set in gold; but is, therefore, an accessory to the body in some cases. He that buys the body of a slave, hath right to all the ministries of the soul; and the man is bound to serve his master with a ready mind and a good will; and the soul is a napakoλoú◊ŋμa of the body. The body is first, and the soul comes afterward to give it life and motion.

8. (3.) When two substances concur to the constitution or integrity of a third, one is not the accessory to the other. The eye is not the accessory to the head, nor the foot to the leg, nor the hand to the arm; for that only is an accessory, “quod alterius rei causa adhibetur aut accedit:" if it comes in accidentally and be wholly for the other's sake, then it is an accessory. Thus order and decency and circumstances of time and place, are for the ministries and ornament of religion, and therefore are accessories. The outward act is the less principal, and an accessory to the inward, for to the inward it wholly ministers; and consequently he that disposes

Lib. Cum Auram. 19. sect. Perveniamus ff. de Aur, et Argent. Leg.

of one, may also govern the other, because the less principal is included in the more, and the less and the more have not two administrations, because they have but one use. But the soul and the body are two distinct substances of differing ministrations, acting to several and sometimes to contrary purposes; they are parts of the same man, a better and a worse, but not a principal and accessory, unless it be by accident and in some uses and to some purposes; and then sometimes one, sometimes the other, is the principal. Concerning which the rule is this.

9. (4.) Those things which of themselves are not, but, by accident, may be made, accessories to a principal, are then to be esteemed to be so, when they actually and wholly are joined in use to the principal, and serve the end of the principal, but have none of their own. Thus when the soul prays passionately, if the lips move without a deliberate act of understanding, but obeying the fancy, the body in that case is purely the accessory. I say, in that case: for if the body receive a command to other purposes, as to attend upon the prince at the same time, when the soul prays, in that case they are both principals; and neither of them accessory to the other. And therefore although it will follow, that, when the body ministers to the actions of the soul wholly, and hath no distinct work and office of its own in that action, he that commands the soul, can also command the body; for they are in that ministry but as one: yet it will not follow that when the body is not the accessory, it is not conjunct in ministry, but does or can act distinctly and to other purposes; he that is of proper authority to command one, hath authority also of the other. And the reason of this will help well to explicate this whole inquiry. For,

10. (5.) He that pretends to a power over the accessory, because he rules the principal, claims his power wholly for its relation to the principal, and therefore it can be extended no further than the relation; but if that relative have also an absolute and irrespective nature, operation, or design, it cannot be governed in any thing of this, because of its relative nature and conjunction in the other; for there it is not accessory. For it is the nature of the συνεκτικὸν αἴτιον· οὗ παρόντος μένει τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, καὶ αἱρομένου αἵρεται, “ the conjunct cause or reason; when it is there, the work will follow: but