sent to this doctrine, St. Ambrose does lessen very much of his reputation, saying, that though he was with the true believers banished for religion, yet he separated himself from their communion. But in the next period, I mean after Gregory the Great, it was not unusual for the bishops of Rome to stir up subjects to rebel against their princes, and from. them came the first great declension and debauchery of the glory of Christian loyalty and subjection to their princes; witness those sad stories of Pope Gregory VII. Pope Urban, and Paschal, who stirred up the emperor's sons against the father. I speak it to this purpose, because it produced an excellent epistle from the churchmen of Liege in behalf of the emperor and of their bishop, who with his chapter was excommunicated for adhering to his loyalty, and Robert earl of Flanders commanded by the Pope to destroy him and all his priests. But, in behalf of princes and the duty of subjection to them, many excellent things were spoken, divers judgments of God fearfully falling upon rebellious people are recited, not only in that epistle of the clergy of Liege, but in the life of Henry IV. emperor. From all these fathers. and ancient authors now cited, "magnum mundo documentum datum est" (that I may use the words of the author of the book last cited) "a great instruction and caution are given to the whole world, that no man rise up against his prince." For all these authors give clear and abundant testimony to these truths, that the power of the supreme magistrate is immediately from God,—that it is subject to God alone, that by him alone it is to be judged, that he is the governor of all things and persons within his dominions,— that whosoever speaks reproachfully of him cannot be innocent, that he that lifts up his hand against him strikes at the face of God,--that God hath confounded such persons, that, against the laws of God, and their own oaths, and the natural bonds of fidelity, have attempted to spoil their su preme lords, that Herman and Egbert, that did so, were confounded for so doing, as though they had never been,-that Rudolphus had his hand cut off and felt divers other of the divine judgments for this impiety.-And this being the constant universal doctrine of the church of God for twelve c Orat. in Obit. Fratr. Satyri. In fasciculo rerum sciend. published at Cologn. apud Simon. Scard. hundred years, and this derived from the plain, the express, the frequent sayings and commandments of God in the Old and New Testament, declared by his prophets and apostles, and by his most holy Son himself, nothing can with greater certainty determine and conduct our conscience than this rule. For the confirmation of which I remember St. Bernard tells a pretty little story, in a sermon upon these words of Christ, I am the vine: "Benè quidam rex cùm percussus hamatâ sagittâ," &c. "It was well said of a king, who being wounded with a barbed arrow," they that were about him, desired he would suffer himself to be bound till the head were cut out, because the least motion irregular would endanger his life: he answered, "Regem ligari nullo modo decet," "A king must at no hand be bound;" let the king be ever safe, but let his power be at liberty. I end this topic with the words of St. Austin and of the sixth council of Toledo, "Non tribuamus dandi regni atque imperii potestatem nisi vero Deo," "Let us attribute the power of giving the right of empire to none but to the true God alone.""Ille unus verus Deus qui nec judicio nec adjutorio deserit genus humanum, quando velit et quantum voluit, Romanis regnum dedit: qui dedit Assyriis, vel etiam Persis; qui Mario, ipse Caio Cæsari; qui Augusto, ipse Neroni; qui Vespasiano, vel patri vel filio, suavissimis imperatoribus, ipse et Domitiano crudelissimo; et ne per singulos ire necesse sit, qui Constantino Christiano, ipse apostatæ Juliano. Hoc planè Deus unus verus regit, et gubernat, ut placet:" "The one true God, who never leaves mankind destitute of right and help, hath given a kingdom to the Romans, as long as he please and as much as he please. He that gave the supreme power to the Assyrians, he also gave it to the PerHe that gave it to Marius a common plebeian, gave it to Caius Cæsar who was a princely person. The same authority he gave to Nero that he gave to Augustus; he gave as much power and authority to the most cruel Domitian, as he gave to Vespasian and to Titus the gentlest and the sweetest princes; and to be short, he gave the authority to Constantine the Christian, and the same afterward to Julian the apostate; for this great affair he rules and governs as he please." sians. e Lib. 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 21. 11. But all this is no more than what natural and necessary reason does teach all the world: "Hanc Deus et melior litem natura diremit." For this which I have alleged from the fathers, is properly a religious reason, 'It is God's power which is in the supreme magistrate, whether he be good or bad therefore whoever rebels, rebels against the power and dispensation of God;' and to this there is nothing reasonable to be opposed. But then that which I am now to say, is derived to us by the reason that every man carries about him, by the very law of nature. Naturam vere appello legem Omnipotentis Supremique Patris, quam prima ab origine rerum Inviolabiliter. By the law of nature I mean the prime law of God, which he unalterably imposed upon all men in their first creation, that by reason and wise discourses they should govern themselves in order to that end, which is perfective of human nature and society. The law of nature is the law of God, which is reasonable and necessary to nature: now by this law or necessary reason we find it very fit, that we should divest ourselves of the practice and exercise of some rights and liberties, which naturally we have. So Aristotle & observes: "Homines abductos ratione multa præter mores et naturam agere, si aliter agi melius esse sibi persuaserint," "Men do some things against their natural inclination, if by natural reason they find it best to do so." Now nature, having permitted every man to defend himself as well as he can, against violence, did, by an early experience, quickly perceive, that few men had power enough to do it against every violent man; and therefore they drew into societies, gathered their strength, and it was put into the hands of them, who by a joined strength could, and by promise and interest and duty would, do it and by this means the societies had peace, and might live quietly. Now the natural consequent is this, that if all our power is united and intrusted to one head, we must not keep it in our hands. If the supreme power be the avenger, we must not meddle; if he be judge, we must submit, for else we are never the nearer to peace. For when we were so many single persons, we were always in war, but by unity : f Ov. Met. i. 21. Polit. 7. cap. 13. and government we come to peace: therefore whatever we could do alone, we having put into the common stock, our natural right of defence is in the public hand, and there it must remain for ever; and we are to be defended by the laws, and they only are now the ministries of peace. This is St. Paul's argument, "I exhort that prayers and supplications be made for all men; for kings and all that are in authority, that we lead a quiet and a peaceable life in all godliness and honesty:" plainly implying, that the security and peace of societies depend upon the power and authority of kings and persons in eminency and trust: for none must make war, but he that does it for all men's interest; and therefore it is peace with all that are under government: but then that which is designed to keep peace, must feel no war from them, whom it is designed to keep in peace, that they may not feel the evils of war. If government be necessary, it is necessary that we should obey it; if we must obey it, we must not judge it; if we must not judge it, we may not endeavour to punish it: and there is nothing in the world a greater destruction to its own ends, than the resisting or rebelling against government; because if we be above it, how are we subjects? if subjects, how are we its judges? if no judges, how can we be avengers? if no avengers, why are we not quiet and patient? If we be not above, we are below; and therefore there let us abide but if we be above, then we are the supreme power; and then it is all one. That which is said all this while concerns the subjects, and not the supreme, to whom, by our natural necessities, by a general contract of mankind, by the law of nations, by the command of God, and by the civil laws of all republics, the subject is bound, and does owe obedience and maintenance, and honour and peace. "Generale pactum est societatis humanæ obedire regibus suis," said St. Austin, "It is a covenant that all mankind have agreed in, to be obedient to their kings." 12. But all this is true: but since kings are for defence. and justice, for good and not for evil, for edification and not for destruction, good kings must be obeyed; but what if they be evil and unjust, cruel and unreasonable enemies of their people, and enemies of mankind? 13. This is that I have been saying all this while,—that let him be what he will, if he be the supreme, he is superior to me, and I have nothing to do, but something to suffer; let God take care, if he please, I shall be quickly remedied; till then I must do as well as I can. For if there be any case, in which the subjects may resist, who shall be judge of that case? can this case be evident and notorious? and does it always consist in 'indivisibili?' If it does not, then many things are like it; and who can secure that the subjects shall judge right? For if they were infallible, yet who will engage that they will not do amiss? what warranty have we against the ambition and the passion and the interest of the reformers of supreme powers? And is it not better to suffer inconvenience from one than from every one that please? But if you allow one case, you must allow as many as can be reduced to it; and who is not witty enough against governors, to find excuses enough to bring them down? 14. (2.) What remedy is there, in case the supreme power be ill administered? will not any remedy bring greater evils thanthe particular injustices which are complained of? It was well said of Xenophon *, Οστις ἐν πολέμῳ ὢν στασιάζει πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα, πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίαν στασιάζει, “ He that opposes his general and prince, opposes his own safety." For consider, what order can be in a family, if the boys rule their fathers and rebel against their command? How shall the sick be cured, if they resist the advice and prescriptions of the physicians? And they that sail, are like to suffer shipwreck, if the boatswain and the swabbers and the boys shall contradict the master. So it is impossible that there can be safety in a commonwealth, if they who are appointed to obey, shall offer to rule. Φύσει γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τινα καὶ σωτήρια τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τῷ δὲ ἄρχεσθαι τέτακται, “For by nature it is necessary and profitable and ordered accordingly, that one should rule and the rest should be obedient." 15. And therefore, these wild cases are not to be pretended against that, which natural reason and natural necessity have established. We cannot suppose a king, that should endeavour to destroy his kingdom. We may as well suppose a father to kill his children, and that therefore, in some cases, it may be lawful for children to rebel against their fathers, |