been and are supreme in their own dominions, by this word we commonly mean the supremacy or the majesty. So Suétonius" speaking of Caligula, says he was very near ❝ speciem principatus in regni formam convertere," "to change the government into a kingdom," that is, to make it absolute and supreme:-and this distinction Piso used concerning Germanicus," Principis Romani, non Parthi regis esse filium," meaning, that the Parthian kings were absolute, but the Roman princes ruled with the senate: and Cæsar tells that Vercingetorix was put to death, because he, being but the prince of the Gauls, affected the kingdom. Baoλevs αὐτοτελὴς ὄντως καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν νόμων, πάντά τε οἷα βούλοιτο ποιῇ, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα ἂν μὴ βούλοιτο μὴ Tрárτη. So Dion' described the power of a king, for that which they understood to be the supreme power. Σύ τοι πόλις, σὺ δὲ τὸ δήμιον, Πρύτανις ἄκριτος ὢν, Κρατύνεις βωμὸν ἑστίαν χθονὸς. So the people in Æschylus speak to their king; "Thou art our city, our commonwealth, above all judicatories, thy throne is sacred and immured as an altar, and by thy suffrage, by thy own will, thou governest all things."-This is the 'jus regium,' this the supreme power can do, it can be no less than this in its own nature and appointment. So the power is described in Theophilus *: Πᾶσαν βασιλεῖ δέδωκε κατὰ τοῦ δήμου ἐξουσίαν, “ He hath given to the king all power over the people."-So it is described by Livy": "Reges, non liberi solum impedimentis omnibus, sed domini rerum temporumque, trahunt consiliis cuncta, non sequuntur;" "Kings are not only free from all lets and encumbrances, but are lords of times and things; they by their counsels draw all things after them, but follow not."-The Greeks call this supremacy, ἐπιτάττειν ἀνυπεύθυνον ὄντα, “ a power to rule without danger of being called to account by men;"-St. Ambrose calls it, "non ullis ad pœnam vocari legibus, tutos imperii potestate;" "a power that is safe in its own circles, and can by no laws be called to punishment:"—v "Caligul. cap. 22. ed. B. Crus. vol. 1. pag. 509. y Lib. 53. a Decad. 1. lib. 9. z Supplic. 375. ed. Butler, vol. 2. pag. 18. Tpúrny apxiv, that is Galen's word, "it is the chief or prime principality.”—“ The king alone" (or he or they, who have the kingly power) "is free;" all others are under compulsories and judges. But St. Peter's phrase is better than all of them, Ὑποτάσσετε τῷ βασιλεῖ ὡς ὑπερέχοντι· The king is the most eminent, the defender of all: and above all, úπɛpéxε, ὑπερμαχεῖ, ὑπερασπίζει, saith Suidas. The king or the supreme hath the power of defence, the power of the sword, and that commands all the rest: for ὑπερέχων, ὑπερνικῶν, it signifies to be more than conqueror. So the grammarians. 4. But in order to conscience, kings and princes, I mean all supreme powers, must distinguish "potestatem imperii ab officio imperantis ;" that is to be considered by subjects, -and this, by princes; supreme princes always have an absolute power, but they may not always use it. He that hath a sword by him, is not always tied to use it, and he must cut his meat with a knife. Κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δὲ ἀόριστος Túpavvic, says Aristotle; "It is a kingdom when it is by rule. and measure, but if it be unlimited, it is a tyranny:" that is, when affairs are capable of a law and order, the supreme power must so conduct them; he must go in that path where they stand; but if they grow wild and irregular, he must go out of his way to fetch them in again. 5. But then it is also to be considered, that the absolute power of the prince is but an absolute power of government, not of possession; it is a power of doing right, but not a power of doing wrong: and at the worst, is but a power of doing private violences for the security of the public. This power is excellently expressed in the tables of the royal law written to Vespasian; "Uti quæcunque ex usu reipublicæ et ex majestate divinarum, humanarum, publicarum, privatarumque rerum esse censebit, ei agere, facere, jus potestasque sit, uti Augusto fuit." Augustus Cæsar was the most absolute prince that ever ruled the Roman people; to him was granted, saith Alciat, to be free from laws, and all the necessity of laws, to be obnoxious to no law written, and to have all the power e De Magistrat. b Lucan. ii. 280. Oudendorp. pag. 127. of kings and yet all that power was but to do every thing which he should esteem to be useful to the public, and according to the majesty of religion, and all human rights public and private.' And therefore he is 'princeps regni,' but not 'dominus,' 'a prince,' not 'a lord;' and the distinction is very material. For to be 'lord,' signifies more than the supreme power of government. "Qui primi fuerunt Romæ principes, etsi poterant videri revera domini, vitabant tamen valde domini nomen, veluti contumeliam ac maledictum : non vitaturi si esɛet nomen solius honoris, aut moderatæ potestatis," saith Suetonius"; "The first princes of Rome esteemed it a disgrace to be called lords, because it was not a name of mere honour, or of a moderate power; for if it had, they would not have declined it:" but it means an absolute power to dispose of all lives and all possessions; which is beyond the power of the king or prince. He that is a king, rules over a free people, but a lord rules over slaves. Tacitus, according to the popular humour of the Romans, supposed the power of a king to be too great a violation of liberty; but domination or lording it was intolerable. "Principatus et libertas res sunt dissociabiles; magis tamen sunt dissociabiles libertas et dominatio;" for to be the absolute lord cannot consist either with freedom or propriety and therefore Ovidf prefers Augustus before Romulus in this very instance; for speaking to Romulus of Augustus, he says, Tu domini nomen, principis ille tenet. Augustus is a prince, a gentle governor; Romulus was a lord;' that is, something that no man loves, but every man serves and fears. This power is well expressed by St. Peter's word of Katakupiɛúεiv, a power not ministering to good, nor conducted by moderation. When the people must suffer the will of their imperious lord d Is the whole of the preceding quotation to be found in Suetonius?—He says of Augustus (cap. 53) "domini appellationem, ut maledictum et opprobrium, semper exhorruit."-(J. R. P.) e Tacit. in Agric. c. 4. "Nerva res olim dissociabiles miscuit, principatum ac libertatem." f Fast. ii. 142. Gierig, pag. 68. Senec. Thyest. 205. Schroder. pag. 121. and must commend it, that is, be a slave in their persons and their labours, their possessions and their understandings: that is more than a prince or a gentle lord will do; for then the word is good, when the man is gentle, and the power is moderate. But that which I intend to say, is this, that the supreme power of government is at no hand a supreme power, or an arbitrary disposer of life and fortunes; but according to law, or according to extreme necessity which is the greatest law of all. In the sense of honour and of moderate power, the king is a lord, but not in this sense of law. “Qui pleno jure dominus est, alienandi, dissipandi, disperdendi jus habet," saith the law". By 'a lord' is meant he, that hath power to dispose of the goods of the vassals: and this a king or a prince hath not. This is not the supreme power of government. A king is not the lord of his kingdom, of the territories of his subjects, "quia dominium in solidum non possit esse duorum," saith Cujacius; "There cannot be two absolute lords of the same land;"—the right owner is the lord, not the right king. "Aliter reipublicæ sunt agri, aliter privatorum. Numquid dubium est, quin servus cum peculio domini sit? dat tamen domino suo munus. Non enim ideo nihil habet servus, quia nihil est habiturus, si dominus illum habere noluerit," said one; "The servant is within his lord's peculiar, but yet he can make a present to his lord. If his lord please, the servant shall have nothing; but yet it follows not, that therefore he is possessed of nothing." Now if this be true in slaves, much more, infinitely more, is it in free subjects; for otherwise are my lands my own, otherwise they are the prince's. "Jure civili omnia regis sunt," saith Senecai; " et tamen illa quorum ad regem pertinet universa possessio, in singulos dominos descripta sunt;" "By the law all things are the king's; but even those things are divided into peculiars, and have private lords."—It is all the prince's lands, and he receives the service and the duty of them all; but the lords receive the rents. The Athenians and the Thebans fight concerning the bounds of their territory; and at the same time Polyænus and Thysias are at law about dividing their shepherds' walks in the same place. Sub optimo rege, omnia rex imperio possidet, singuli do L. 7. de Relig. 1. sed etsi, lege 25. sect. Consuluit, ff. de Hæred. Petit. minio;" "The king governs all, but the subjects possess all their own:" for so Livy might buy his own books of Dorus; they were Dorus's books, and Livy's too: and when a lord receives his rent, the tenant may call the lands his own. Some things are mine by possession, some by use; some by title, some by incumbency; one is the author, and another is the buyer; one is the artificer, and another the merchant, of the same thing; and the king hath the power, but his subjects have propriety. "Cæsar omnia habet; fiscus ejus privata tantum, ac sua: et universa in imperio ejus sunt, in patrimonio propria!." That is the sum of this inquiry. The king hath all, and yet he hath something of his own in his peculiar, and so have the subjects. 6. The effect of this consideration is this: that the supreme power must defend every man's right, but must usurp no man's. He may use every man's peculiar for the public necessity, and in just and necessary government, but no otherwise; and what is out of any peculiar expended for the public defence, must out of the general right be repaid for the private amends. "Verum etsi nostra tempore necessitatis patriæ conferre debeamus, tamen jure naturæ congruit ut communis salus, communis utilitas, commune periculum, non unius duntaxat aut alterius, sed communibus impensis, jacturis, periculisque comparetur," said Cicero". A king is to govern all things; but to possess nothing but what is his own. Only concerning the necessity, if the question be, Who shall be judge;' it is certain that it ought to be so notorious, that every man might judge: but he who is to provide against it, is certainly the only competent person, and hath the authority. For he that is to stand against the sudden need, ought to espy it. But if ever there be a dispute, who shall judge of the necessity, it is certain, the necessity is not extreme; and if it be not, yet it ought to be provided against, when it is intolerable. Ahab had no right to take Naboth's vineyard; but if the Syrian army had invaded Israel, Ahab might have put garrison in it, or destroyed the vines, to have saved or served his army. 7. And to this sense Lyra expounds the 'jus regium,' the right of the king,' described by Samuel" to the people of |