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pears to have conceived it a fit opportunity to point out to lord Fingal the expediency of exerting himself for the preservation of the public peace. His lordship, at the same time, entered very fully into explanation of the reasons which, in his opinion, particularly required the most active vigilance. But in stating to lord Fingal the nature of the very important dutics which his lordship had voluntarily undertaken to discharge, lord Redesdale particularly dwelt upon the necessity of most strongly inculcating and enforcing the great duty of allegiance. After establishing it as a principle, that no duty of religion was contrary to the duty of allegiance, his lordship proceeds to observe, that many of the highest ministers of the Roman persuasion inculcate, that all who differ from them in religious opinions, are to be considered as guilty of defection from the see of Rome; in other words, guilty of rebellion. It cannot, therefore, be expected that vulgar men should think themselves bound by any tie of allegiance to his majesty, who is thus represented to them as guilty of a breach of what is termed a higher duty of allegiance.

When lord Redesdale, actuated without doubt by the purest sentiments of patriotism and religion, addressed these observations to a Roman catholic nobleman, it did not occur to his lordship, that, without some qualification, they might easily be construed into an aspersion upon the faith and the loyalty of the whole body of the catholics of Ireland. Nor, to an individual attached to any particular persuasion, could any radical objection to his fundamental tenets be stated, without either wounding his feelings, or provoking a reply. A very important distinction, too,

between spiritual and temporal allegiance, seems altogether to have escaped the attention of his lordship; or, at least, if it be admitted that such a distinction exists, his lordship does not appear to allow the catholics the merit of regulating their actions accordingly. On the contrary, those who profess the Roman religion Roman religion consider, apparently in lord Redesdale's opinion, that their allegiance to the see of Rome absolves them from temporal allegiance to his majesty. There is, however, the strongest presumption that this is by no means the case.

For the Roman catholics of Ireland, so far as we have had it in our power to collect any information respecting their religious and civil opinions, profess only a spiritual allegiance to the pope, but acknowledge a temporal allegiance to his majesty. Indeed, in lord Fingal's answer, it is expressly stated, that the doctrine of allegi ance is perfectly understood, and unceasingly preached by the clergy; and that the loyalty and allegiance of the catholics would oblige them to resist even the head of the see of Rome, if it were possible that he should land in Ireland with an invading army.

This assurance, however, did not appear to satisfy lord Redesdale; and as the correspondence with the earl of Fingal proceeded, his lordship expressed his persuasion, that the want of true christian charity had been the real cause of all the unfortunate events which of late had disgraced that country; that the Roman catholics, instead of being taught to live in charity with all men, were unfortunately instructed to exercise a very confined charity, being told they are exclusively members of the church of Christ; and that doctor Troy and doctor Hussey had strenuous

ly

ly insisted on the exclusive doc. trine. From this, his lordship infers, that as long as the priests of the see of Rome shall think fit to hold up to their flocks, that all who do not yield obedience to that see are guilty of rebellion against it; are not to be considered as members of the church of Christ; and therefore are not, in the eyes of the vulgar at least, to be considered as Christians; they never will bear christian charity towards those who are so represented; and will never be loyal and dutiful subjects of a king, thus held out to them as himself a rebel.

It must be confessed, there appears to have been some foundation for apprehending that the principles of exclusive charity and allegiance might, in some instances, have been inculcated by the clergy. For the earl of Fingal acknowledges that he cannot attempt to vindicate all those who, at different times, have addressed the catholics. The late exhortations, however, his lordship says, were intended and calculated to inspire senti ments of loyalty, obedience, and christian charity. Such instructions he had constantly heard given by the catholic clergy to their flocks; nothing to excite ill-will or dislike to any person on account of his religious belief, but the most perfect brotherly love and affection

to all.

But even if the principles of exclusive charity were occasion. ally preached to the catholics, objectionable as such principles are; if they were inculcated only generally and speculatively, they were not likely to produce any very material injury. The consequences which they involve are not so apparently obvious, as they are represented to be in his lordship's inferences. Before an ignorant catholic

discovers a rebel in the august head of the British empire, a long process of false and sophistical reasoning is necessary to conduct his mind to so absurd a conclusion. The tenets of every religion may be divided into those which are purely speculative, and those which peremptorily dictate a certain line of conduct. The maxim of exclusive charity may belong to the speculative tenets of the Romish faith; but the adaptation of moral conduct to such a principle, in the present enlightened period, is altogether impracticable. The common interchange of services, which constantly takes place in the intercourse between catholics and protestants, sufficiently demonstrates, that exclusive charity is not a practical tenet of the Roman church. Far otherwise is the fact; even the language of the pastoral letters of their bishops proves this to be the case. Besides, the fundamental principles of the christian religion, in which the fullest coincidence prevails among catholics and protestants, are in direct opposi tion to such a limitation of charity. The exclusive doctrine may sometimes be inculcated by the priests of the Romish persuasion; but this is not the general practice of the great body of the clergy. Some members of our own church do not always rigidly adhere to the prac tical tenets of the established religion of the country; but would it not be unjust, on this account, to accuse so respectable a body as the clergy of this country, of the folly of attempting to inculcate many of the absurdities of speculative theology?

It is unnecessary for us to enter more fully into this subject. We have already stated the fundamen tal points upon which lord Redes

dale

dale and the earl of Fingal are at issue. The former conceives that the allegiance of the catholics to the see of Rome is regarded by them as paramount to their allegiance to his majesty; and that the doctrine of exclusive charity is so generally inculcated as to afford but little expectation, that the sentiments of those of the people of Ireland who adhere to the see of Rome, towards those who refuse obedience to it, may be conducive to their living together in peace. The earl of Fingal, on the contrary, represents the temporal allegiance of the catholics to his majesty, as considered by them, to be paramount to their temporal allegiance to the see of Rome, and declares, that the doctrines of the priests of the Romish persuasion, instead of impressing on the catholics the limited benevolence of exclusive charity, exhort them to the exercise of the most perfect brotherly love and affection to all mankind.

It is the more difficult to pronounce an impartial judgment on the statements before us, since the whole of the correspondence was not published. Where religious differences exist, and imaginary political grievances are endured, it is by no means uncommon to employ religion as an instrument to promote political ends. Upon this ground alone, lord Redesdale might readily suspect, especially at a time when an insurrectionary disposition was known not to have entirely subsided, that the disaffested amongst the catholic clergy might occasionally take advantage of the ignorance and credulity of the lower orders of their persnasion, and impress-upon their minds sentiments unfavourable to loyalty. This suspicion might have been, in a great measure, confirmed by e

presentations, whether true or false, made to his lordship in too general

terms.

The designs of a catholic enemy against that part of the British empire, might have had the effect of communicating a stronger apprehension of danger from the suspected dissemination of disloyal sentiments. In a situation of affairs in which every circumstance connected with public danger might have presented itself to the mind in the vivid colours of exaggeration, it was by no means surprising, that a nobleman holding a situation of such high importance. and responsibility as that of chancellor of Ireland, should express the greatest anxiety to resort to every possible measure adapted to maintain the preservation of the public peace. It was, therefore, difficult, in conveying instructions to a catholic nobleman, who, from patriotic motives alone, had solicited to be appointed a magistrate, to avoid insisting on the importance of inculcating a paramount allegiance to his majesty, if his lordship had received certain information that a different doctrine

was generally promulgated by the priests of the Romish church. That it was at the same time proper to enter into a religious discussion of various tenets of the catholic faith, and to express an apprehension of a general political disaffection among the adherents of the see of Rome, arising from the very principles of their religious creed, but few perhaps will be inclined to admit. Zeal, even in the best of causes, may sometimes exceed its proper boundaries; and whatever is objectionable in this correspondence may probably have originated solely from an unlimited anxiety to preserve entire the internal tranquillity of Ireland,

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

War in India-Immediate Cause of Hostilities-System of Policy formerly pursued by the Marquis Cornwallis adopted by the Governor-GeneralThe Embarrassments of the Peisbwah favourable to the Pipsecution of this System-Alliance between the British Government and the PeisbwabProceedings of Dowlus Rao Scindiah in consequence of the Conclusion of this Alliance-Scindiab's Views of Encroachment upon the Peishwab's Authority-Proceedings and Views of the Rajab of Bera-Statement of the Foundation of the Pretensions of Scindiab and the Rajah of Berar to the Supreme Authority in the Marbatta Empire-Concise Historical View of the Establishment of this Empire-Examination of the Independent Right of the Peishwab to conclude Treaties with Foreign Powers-Actual State of the Peisbah's Authority-Statement of the Combined Forces of Scindiah and the Rajab of Berar assembled on the Frontier of the Soubabdar of the Dekan-Discussions with Scindiab and the Rajab of Berar on the Subject of withdrawing their Armies to their respective Stations-Authentic Inteligence of the hostile Designs of these Chieftains--Statem. nt of the Extent of Monsieur Perron's territorial Power;-and of the Forces of the EnemyAmount and Distribution of the British Forces-Plan of the CampaignCommencement of Hostilities in the Dekan-The Fortress of Ahmednuggur taken by Assault-The Fortress of Jalnapoor attacked and carried-Decisive Battle of Assye-Surrender of Boorbanpoor and the Hill-Fort of Asseergbur-Military Operations in the Province of Guzerat--Fort of Baroach stormed and carried-Sur ender of Champoneer and the Fort of Porvangbur-Invasion of the Province of Cuttuch-Surrender of Manickpatam, the Pagoda of Jaggernaut, Balasore and Soorong-Reduction of the Fort of Birabutty-Military Operations on the North west Frontier of Oude-Battle of Coel-Ally-Gbur taken by Assault-Monsieur Perron's Resignation-Affair at Shekoabad-Battle of Debli, and Surrender of the City and Forts of Debli-Restoration of the Emperor Shab Aulum-Expulsion of the Enemy from the Province of Bundelcund-Surrender of the Town and Fort of Agra-Decisive Battle of LaswareeConcise Recapitulation of the Achievements of the British Arms from the Commencement to the End of the Campaign-Statement of the beneficial Consequences likely to result from the successful Termination of the War, and Treaties concluded withibe principal Marlatta Chieftains-Reflections

on these Events.

WH

WHILE we were thus preparing for the prosecution of the war with France, information was received by his majesty's government of the termination of hostilities in India. The news of this

happy event diffused a more general satisfaction, in consequence of its entirely removing the apprehension which many were inclined to entertain, that we were engaged in an arduous contest with several of

upon inquiry into the immediate cause and objects of the war, it shall appear, that the sword has been unsheathed in India in vindica tion of the just rights of our allies, and for the preservation of the menaced security of the dominions of the company, we shall review with still greater satisfaction the rapid progress of the British arms in the splendid career of victory, To form a deliberate and impar tial judgment on the origin of this contest, and to determine how far it supplied a sufficient and justifi able cause of war, it will be neces sary dispassionately to examine the proceedings of the belligerent par ties previously to the commenceIt ment of hostilities.

the most formidable of the native powers, without any well-grounded expectation of ultimate success. This apprehension seemed to derive its origin from an opinion, that the extension of our dominion in India must finally weaken our power in that distant quarter of the globe. As every victory is supposed to be purchased with a diminution of our military resources, so it is conceived that every new acquisition of territory, necessarily requiring an increase in our permanent regular force, must have the effect of rendering our possessions less secure; since our line of frontier is thus extended, while our means of preservation and defence are diminished. cannot be denied, that such an opinion is not deficient in plausibility. But it should be remembered, that conquests are achieved by a destruction of part of the resources of the enemy. The question of political strength or weak ness, therefore, is entirely relative. The conquering power must for a time preserve its relative superiority; and, upon the admission that this relative strength or weakness is not liable to any material fluctuation, the acquisition of territory is not accompanied with a proportionate insecurity of possession.

But whatever sentiments may prevail on this subject, or whatever difference of opinion may arise with respect to the expediency or justice of the war with the confederated Marhatta chieftains, no one can deny that it was conducted with extraordinary judgment and vigor, and that the events to which it gave rise, exhibit a series of brilliant achievements and splendid victories, which cannot be contemplated without emotions of national pride and glory. If,

3

According to the statement of the marquis of Wellesley, the im mediate cause of the war was the refusal of the confederated Marhatta chieftains to separate and to withdraw to their usual stations, within their respective territories, the armies which they had assem Bled and united on the frontier of our ally the soubahdar of the Dekan, after having declared, that the intention of that junction was to decide whether there should be peace or war with the British go vernment and its allies. The determination of the chieftains to maintain this position was regarded by the noble marquis as a manifest indication of a design to frustrate by hostilities, or by the terror of their arms, the operation of the alliance concluded between the British government and the Peishwah, and to disturb the tranquillity of the dominions of the Nizam, and ultimately of those of the company. The union of the confederate forces, and their commanding and menacing position, afforded every advantage to the chieftains in pro

secuting

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