Secondly. I have thus far considered the cases in which silence respecting the evil actions of others is our duty. It is our duty, when we have no just cause either for speaking at all, or for speaking to the particular person whom we address. But where there is a sufficient cause, we are under an equally imperative obligation to speak, wherever and whenever that cause shall demand it. The common fault of men is, that they speak when they should be silent, and are silent only when they should speak.

The plain distinction in this case is the following. We are forbidden, causelessly, to injure another, even if he have done wrong. Yet, whenever justice can be done, or innocence protected, in no other manner than by a course which must injure him, we are under no such prohibition. No man has a right to expect to do wrong with impunity; much less has he a right to expect that, in order to shield him from the just consequences of his actions, injustice should be done to others, or that other men shall, by silence, deliver up the innocent and unwary into his power.

The principle by which we are to test our own motives, in speaking of that which may harm others, is this. When we utter any thing which will harm another, and we do it either without cause, or with pleasure, or thoughtlessly, we are guilty of calumny. When we do it with pain and sorrow for the offender, and from the sincere motive of protecting the innocent, of promoting the ends of public justice, or for the good of the offender himself, and speak of it only to such persons, and in such manner, as is consistent with these ends, we may speak of the evil actions of others, and yet be wholly innocent of calumny.

We are therefore bound to speak of the faults of others,

1. To promote the ends of public justice. He who conceals a crime against society, renders himself a party to the

offence. We are bound here, not merely to speak of it, but also to speak of it to the proper civil officer, in order that it may be brought to trial and punishment. The ordinary prejudice against informing is unwise and immoral. He who, from proper motives, informs against crime, performs an act as honorable as that of the judge who tries the cause, or of the juror who returns the verdict. That this may be done from improper motives alters not the case. A judge may hold his office for the love of money, but this does not make the office despicable.

2. To protect the innocent. When we are possessed of a knowledge of certain facts in a man's history, which, if known to a third person, would protect him from important injury; it may frequently be our duty to put that person on his guard. If A knows that B, under the pretence of religion, is insinuating himself into the good opinion of C, for the purpose of gaining control over his property, A is bound to put C upon his guard. If I know that a man who is already married is paying his addresses to a lady in another country, I am bound to give her the information. So if I know of a plan laid for the purpose of seduction, I am bound to make use of that knowledge to defeat it. All that is required here is, that I know what I assert to be fact; and that I use it simply for the purposes specified.

3. For the good of the offender himself. When we know of the crimes of another, and there is some person-for instance, a parent, a guardian, or instructor-who might, by control or advice, be the means of the offender's reformation, it is our duty to give the necessary information. It is frequently the greatest kindness that we can manifest to both parties. Were it more commonly practised, the allurements to sin would be much less attractive; and the hope of success in correcting the evil habits of the young much more encouraging. No wicked person has a right to expect that the community will keep his conduct a secret from those

who have a right specially to be informed of it. He who does so is partaker in the guilt.

4. Though we may not be at liberty to make public the evil actions of another, yet no obligation exists to conceal his fault by maintaining towards him our former habits of intimacy. If we know him to be unworthy of our confidence or acquaintance, we have no right to act a lie, by conducting towards him, in public or in private, as though he was worthy of it. By associating with a man, we give to the public an assurance, that we know of nothing to render him unworthy of our association. If we falsify this assurance, we are guilty of deception, and of a deception by which we benefit the wicked at the expense of the innocent; and, so far as our example can do it, place the latter in the power of the former. And still more, if we associate, on terms of voluntary intimacy, with persons of known bad character, we virtually declare, that such offences constitute no reason why the persons in question are not good enough associates for us. We thus virtually become the patrons of their crime.

5. From what has been remarked, we see what is the nature of an historian's duty. He has to do with facts which the individuals themselves have made public, or which have been made public by the providence of God. He records what has already been made known. What has not been made known, therefore, comes not within his province; but whatever has been made known, comes properly within it. This latter he is bound to use, without either fear, favor, or affection. If, from party zeal or sectarian bigotry, or individual partiality, he exaggerate, or conceal, or misrepresent, if he "aught extenuate, or set down aught in malice," he is guilty of calumny of the most inexcusable character. It is calumny perpetrated deliberately, under the guise of impartiality, and perpetrated in a form intended to give it the widest publicity and the most permanent duration.

These remarks have had respect, principally, to the publication of injurious truth or falsehood, by conversation. But it will be immediately seen that they apply, with additional force, to the publication of whatever is injurious, by the press. If it be wrong to injure my neighbor's reputation within the limited circle of my acquaintance, how much more wrong must it be to injure it throughout a nation! If it be, by universal acknowledgment, mean, to underrate the talents or vilify the character of a personal rival, how much more so, that of a political opponent! If it would be degrading in me to do it myself, by how much is it less degrading to cause it to be done by others; and to honor or dishonor with my confidence, and reward with political distinction, those who do it? Because a man is a political opponent, does he cease to be a creature of God; and do we cease to be under obligations to obey the law of God in respect to him? or rather I might ask, do men think that political collisions banish the Deity from the throne of the universe? Nor do these remarks apply to political dissensions alone. The conductor of a public press possesses no greater privileges than any other man, nor has he any more right than any other man to use, or suffer to be used, his press, for the sake of gratifying personal pique, or avenging individual wrong, or holding up individuals, without trial, to public

scorn.

Crime against society, is to be punished by society, and by society alone; and he who conducts a public press has no more right, because he has the physical power, to inflict pain, than any other individual. If one man may do it because he has a press, another may do it because he has muscular strength; and thus, the government of society is brought to an end. Nor has he even a right to publish cases of individual vice, unless the providence of God has made them public before. While they are out of sight of the public, they are out of his sight, unless he can show that he has been specially appointed to perform this service.

CLASS FIRST.

DUTIES TO MEN AS MEN.

VERACITY.

EVERY individual, by necessity, stands in most important relations, both to the past and to the future. Without a knowledge of what has been, and of what, so far as his fellow-men are concerned, will be, he can form no decision in regard to the present. But this knowledge could never be attained, unless his constitution were made to correspond with his circumstances. It has, therefore, been made to correspond. There is, on the one hand, in men, a strong à priori disposition to tell the truth; and it controls them, unless some other motive interpose: and there is, on the other hand, a disposition to believe what is told, unless some counteracting motive is supposed to operate.

Veracity has respect to the PAST and present, or to the We shall consider them separately.

FUTURE.