wrong, so far as it proceeds from the same motives, however it may arise in part from the motive of the child's good. To render this still plainer, let us suppose, that a parent inflicts pain on his child merely to afford amusement to his neighbors, as the Romans were wont to exhibit fights of gladiators. It will be agreed on all hands, that this action is abominable. Again, suppose the same pain be inflicted partly from the motive of amusing his neighbors, and partly from a regard to the child's good. I presume all will allow, that so far as the action proceeds from the former motive, it is still abominable, and not sanctified by the co-existent motive of the child's good.

On the whole, we arrive at this conclusion; that if it be consistent with the divine perfections, that God should inflict punishment from the two motives of vindicating his own law and government and benefiting the sinner; it is equally consistent with the divine perfections to inflict punishment from the former motive only. All the vindictive punishment pleaded for, is that which is deserved by the sinner and is necessary to support the divine law and moral government in proper dignity, and thus to promote the general good; and this surely is opposed to no attribute of God, whether justice or goodness.

Objection 2. To the argument drawn from the destruction threatened to the wicked, it may be objected, that this destruction means, that they shall be destroyed as sinners only, or shall be brought to repentance and a renunciation of sin. To this it may be answered, that in this sense every one who in this life repents, and believes, is destroyed, and suffers destruction. Yet this is never said in scripture. This sense of the word destruction makes the punishment of hell, and the awful curse of the divine law, to consist in repentance, which is no punishment or curse, but an inestimable blessing. Besides, that repentance, on which the sinner is forgiven, if it can be called a destruction at all, is not an everlasting destruction, but an emotion of the heart, which is begun and finished in a very short time. Or if by this everlasting destruction be understood the habitual and persevering repentance of the true convert; then the glorified saints in heaven, are constantly suffering that destruction which will be everlasting, and which is the curse of the divine law.

Before this subject is dismissed, proper notice ought to be taken of some arguments urged in favor of the sentiment, that the punishment of hell is merely disciplinary.

1. It is urged,* that the various afflictions of this life are designed for the good of the patients; therefore, probably the same

end is designed by the sufferings of hell. To this it may be answered, It is by no means granted, that all the afflictions of this life are designed for the good of the patients. It does not appear, that men in general, who are visited with the loss of children, wives, or other dear friends; or with the loss of eyesight, of some other sense, or of a limb; or with distressing pains or incurable diseases; are thereby rendered more happy in this life. If men may be allowed to judge by their own experience, they will in most cases decide the question in the negative. Nor does the decision in many cases appear ill founded to those, who have opportunity to observe persons under those afflictions. To say that men are no proper judges, whether they themselves be, in this life, made more happy or not, by the afflictions which they suffer, is to say, that they are no judges of their own happiness or misery. This being once established, we may assert, that hell-torments though endless promote the happiness of the patients; because being no judges of their own happiness or misery they may be extremely happy, at the very time they judge themselves to be perfectly miserable.

In any case in which calamity proves fatal, it is absurd to pretend, that it promotes, in this life, the happiness of the patient, unless calamity itself be happiness. No man has opportunity in this life to derive any good from the pains of death. Therefore, at least these pains are not designed for the subject's good during his present life.

Here it may be proper to mention several remarkable instances of grievous calamity recorded in scripture: As the instance of the old world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, of Pharaoh, Saul, the house of Eli, Nadab and Abihu, Hiel, etc. It is presumed, Dr. C. himself would not pretend, that these calamities were intended for "the profit of the sufferers themselves" in this life. What right then had he to argue, as in the following passage? "The proper tendency and final cause of evils in the present state, are to do us good. This is the voice of reason confirmed by experience, and scripture concurs herewith."* He then quotes Ps. 89: 31-34, and proceeds: "If evil, punishment or misery in the present life is mercifully intended for the good of the patients themselves, why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as the father of mercies and God of pity, confined to this world only?" The force of all this depends entirely on the supposition, that in all instances of suffering in this life, the end is the sufferer's good during this life.

But this supposition, we see by what has been said already, is

* Pages 324, 325.

by no means true. The superstructure therefore built on this foundation falls entirely to the ground. We all grant, that in some instances afflictions are intended for the good of the sufferers. A proof of this, which needed no proof, Dr. C. has produced out of the eighty-ninth Psalm. On this foundation extended in his own imagination to comprehend all instances of affliction, he built an argument in which he triumphed. Now since there are those several instances of calamity before mentioned, which Dr. C. would not pretend were designed for the sufferer's good in this life; I might as well suppose that no other instances of calamity are designed for the sufferer's good in this life; and then adopt Dr. C's strain of ardent declamation, in manner following: If evil punishment or misery in the present life, be not intended for the good of the patients themselves, but to support the authority of the divine law, and thus subserve the general good; why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as a God of perfect purity and strict justice, limited to this world only? Why should it not be supposed, that the infinitely holy God has the same hatred of sin in the other world which he has in this? and that he has in the next state the same intention which he has in this, to vindicate, by punishments, his law and government.

The truth is, that as some of the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life, and others are as manifestly not intended for his good in this life; nothing certain can be hence concluded concerning the end of the misery of the damned. Nay; if it were certain, that all the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life, or that they are not intended for his good in this life; yet it could not be certainly thence concluded, that the miseries of the damned are intended for the good of the patients, nor that they are not intended for the good of the patients. But this point must be determined by other evidence, the evidence of revelation.

If it should be said, that though some of the sufferings of this life do not, in this life, produce good to the patients; yet they will produce good to them in future life; it will be sufficient to reply, that this wants proof; that it is a main point in the present dispute; and that it should be taken for granted, is not to be suffered.

2. It is also urged by our author, "That the whole course of nature, and even the revelations of scripture constantly speak of God, as the universal father, as well as governor of men. What now is the temper and conduct of fathers on earth towards their offspring? They readily do them good and chastise them for their profit; but they do not punish their children, having no view

to their advantage." "And shall we say that of our Father in heaven, which we cannot suppose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father?" He abounds in pathetic discourse of the same strain, which is much more suited to work on the imaginations and passions of mankind, than on their reason. The foundation of all this discourse is, that fathers on earth, acting in character, never punish and never can punish their children but with a design to promote their personal good. But would Dr. C. himself adventure to lay down this position and abide by it? Did never a wise and a good father find it necessary to punish, and even to cast out of his family, a desperate child, to prevent his ruining the rest of the children? Was there never, or can there possibly never be, an instance of this? If such an instance ever has, or ever may occur, the appearance of argument in the forecited passage, vanishes at once. Not only do fathers find it necessary to punish desperate children, without any prospect of their personal good; but very frequently do kings, governors and chief magistrates find this necessary with regard to their subjects. Now in the scripture, God much oftener illustrates his character, by that of a king, a prince, a sovereign lord, than by that of a father. And as kings, etc. often find it necessary to inflict capital and other punishments, without any view to the personal good of the sufferers; we may hence deduce an argument, that God also will punish many of his rebellious subjects, without any view to their personal good, but to support his moral government, to be an example of terror to others, and thus to secure the general good; and this argument would be at least as strong as that of Dr. C. just cited.

3. It may be pleaded, that though calamities in this life do not always issue in the sufferers good; yet God may compensate them in the future state, for the loss or suffering, of which they are the subjects in this life. Thus our author: "It is possible that the evils which any suffer in this, may be made up to them in another state."* It is granted, that God is able to compensate his creatures for the evils of this life; but that he in fact will do it in all cases, is to be proved. Besides; the very idea of compensation is inconsistent with the idea of disciplinary punishment, and that all the evils of both this life and the future are necessary and are intended for the good of those who suffer them. For if this idea be just, what foundation is there for compensation? Will a father compensate a child for the pain of that discipline which is absolutely necessary for his good, and most wisely adapted to it? No man would ever think of it. Compensation supposes, that the

Benevolence of the Deity, p. 249.

evil for which compensation is made, has been inflicted from other motives, than a regard to the good of the sufferer. And if evil may in one instance be inflicted from other motives than a regard to the good of the sufferer; it may in any other instance in which justice and wisdom admit of it; and if in this state, in the future too. If the evils of life be intended for the good only of the subjects, we may as well talk of compensating a man for the pain of drawing a tooth which is a perpetual torment to him; or for the disagreeable taste of the dose which cures him of the cholic; as to talk of compensating him for the calamities of life. The saints will indeed be rewarded for their patience under these calamities; and this part of their holiness is doubtless as amiable, and is as properly as any part of their holiness the object of the complacency of the Deity, and of those rewards which are the fruits of that complacency. But those rewards are not to be considered as compensations of losses or of damages. The very idea of compensation implies, that that for which compensation is made, is on the whole an evil to the person compensated. But the very idea that present evils are necessary and conducive to the good of the subjects, implies, that on the whole they are no evils to the subjects.

It is now submitted to the reader, whether the doctrine that the damned will in fact suffer no other punishment than that which is subservient to their personal good, be not in many respects most glaringly inconsistent with the scriptures; and whether it be not equally irreconcilable with their general tenor as with many particular passages, and also with many parts of Dr. C's book.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTAINING AN EXAMINATION OF DR. c's ARGUMENTS TO PROVE ENDLESS PUNISHMENT INCONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE.

That the endless punishment of the damned is inconsistent. with justice, is positively and abundantly asserted by Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation. Whether the arguments which the Doctor offers to prove the injustice of endless punishment, be conclusive, is the subject of our inquiry in this chapter.

Before we proceed to this inquiry, it seems necessary to explain the meaning of the proposition-That the endless punishment of the damned is consistent with justice.