limitation or confinement, so that the mind not only produces its own volitions; but produces them at random and by mere chance, without the influence of motive and without any previous certainty, what particular acts it shall produce, and whether any. Thus according to them self-determination is acting by chance and becoming the subject of volitions without any proper cause at all. For a cause that acts by chance and stupidly, without motive or design, is no proper efficient cause at all. Dr. West says, "We have set aside the notion, that the will determines all the present acts of the will. For we entirely join with Mr. Edwards in exploding that idea."* What mystery there may be couched under the will, I will not pretend to say. But as he "entirely agrees with Mr. Edwards, in exploding that idea," Dr. West must hold not only, that the will as a distinct power of the mind does not determine the present acts of the will; but that the mind in the exercise of the power of will, does not determine those acts. For this is equally exploded by Mr. Edwards, as the other. The Doctor says, that "the will does not determine all the present acts of the will." But does it determine any of the acts of the will, whether present, past or future? As he agrees in this particular with Mr. Edwards, he must answer in the negative. All past acts of the will were once present; and when they were present Dr. West denies, that the will determined them; and he will not say, that the will determines them now that they are past. Also all future acts of the will erelong will be present; and when they shall be present, they will not, according to Dr. West's concession, be determined by the will. Therefore he will not say, that they are determined by the will now, before they come into existence. Doubtless by whatever they are determined, they are determined by it at the very instant of their coming into existence. No cause produces an effect, at a time before or after the existence of that effect. Therefore by this concession of Dr. West it seems he holds, that no volition, past, present or future is determined by the will, or by the mind in the exercise of the will. Yet Dr. West strenuously pleads for a self-determining power. But what good purpose does this power answer, since it determines no act of will? It seems it is a very innocent and harmless thing, because it is very inefficacious and dormant, doing neither good nor hurt.

Dr. Clarke, in papers between Leibnitz and himself, grants, that "nothing is, without a sufficient reason why it is, rather than not; and why it is thus, rather than otherwise. But" says, that "in things in their own nature indifferent, mere will, with

Page 17.

son.

out anything external to influence it, is alone that sufficient reaBy will the Doctor must mean either an act of volition, or the power of the will. If he mean that the former is the reason or ground of our acts of the will, he runs into the infinite series. If he mean the latter it is as absurd as to say, The ability of Dr. Clarke, to write his replies to Leibnitz, was alone the sufficient reason why he wrote them.

Dr. Price in his correspondence with Dr. Priestly, says, "It cannot be justly said, that self-determination implies an effect without a cause. Does it follow, that because I am myself the cause, there is no cause?" To this I answer, that though it does indeed not follow, that because I am myself the cause of a volition, there is no cause; as it is taken for granted, that there is a cause, and that I am that cause; yet from the supposition, that volition is not the effect of a cause extrinsic to the mind in which it takes place, it will follow, that there is no cause of it; because it is absolutely impossible, that the mind itself should be the cause of it. The impossibility of this has been already stated in the preceding discourse, and more largely illustrated by other writers. And if any man will show the possibility of the mind's causing its own volitions, and will remove the absurdities attending that supposition; erit mihi Magnus Apollo. It will then and not till then, be incumbent on us to speak of self-determination in a very different strain.

In fine, those who plead for a self-determining power, either mean what Dr. West declares he means, that we ourselves determine whenever we do determine; which is no part of the subject of this controversy, is disputed by none and is nothing opposite to moral necessity, extrinsic causality of volition, etc. but amounts to this merely, that we are the subjects of volition. Or they mean, that we are the efficient causes of our own volitions. But these men seem never to have reflected so far on the subject, as to see, that this idea of self-determination runs into what has been so often charged upon them, an infinite series of volitions causing one another; and therefore when this difficulty is suggested to them, they are either silenced and have nothing to answer, or else answer in such a manner as to show, that by efficiently causing our own volitions they mean merely what Dr. West professes to mean, that we will or are the subjects of volition, which no more implies that we cause them, than that we cause all our own perceptions and feelings follows from our being the subjects of them.

"I take it to be an important truth," says the Doctor," that

li

i

Where? TERESSC bes. Eberty ends; and that a
aven" && "'ummdcoce What a pity, that the Doc
underthat the offence of a proposition, which he is
nenstuale to beg " Or it he be not necessitated to
auty that he should do it without necessity! He kno
to have known, that this which he here takes for gr
conceded that President Edwards and all his f
that the most absolute moral necessity is consistent
liberty, and that an agent acting under moral nec
from a contradiction, that neither God nor creat
any other agent. If Dr. West should say, that
is & contradiction according to his idea of ager
terminate agent or one acting by chance, be it
prove and not assume, that his idea is possible

truti..

- Wher a man considers," says Dr. West
moved by any extrinsic cause to do evil, but t
has originated wholly from himself, he must
inly vis and unworthy of any divine favor
alzether in the clouds What does he
originated from a man's se? He cannot e
*sei" arts or self and produces wickednes
I: he mean that a man is himse
wired volitions or actions; this is
sec to his being moved by an
- 21 more than a man's being
with the pain's being effecte

as absurd.

que te quienes beside these two, i DESPOJILON TO a man's self, let it be

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

341

an extrinsic cause, is certainly the subject of mere
ccident." Indeed! and is the planetary system
mere chance and accident? The material world
self, yet not a hair of our head escapes the notice
f our heavenly Father. Surely the Doctor an
t consideration.

of self-determination implying, that when the
s has an objert sew, and that there is al
ting, is as fly cute with our being the
s and proses protone and threaten
as sure a course wen mane and
Edwards come to me from
Yes the Door & soets www," that
red by the men an, and that
between me a

the meaur aut qurd as
run of comma.bor and

a

its

ex

ing. with

either en the

act in he real

е оссаe action casion of he action st without ist without will be supreason exist, sed reason is ɔmething else stence without e occasion and y to say, that on and motive, n a thing and its

wherever necessity begins, liberty ends; and that a necessary agent is a contradiction."* What a pity, that the Doctor should undertake the defence of a proposition, which he is necessitated perpetually to beg! Or if he be not necessitated to beg it, what a pity that he should do it without necessity! He knows or ought to have known, that this which he here takes for granted, is not conceded; that President Edwards and all his followers hold, that the most absolute moral necessity is consistent with perfect liberty, and that an agent acting under moral necessity, is so far from a contradiction, that neither God nor creature is or can be any other agent. If Dr. West should say, that a necessary agent is a contradiction according to his idea of agent, i. e. a self-determinate agent or one acting by chance, be it so; he ought to prove, and not assume, that his idea is possible and according to truth.

"When a man considers," says Dr. West, "that he is not moved by any extrinsic cause to do evil, but that his wickedness has originated wholly from himself, he must feel himself exceedingly vile and unworthy of any divine favor." This is talking altogether in the clouds. What does he mean by wickedness originated from a man's self? He cannot consistently mean that "self acts on self and produces wickedness;" for this he rejects as absurd. If he mean, that a man is himself the subject of wickedness, wicked volitions or actions; this is granted; but it is not at all opposed to his being moved by an extrinsic cause to that wickedness, any more than a man's being the subject of pain is inconsistent with the pain's being effected by an extrinsic cause. If there be any sense beside these two, in which wickedness can be originated from a man's self, let it be pointed out.

"If men have an existence distinct from Deity," says the Doctor," endowed with a consciousness distinct from Deity, then they have a self-active principle distinct from Deity; i. e. they have a self-determining power." That men have an existence and consciousness distinct from Deity, is granted; but that it thence follows, that they have a self-determining power, if by that be meant anything distinct from a faculty of will influenced by extrinsic motives and causes, is not granted, and ought not to have been taken for granted, nor asserted without proof. From the same premises it would follow, that brutes have a self-determining power; which is not generally allowed by the advocates for that power. For brutes have both an existence and a consciousness distinct from the Deity.

"He that cannot govern his own mind; but is constantly de† Part II. p. 23. ‡ Part II. p. 24.

* Part II. p. 19.