It would be idle to deny that Senator Borah's resolution on the subject of American claims against Great Britain suggests possibilities of a most unpleasant kind. The knowledge that claims of a very controversial character, amounting to over a hundred million pounds sterling, might at any moment be presented at Whitehall would in itself be sufficiently disturbing. That, however, is not the worst. The nature and origin of these particular claims, and the circumstances in which their presentation is now demanded, combine to make it quite certain that they cannot be pressed without exasperating public opinion in this country to an extreme degree. The fact that Senator Borah's action has synchronized with the partial publication of a very critical and even censorious report on the political state of Europe by Mr. Houghton, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, adds to the risk of the question giving rise to an embittered controversy.

In these circumstances it is of the first importance that all, on both sides of the Atlantic, who realize the supreme importance of friendly Anglo-American relations should form a clear idea of the questions at issue. What, in the first place, is the present position, and what are the chances that the American Government will take official action in support of the claims?

For several years past American exporters, shippers, and marine-insur'From The Nation and the Athenæum (London Liberal literary and political weekly), March 27

ance firms have been filing with the State Department claims against Great Britain and France for damages arising out of the Allied blockade of Germany between August 1914 and April 1917 - that is, during the period of American neutrality. For a long time the United States authorities did nothing; but, as the claimants are very numerous and very wealthy, they have combined to put political pressure on the Administration. The Senate has passed a resolution that the Secretary of State be invited to explain what action he proposes to take with regard to the claims; the resolution has been referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator Borah is chairman, and the Committee has reported favorably upon it.

The next step to be taken is not quite clear. Either the chairman of the Committee summons the Secretary of State to answer questions, or else the resolution is placed upon the Senate's agenda for further discussion, and the necessary action with regard to the Secretary of State is taken by the Committee, after a debate and division. It is reported, however, that Senator Borah, for the moment at any rate, does not intend to press the matter. Further, it must always be remembered that, even if the Foreign Relations Committee or the Senate presses for a decision, the Secretary of State is under no constitutional obligation to comply; he is perfectly entitled to refuse, on grounds of general policy, to proceed further in the affair.

The latest reports give reason to hope that counsels of wisdom and moderation will prevail; but the fact remains that the agitation in favor of the claims is backed by a large number of very wealthy men with great electoral influence, and that the present temper of a large section of American public opinion with regard to European affairs ensures a favorable hearing for those who wish to press the claims. Even if the question should stand over for the moment, it may be revived, and it is essential that the British public should realize that the claims are seriously put forward, and that, if the American Government should decide to support them diplomatically, it would have a strong backing in the United States.

The claimants' case stands thus: The blockade of Germany was carried on by a series of Orders in Council, contraband proclamations, and methods of naval and financial pressure which the United States Government, during its neutrality, challenged, and declared to be illegal. Each of these measures caused loss to American exporters, and the State Department cannot refuse to press their claims- so the claimants argue without admitting that its own protests were merely formal and made without justification or conviction. It is true that, after the United States entered the war, the weapon of economic pressure was used more drastically than ever; but it was exercised, so far as concerned the United States, not by naval patrols, the interception of neutral goods, and prize-court condemnations, but by general export embargoes on all American goods with a neutral destination, which were only removed when neutrals adjacent to Germany gave satisfactory guaranties against reëxport. It is claimed, and from a lecture delivered by Admiral Tupper before the Royal United Service Insti

tution it appears to be a fact, that the United States Government carefully avoided sending so much as a picket boat to strengthen the naval forces employed on blockade duty.

It is important to grasp the last point, for the incredulity with which the first reports of the American claims were received on this side was based largely on American participation in the economic offensive during the later stages of the war. It is an essential part of the claimants' case that the right of a sovereign State to impose such restrictions as it pleases on the exports of its own products is absolutely consistent with the protests made by the United States Government against British interference with neutral goods and ships.

If the claims are really presented, they will, of course, have to be discussed in terms of international law, and it is not impertinent to remark that precedents, extremely valuable to the Allies, will be found in the records of American Prize Court decisions during the Civil War. We propose, however, to leave the legal aspect of the claims, for the moment, on one side; for we believe that an embittered legal wrangle would have a very bad effect on Anglo-American relations, and we hope that, on general grounds of honor and policy, the American people, as a whole, will express themselves so strongly against the claims as to enable the Administration to resist any pressure brought to bear by the claimants and their supporters. So long as there is still room for American opinion as a whole to make itself felt, it would be bad strategy for Britain to spend time and energy on legal arguments appealing, of necessity, only to a few specialists.

There are, it seems to us, two questions which every American citizen should be invited to answer, with

out regard to political or juridical niceties:

First, can it be doubted that the American nation profited, and profited enormously, by those very measures against which the State Department protested? The legend of a Germany that gorged itself with neutral supplies while the British Foreign Office slumbered was long ago exploded. The American armies took the field against an enemy whose powers of resistance, military and economic, had already been sapped and debilitated by a long period of isolation. Whatever judgment be passed on the methods employed, can the United States Government, with any sense of equity, seek to recover vast sums from Great Britain in respect of measures which, as matters turned out, saved many millions of American treasure and many thousands of American lives?

Secondly, can the United States Government decently press claims press claims upon Great Britain of which no mention was made in the debt settlement? It is true that the admitted liability in respect of war loans and the contested

claims in respect of seizures and condemnations were not, even in their origin, on the same footing; but it is equally true that at the time of the debt settlement the British people had no idea that such claims as these could be made, and looked on the debt settlement as a final liquidation of all outstanding financial questions between the two countries. The American public, press, and Government must be perfectly well aware that the debt settlement would never have been effected on its actual terms if the British Government had had the slightest inkling that a new and most burdensome set of claims might be presented a few years later.

[THE following story, which will appear in a series of articles in the Living Age, we believe to be perfectly authentic. The author was for several years the officer in command of the Russian Government's counter-espionage service in Siberia, having under his charge the military districts of Omsk, Irkutsk, and Trans-Amur, that is, the whole Eastern and Western section of Siberia with the exception of the Amur district — a post he held until the Revolution. The names of the actors have been disguised in order to prevent embarrassing consequences befalling them should the facts revealed come to the attention of people in a position to do them injury. Needless to say, we publish the narrative to illustrate the seamy side of all international relations where military rivalry comes into play, and not as a reflection upon the methods and procedure of any particular Government.]

WHEN I took possession of my new post in Siberia I found myself in charge of a very limited staff, whose members had to cover a great area of country, and who had on file very inadequate records of their operations. Consequently we were compelled to start almost from the beginning.

Our first task was to make a census of all the Japanese living within the limits

1 From a Confidential Journal. Copyrighted by the Living Age Company. All publication rights reserved.

ascer

of our jurisdiction. We soon tained that along the railway line from Cheliabinsk to Manchuria Station, or a distance of more than three thousand miles, there were only a few score permanent residents of this nationality. They were mostly small traders and artisans. Of course it was also my duty to inform myself about other foreigners in this territory, but owing to our geographical position my chief attention was naturally concentrated upon the Japanese.

The local police and the civilian residents who assisted us in gathering this information testified that their Japanese neighbors were peaceable and industrious people who worked regularly for their livelihood. They were washermen, barbers, photographers, cigarettemakers, acrobats, and small retailers. All the educated Japanese and wealthy merchants in our part of Asia lived to the eastward of Manchuria Station, along the Chinese Eastern Railway. West of that point, in addition to the small number already mentioned, were several women, almost exclusively inmates of Japanese brothels, whose proprietors were of the same nationality.

As Irkutsk was the military centre of Siberia, we naturally began our intensive investigations at that point. They disclosed the fact that there were about twoscore Japanese residing in the town, of whom the two most open to suspicion of espionage were the brothers

Siraisi. The elder of these, a man of forty-five or fifty years of age, owned a laundry, the younger a photograph shop. They occupied a small house not far from the headquarters of the commanding general. The elder used the lower floor for his business, the younger the second story. Each had a separate entrance both from the street and from the back yard.

My agents kept these brothers under surveillance from morning until night. Our reports showed that they seldom left their house except to make necessary purchases. The only people who visited them were Russians who brought linen to be washed, and an occasional Japanese visitor on a holiday. For three or four months our surveillance revealed nothing more than this. Reports from other Siberian towns where Japanese were being watched were of the same character. I felt sure, however, that the Japanese intelligence service would not neglect such an important military post as Irkutsk, and kept new agents constantly on the job there. None of them managed to get acquainted with the Siraisi brothers. The latter were very cautious and reserved in their conversation, and apparently their pidgin Russian did not extend beyond a meagre vocabulary relating to their trade. We might have made more progress if some of our agents had known Japanese, but none of them possessed a speaking knowledge of that language.

Just when the prospect of discovering anything of importance seemed absolutely hopeless, luck came to our assistance as it always did on precisely such occasions during my long experience as a counter-espionage officer. Our Army Headquarters included a cartographical establishment where our secret maps were printed. This institution was under the charge of a highly esteemed and competent specialist, Colonel X- who was also a man

famous for his courteous and genial disposition. But he was not a strict disciplinarian. His force included, besides the regular soldier detailed to his service, several civilian employees, some of whom led dissipated lives. From the time I began my work I tried to get one of my agents employed in this department, but for some reason or other always failed. Finally, in April 1912, I decided to see what I could do personally.

So one afternoon, about five o'clock, when the employees were leaving to go home, I appeared at the door dressed as a civilian. As I had just arrived at Irkutsk after a considerable absence, and as I was not accustomed to being seen in the streets, I ran little risk of recognition. Approaching one of the soldiers coming out, who seemed to me rather more intelligent than the others, and introducing myself as a merchant from Novo Nikolayevsk, I asked him to help me find among the employees a good lithographer for a printing office conducted by my brother in that town. The soldier, who was a garrulous fellow, said at once that he knew just the man for me.

While we were walking along talking the question over, we came to a small restaurant. I asked the soldier if he would take a drink with me. He readily accepted my invitation and we entered. After several glasses of vodka and two or three bottles of beer my new acquaintance became confidential. I pretended to be greatly interested in his personal affairs and asked him about his work and his superiors. The fellow, who was now quite drunk, boasted about the easy time he had. His work was not hard and his superiors were fine fellows. But his pay was too small; he had n't enough money to buy a drink now and then. Things had gone better the preceding year, for one of his friends, a soldier called Ignatiev, who