putes amongst ourselves, not with the enemy. In six several councils of war the siege of Barcelona, under the circumstances we then lay, was rejected as a madness and impossibility. And though the General and Brigadier Stanhope (afterward Earl Stanhope) consented to some effort, yet it was rather that some effort should be made to satisfy the expectation of the world, than with any hopes of success. However, no consent at all could be obtained from any council of war; and the Dutch General in particular declared, that he would not obey even the commands of the Earl of Peterborow, if he should order the sacrifice of the troops under him in so unjustifiable a manner, without the consent of a council of war.

And yet all those officers, who refused their consent to the siege of Barcelona, offered to march into the country, and attempt any other place, that was not provided with so strong and numerous a garrison; taking it for granted, that no town

in Catalonia, Barcelona excepted, could make long resistance; and in case the troops in that garrison should pursue them, they then might have an opportunity of fighting them at less disadvantage in the open field, than behind the walls of a place of such strength. And, indeed, should they have issued out on any such design, a defeat of those troops would have put the province of Catalonia, together with the kingdoms of Arragon and Valencia, into the hands of King Charles, more effectually than the taking of Barcelona itself.

Let it be observed, en passant, that by those offers of the land officers in a council of war, it is easy to imagine what would have been the success of our troops, had they marched directly from Valencia to Madrid. For, if after two months alarm, it was thought reasonable, as well as practicable, to march into the open country rather than attempt the siege of Barcelona, where forces equal, if not superior in number, were ready to follow us at the heels,

what might not have been expected from an invasion by our troops when and where they could meet with little opposition? But, leaving the consideration of what might have been, I shall now endeavour, at least with great exactness, to set down some of the most remarkable events, from our taking to the relief of Barcelona.

The repeated refusals of the councils of war for undertaking the siege of so strong a place, with a garrison so numerous, and those refusals grounded upon such solid reasons, against a design so rash, reduced the General to the utmost perplexity. The court of King Charles was immerged in complaint; all belonging to him lamenting the hard fate of that Prince, to be brought into Catalonia only to return again, without the offer of any one effort in his favour. On the other hand, our own officers and soldiers were highly dissatisfied, that they were reproached, because not disposed to enter upon, and engage themselves in impossibilities. And, indeed, in the manner

that the siege was proposed and insisted upon by the Prince of Hesse, in every of the several councils of war, after the loss of many men, thrown away to no other purpose, but to avoid the shame (as the expression ran) of coming like fools and going away like cowards, it could have ended in nothing but a retreat at last.

It afforded but small comfort to the Earl to have foreseen all these difficulties, and to have it in his power to say, that he would never have taken the Archduke on board, nor have proposed to him the hopes of a recovery of the Spanish monarchy from King Philip, if he could have imagined it probable, that he should not have been at liberty to pursue his own design, according to his own judgment. It must be allowed very hard for him, who had undertaken so great a work, and that without any orders from the government; and by so doing, could have had no justification but by success; I say, it must be allowed to be very hard, (after the undertaking had been ap

proved in England,) that he should find himself to be directed in this manner by those at a distance, upon ill grounded and confident reports from Mr Crow; and compelled, as it were, though General, to follow the sentiments of strangers, who either had private views of ambition, or had no immediate care or concern for the troops employed in this expedition.

Such were the present unhappy circumstances of the Earl of Peterborow in the camp before Barcelona: Impossibilities proposed; no expedients to be accepted; a court reproaching; councils of war rejecting; and the Dutch General refusing the assistance of the troops under his command; and, what surmounted all, a despair of bringing such animosities and differing opinions to any tolerable agreement. Yet all these difficulties, instead of discouraging the Earl, set every faculty of his more afloat; and, at last, produced a lucky thought, which was happily attended with events extraordinary, and scenes of success