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Nevertheless, let me try to briefly address some of these issues and I will be happy to respond in depth at this time or for the record if you have any additional questions. First, preparation of the RDT&E budget. Basically the RDT&E budget, like the rest of the DOD budget, is prepared in the context of overall resource allocation guidance from the Secretary of Defense. Priorities are established for readiness, sustainability, modernization and force structure expansion both for the mid and long term. Our RDT&E budgets are established to reflect these priorities as given to me. Second, regarding general policy. Our general policy for force structure requirements does not call for any arbitrary or fixed division between strategic and conventional programs. To maintain our deterrent posture, we must pursue a funding strategy for RDT&E that allows us to exploit the required technologies. In the strategic arena, this means missile base survivability, small ICBM, ATB, Trident II (D-5) program and SDI. In the conventional arena, it means exploiting technology to maintain the qualitative edge necessary for deterrence of quantitatively superior forces. I have already discussed our strategic and development programs, but I will be happy to answer any questions you have on that. On the subject of testing, our overall theme has been quality testing and independent objective reporting of test results in order to support the acquisition and decisionmaking process. There is no one in USDRE that has a desire to hide anything about weapons systems. The DOD directive that is being revised, is being revised to reflect these priorities and emphasize the need for realistic operational testing. The same principles are also being applied in our joint Live Fire Test Program for tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and aircraft. Thank you, gentlemen. That concludes my remarks and I am prepared for any questions you might have.
The FY 1987 Department of Defense
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FIGURES U.S. and USSR Defense Spending as a Percentage of Gross National Product, 1965-1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Estimated Dollar Cost of NATO and Warsaw Pact
A Comparison of U.S. Defense Investment Outlays
Average Number of U.S. and USSR New and Modified
U.S. and USSR New Weapon Systems as a Fraction of
Production Ratios of Selected Weapons: U.S. and USSR 1981-1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Production Ratios of Selected Weapons: NATO and
New and Improved U.S. and USSR Intercontinental
U.S. Inventory Value of Intercontinental Attack
USSR Inventory Value of Intercontinental Attack
Strategic Forces Funding as a Percent of Total DoD
U.S. and USSR Nuclear Warheads, 1965-1985 . . . . . . . . . . .
New and Modified U.S. and USSR Armor Systems
New and Modified U.S. and USSR Artillery Systems by
U.S. and USSR Major Surface Combatant Inventory
U.S. and USSR Attack Submarine Inventory