thorough management reviews of the cost characteristics of each system.

It is essential that we define the character of the future stockpile in view of improved weapon systems capabilities and changing requirements. We must also continue to improve upon the survivability and endurance of our forces and support infrastructure--both in CONUS and abroad. In addition, we plan to determine the feasibility and suitability of applying nuclear directedenergy technology to specific weapons applications. Finally, the modernization of the capital plant and infrastructure for nuclear weapons and weapons materials research, development and production must continue. In future years we must more fully consider total weapon system cost and performance in establishing military requirements and design objectives for nuclear weapons.

Challenges and Opportunities

Within the nuclear weapons area, the greatest challenge continues to be our country's will to stay the course in modernizing our stockpile. We are faced with a formidable adversary who possesses

steadily increasing

capabilities, yet is rarely subject to changing military strategy or wide variations in funding. The Soviets are not content to maintain parity, but are

dedicated to obtaining and maintaining clear military superiority. In response, we must sustain the effectiveness of our deterrent posture over time. We have a program for modernizing our nuclear forces and we now need the continuing commitment to bring that program to fruition in the years ahead.

It is also important to continue pursuing arms control and arms limitations agreements with the Soviets--agreements that provide for mutually verifiable limits. Until such agreements are realized, however, we must maintain a vigorous and technologically advanced program of research, development, and testing as the surest way of guaranteeing deterrence and encouraging meaningful arms control negotiations.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

There is no more urgent task facing Americans than to restore and then maintain the strategic balance. Matching the Soviets system by system, number by number, is not the answer. We must exploit our innate advantages in technology that are fostered and nurtured by our free society to provide the leverage required to maintain the balance, yet stay on a reasonable economic course for the country. The Strategic Modernization Program and the Strategic Defensive Initiative are

INTRODUCTION

The primary objective of our Tactical Warfare Programs is to provide a credible conventional deterrent for our forces worldwide. Our primary areas of concern are Central Europe, Korea, and Southwest Asia; but we must have the capability to respond to contingencies in other areas as well. Ongoing tactical warfare programs are aimed at modernizing our weapons systems and filling munitions inventory objectives for a wide range of general purpose land, air, and naval forces. In all of these areas, we are attempting to apply emerging technologies selectively to create new, high leverage capabilities at affordable costs in order to take advantage of our basically defensive posture. These high-leverage capabilities emphasize low observables and smart weapon technologies that will render large portions of the threat obsolete. One of the major thrusts in tactical warfare is the "Conventional Initiatives" package of programs that is aimed at providing the capability to both see and strike deep, denying enemy forces surprise, and threatening them throughout the length and breadth of the battlefield. In addition, there are

important improvements underway in each of the major warfare areas--land, sea, and air--that are aimed at providing an effective deterrent to attack by any potential adversary.

CONVENTIONAL INITIATIVES

to our

The key ingredient Conventional Initiatives effort is the deep surveillance and strike program which supports the Airland battle and the Follow-on Force Attack concept. This program consists of a series of Joint Service, principally Army and Air Force, standoff and penetrating systems incorporating a variety of advanced technologies including low observable technology, smart munitions for top attack of armored vehicles, new all weather real-time acquisition, and micro-processing for improved data handling. The impact of these technologies is to greatly enhance our conventional defensive capability throughout the depth of the battlefield, by increasing both firepower and survivability, without increasing force structure.

The programs that constitute the core of this program are the Joint

Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS) and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), the Joint Tactical Fusion Program (JTFP), and the Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD).

The Joint STARS (Air Force lead) is a multi-Service, multi-function radar that has a Moving Target Indicator surveillance mode, Fixed Target Indicator spot mode, and a weapons guidance mode. The ATACMS (Army lead) is the weapons program that provides an extended range strike capability by a correctable-trajectory ballistic missile for attacking maneuver forces. It is augmented by the JTACMS (Air Force lead).

In the Air Force, these near real time attack assets will be managed through a Ground Attack Control Center (GACC). In the Army a deep strike cell combining the same standoff sensors as the GACC will be the Fire Support Element (FSE). Again, the Joint STARS will be the hub while JTFP will serve as the key target nomination source. Joint STARS will be a primary sensor input to the GACC and FSE.

The Air Force lead JSEAD and its Precision Location Strike System (PLSS), is a major component which

must be integrated into the system architecture. The JSEAD is a set of triService, fully coordinated programs involving both lethal and non-lethal means to suppress and/or destroy enemy air defense, associated C3, and jammers.

Particularly important, as the Soviets expand the scope of their Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs), the long range strike capability will provide lateral fires, across Corps boundaries to prevent breakthrough on the flanks. These weapons, launched either from aircraft or by ground systems, will also be used to attack command and control nodes, transportation choke points, airfields. and other vital targets.

The lethality of the strike program is made possible by the smart munitions achievements. Soviet ground force equipment is susceptible to targeting by any of the three basic types of existing and proposed "supersmart" terminal guidance concepts: fly-over shoot-down; loiter-search shoot-down; hit-to-kill. Any of these types of munitions could include activating mechanisms, singly or in combination, employing technologies such as optical contrast, infrared, semi-active laser, imaging or pseudo-imaging, passive millimeter wave and active Millimeter Wave Radar (MWR).

A wide range of submunition candidates exist, from cluster bomblets to precision terminally guided submunitions. Area bomblets already in the field can be very effective when delivered accurately against many types of targets. Sensor fuzed munitions, e.g., warheads fuzed by relatively inexpensive sensors such as Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) are in development. Sensor fuzed munitions accurately delivered are extremely effective against any target type. These can be dispensed from a variety of air or surface delivered munition carriers. The most mature submunition concept which has been demonstrated is the autonomous hit-to-kill submunition. Such terminally guided submunitions after being dispensed from the carrier vehicle, select an individual target within their field of view and maneuver to selectively engage these targets.

These technologies, now being deployed or under system development, will dramatically improve conventional defense capability and enable day/night, all-weather engagement against moving and short dwell maneuver targets as well as interdiction of fixed targets. Attacks at the time of the Commander's choosing will have the direct effect of raising the nuclear threshold and the synergistic effect of increasing the credibility of our nuclear force posture.

The past 15 years have seen technological improvements in Soviet military equipment, an expansion in the size of their ground forces, and numerous organizational changes; all of which are part of the sustained effort by the Soviets to improve and expand their ground forces. This Soviet modernization directly challenges past U.S. qualitative superiority in ground combat forces. New Soviet tanks, armored vehicles, attack helicopters, self-propelled artillery, and surface-tosurface rockets and missiles, along with new guided munitions for all of these categories of weapons, pose major threats to U.S. ground combat forces. Countermeasures, decoys and wide spread use of deception techniques will be necessary to enhance force survivability. Rapid introduction of more effective weapon systems and munitions using emerging technologies