missile systems and air-to-air systems. In addition, the Soviets are developing and deploying airborne warning and control systems which will further challenge the capability of our bombers to penetrate. In contrast, the U.S. has to this point modernized only its warning systems, begun modernization of its small force of dedicated air defense interceptors, and pursued initial development of the U.S. ASAT system. This situation may change, however, with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The SDI research program offers the possibility of a more stable deterrence based upon defenses that are survivable, militarily effective, and reasonable in cost. If our vigorous research shows that such defenses against ballistic missiles are feasible, then we may transition from a deterrence based largely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to one based upon defensive capabilities that poses no threat to anyone. SDI research programs also provide insurance against the unilateral Soviet deployment of a similar system, as well as a necessary response to the current Soviet offensive and defensive buildup.

In non-strategic nuclear systems, the USSR is also pursuing a vigorous program with the development of theater ballistic and cruise missile systems (Table III-5). The U.S. is

defense capability of the Soviets and provide insurance against a significant Soviet breakthrough in ballistic missile defense.

Cruise and standoff air-to-surface missiles are also good examples of capabilities derived from our advanced technology. Developments in propulsion, guidance, and miniaturization of components have enabled us to develop systems which offer a significant force multiplier effect, as well as improved flexibility and high survivability. For example, we are developing and deploying sea-launched cruise missile variants capable of both nuclear and conventional attack, which can be launched from submarines, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. There are similar high leverage technologies in other areas as well. The key point is simply this: our strategy must be to exploit technology for the leverage benefits it provides over Soviet advantages in strategic force mass and capability.

STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

GOALS/OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of U.S. strategic forces remains the maintenance of stable deterrence. Our strategic forces must be able to survive a well-executed surprise attack and be capable of retaliating against a wide

range of possible targets while retaining a secure reserve force as a further deterrent. The Soviet Union is challenging our basic objective by gaining advantages in critical nuclear force capabilities, thereby threatening our deterrent strategy. To counter the Soviet's growing nuclear warfighting potential, the President has given the highest priority to the modernization of our strategic nuclear forces. In addition, equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements are being pursued in parallel with these modernization programs. The objective of these efforts is to create a more stable nuclear balance at reduced levels of armament.

U.S. nuclear forces include strategic weapons deployed on land (ICBMs), at sea (SLBMs), and in the air (heavy bombers). These three major force elements comprise the well-known strategic triad. The distribution strategic forces within the triad is a key factor in assessing the deterrent capabilities of our forces compared to the Soviets. Unlike the United States, the Soviets rely on numerous heavy ICBMs which pose the greatest threat to military and civilian targets in our country. Our nuclear forces, in contrast, are more evenly distributed, with the bulk of our nuclear weapons deployed on less powerful and less accurate SLBMs or relatively slow-flying bombers. Thus,

U.S. forces are designed only for retaliation, and they lack the needed yield, accuracy and promptness to threaten the Soviets with a credible first strike attack.

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Each element of the strategic triad offers differing characteristics in terms of responsiveness, accuracy, control, targeting flexibility, and destructive power. These unique characteristics provide a hedge against a Soviet breakthrough in technology breakout from an arms control agreement that might jeopardize the capability of one or more of the other elements. Also, the depth and redundancy of our forces bolster credibility and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent and provide us with a range of retaliatory options short of a spasmodic, suicidal response to a Soviet attack. These qualities force the Soviets to account for a multiplicity of threats by developing extensive defensive capabilities against each element.

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In the paragraphs that follow, we will outline the objective of each triad element, assess its capability, and report the progress we have made in upgrading it to meet the increasing demands of a credible deterrent posture.

INTERCONTINENTAL

OFFENSIVE FORCES

Introduction

In their move toward strategic superiority, Soviet strategic forces continue to grow and improve. The number of strategic nuclear warheads targeted against us has doubled since the SALT II treaty was signed in 1979. In fact, the era of SALT II was a time for rapid buildup of Soviet forces as shown in Figure III-1. Currently, the Soviets have a four to one advantage over us in deployed ICBM throwweight--a useful static measure of force capability. Also, their move to mobile ICBMs continues unabated, with the road mobile SS-25 now operational and the rail mobile SSX-24 under development.

As regards SSBNs and SLBMs, the Soviets continue their rapid expansion with two classes of ballistic missile submarines, the the DELTA IV and TYPHOON. They have been producing an average of 130 SLBMs annually for the past ten years with a strong trend toward longer range and greater accuracy. This gives the Soviets the capability to launch SLBMs against us from waters close to their home ports under the protection of their antisubmarine warfare capabilities and land-based air cover. Thus, this strategy reduces their requirements for "on

station" patrols that are more difficult to sustain and defend.

In bombers, the Soviets are producing new BEAR-H cruise-missilecarrying bombers and nearing initial deployment of the BLACKJACK. Contrary to popular belief, the Soviets enjoy an advantage in numbers of cruise missiles, with five new types of air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles either deployed or in development.

The next paragraphs describe our efforts to reverse these trends.

Land-Based ICBM Forces

The need to modernize our ICBM forces for the tasks of the 1980's, 1990's and beyond still requires near and far term solutions. In the near term, the Peacekeeper ICBM is needed to redress the growing asymmetry between the hardening of Soviet high priority assets and our ability to place these assets at prompt risk. We are now proceeding with a two-phase modernization program involving the silo-based ICBM force with the deployment of 50 missiles in Minuteman silos, and continued research on alternate basing modes, all directed toward a force of 100 deployed missiles. The Peacekeeper flight test program continues on schedule with ten successful test flights to date, the last

two from a modified Minuteman test silo at Vandenberg AFB. We are proceeding with our evaluations of more survivable basing modes, including superhard silos, deceptive concepts also incorporating new hardening technology, and the socalled "shallow tunnel" and "carry hard" modes. Recent advances allow us to achieve silo hardness levels far in excess of those ever thought possible. Our work now is focused on reducing costs for these silos. Superhard silo basing would counter the current Soviet threat and help in the transition to longer term solutions involving mobility, deception and/or active defense. The advanced deceptive systems for Peacekeeper are less well developed than superhard silos, but they, too, appear promising.

To enhance strategic stability in the 1990's, the small ICBM program provides for increased survivability due to its adaptability to various basing modes. The superhard silo, hard mobile launchers on DoD land, and hard mobile launcher on Minuteman launch facilities all continue to show promise, and development programs are progressing on schedule. With a planned nine-year development cycle, this program will challenge our capabilities, and we are proceeding with a demanding development schedule to overcome the major technical challenges of low missile weight, lightweight/