KGB (Committee for State Security) and GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff); the facilities of the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Western countries, including state owned business corporations; the State Committee on Science and Technology, which arranges government science and technology agreements; and the Academies of Science and their Institutes, which have contacts with Western universities and research institutes both directly and through technical conferences. These Soviet organizations also have the cooperation of their counterparts in other Soviet Bloc countries.

• Finally,

our studies show significant savings in Soviet defense resources which have occurred through the exploitation of Western technology which we believe has been applied to other aspects of Soviet defense. Our estimates of such savings to their defense budget approach tens of billions of rubles. These savings have very high military leverage, particularly in their quest for qualitative weapons improve

ments.

As the Soviets pursue their aggressive technology acquisition program, the U.S. and its allies must continue to work diligently to curtail those transfers that could have significant adverse military impact. Our recent export control efforts have been successful in curtailing some critical transfers; indeed our studies have shown that, since the early 1980's, the U.S. Technology Security Program has denied the Soviets information and material they would have otherwise obtained. There will be continued efforts on the part of the Soviets to acquire specific technologies in the coming years. Given this fact, we must continue to place emphasis on restricting transfers, not only through the use of the domestic Commodity

Control List (CCL) and the International Coordinating Committee (COCOM), but also through other channels. Bilateral arrangements are in process or have been worked out with certain non-COCOM countries regarding protection of U.S. militarily critical technologies and products. Success in these efforts may well be one of the more urgent defense issues for the coming

years.

CONCLUSION

We have presented our view of the U.S.-USSR R&D and to a lesser extent the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance. The USSR has been investing heavily and is indeed deriving benefits from U.S. and allied programs. It has been introducing new weapons and modifications at a much faster pace than the U.S. Its centralized system allows it to pursue goals with a singular focus that we have been able to generate only in limited instances. At the same time, our free enterprise system gives us a flexibility that has allowed us to keep ahead in technology.

INTRODUCTION

The forces discussed in this chapter include the strategic triad, non-strategic nuclear forces, and strategic defensive systems.

Our basic strategy is deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict. The balance of American military deterrent power is our strategic nuclear arsenal: intercontinental bombers and associated tankers; land based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

(ICBMs); and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and the Nuclear Submarines (SSBNs) that launch them.

Deterrence is a function of three factors: military capabilities, the will to use them, and a potential aggressor's perception of the first two. Thus, implicit in our concept of deterrence is the capability and determination, should deterrence fail, to deny the enemy, particularly the Soviets, their objectives at any level of conflict.

Throughout the 1960's we possessed a strong deterrent. Our

nuclear posture confronted the Soviet leadership with a retaliatory capability sufficient to deny any aggressive ambition it may have harbored. During the 1970's, the U.S. attempted to promote and maintain nuclear stability through negotiation and unilateral restraint with regard to our own strategic forces. Unfortunately, by the 1980's it became apparent that Soviet efforts were not aimed at achieving nuclear stability, but at denying us a retaliatory capability.

This evolution is dramatically illustrated in Figure III-1 and Table III1, which depict the major offensive improvements made by the Soviets and the U.S. since the 1960's and 1970's. The USSR has introduced 10 new weapons and 17 weapon modifications over the last 10 years, compared to 4 new weapons and only 5 modifications for the U.S. The USSR has been most active in upgrading its ICBM force, the most destabilizing of the offensive forces introducing at least seven modifications during the period. More importantly, over the past ten years, Soviet production of strategic weapons far