Making joint programs succeed takes a concerted effort by Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and the Services. DoD uses special high level management bodies to address the opportunities and challenges of joint program development and management. DoD also continues to initiate R&D actions which enhance affordability in addition to meeting interoperability requirements and improving logistical efficiency. Our search for opportunities includes: surveying multi-Service mission requirements for common functions or related threats; resolving unnecessary differences in requirements and specifications; integrating requirements to get more economical production rates and more competitive acquisition; and

developing common, simplified training and logistic support bases.

We support strong Joint Chiefs of Staff utilization of the Joint Requirements and Management Board (JRMB) to identify joint military requirements and candidates for joint research and development, and to resolve Service requirement issues that may arise after joint programs are initiated. The JRMB is off to a good start and will continue to be helpful in solidifying joint programs.

Currently, there are more than 150 joint programs in various stages of development and procurement. In addition, resolution this past year of inter-Service issues regarding JSTARS and the Joint Service Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (V-22) provides two examples of the commitment of OSD leadership to effective joint progam management.

Other Initiatives

We are also supporting other efforts such as the Deputy Secretary's Acquisition Streamlining Initiative. This initiative to tailor development and procurement specifications during new system reviews is resulting in the elimination of requirements that are overly ambitious and uneconomical.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains an overview assessment of the U.S.-USSR research and development (R&D) balance. Such an assessment is useful because:

It gives us a broad view of where we have been and where we are going. It places our current defense R&D effort in context and highlights those trends that may require changing emphasis in future R&D programs.

• It alerts us to be on guard in areas where the USSR may be taking advantage of our open society to acquire advanced technology through legal and illegal means.

• It points to mission areas or weapon types where the U.S. or USSR face the prospect of replacing large quantities of aging equipment.

• It points to possible areas of high leverage, where relatively small investments can have major impacts.

The kinds of simple static balance comparisons that can be presented in an open publication have limitations: they omit critical areas of technology that must remain classified; they do not address the interactive dynamics of U.S.-USSR force acquisitions; and they cannot even begin to illuminate the potential outcomes of combat. Nevertheless, we feel such comparisons are useful because they foster public understanding of the issues to be considered in our FY 1987 budget and direct the attention of specialists to the threats and opportunities we appear likely to face in the 1990's.

The discussion in this chapter will focus on several broad areas. More detailed information by military mission area is presented in later chapters. Here are discussed: (1) defense resources-dollars and manpower devoted to defense in general, and defense-related

5

R&D in particular; (2) the R&D organizations and processes by which the U.S. and USSR turn new technology into deployed weapons; (3) the comparative levels of basic and applied research and development efforts; (4) the level of technology incorporated into deployed weapons; (5) the numbers of new and modified weapons developed and introduced into the forces in the last 25 years; and (6) the degree to which the technological improvements incorporated in those weapons reflect the Warsaw Pact's exploitation of Western advances.

Within the discussion of major mission areas in later chapters, data are presented on the major new weapons deployed in the mid-1980's, the major

20

DEFENSE SHARE OF GNP

qualitative trends in modernization in the mid-1980's, and selected statistics on numbers of new weapons, inventory value of forces and aging trends.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

In terms of overall spending the USSR is estimated to devote roughly 16% of its Gross National Product (GNP) to defense. This compares to 6% for the U.S. (Figure II-1). Our NATO allies contribute substantially to the common defense. The measurable contribution of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries to the Warsaw Pact is limited. When measured in dollars, NATO defense expenditures exceed those of the Warsaw Pact (Figure II-2).

500

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

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The Soviets❜ commitment resources to both military research and development and procurement has been enormous. Over the past 20 years the dollar cost of Soviet military investment (RDT&E, procurement and military construction) has increased at an average annual rate of 3%. Soviet military R&D activities alone have increased at about 4% annually. During the past ten years, growth in Soviet procurement has slowed, but its level has been so high that the estimated dollar cost of Soviet defense investment exceeded U.S. outlays by approximately $350 billion (Figure II-3).

The last decade has seen significant expansion in Soviet investment in those organizations that carry out military-related R&D. Despite such efforts, the recent strengthening of the U.S. military R&D commitment and its prospective continuation into the future represents a continuing response to Soviet military R&D. If they so choose, it will remain difficult for the USSR to close many already existing technology gaps, and new ones are likely to emerge. U.S. R&D expenditures have remained about 12% of Defense outlays since the late 1970's. Estimated Soviet RDT&E expenditures have risen steadily over the last 20 years. The impact of the Soviet R&D program has been to create a wide array of future options for exploiting existing technology across the broad range of military missions.

This Soviet challenge is qualitative and quantitative and requires that we maintain both a sustained modernization effort and a strong defense technology base to assure an acceptable balance of near and long term risks to national security. Our prospects for achieving such a balance are enhanced, in part, by our strong commercial technology base, which has helped alleviate the asymmetry in expenditures for military research and development.

The challenge presented by the growing Soviet military RDT&E program and the Warsaw Pact military industrial base has several dimensions. First, the Soviet military acquisition effort has traditionally been characterized by the highest national priority, centralized control in the execution of its plans, and long range program stability. High production rates and a deliberately evolutionary approach--routinely improving existing systems in parallel with development of new systems--are also characteristic of the effort. Taken together, those approaches have led to steady, across-the-board improvements in military capability in all mission

areas.

the

At times the independence and national priorities of NATO members mitigtate against an efficient weapons development process, whereas coordination of Warsaw Pact efforts entails coercion rather than the negotiation that occurs within the NATO alliance.

However, the Soviet acquisition program has weaknesses. These stem from three interrelated factors: the Soviet system lacks the flexibility and incentives inherent in free-enterprise economies with their many suppliers; they depend on Western accomplishments to point the way

toward high-technology advances; and their domestic political priorities and age-old penchant for secrecy hinder the dissemination and application of scientific developments.

WEAPONS R&D

ESTABLISHMENTS

The USSR has recognized that leadership in science and technology plays a key role in maintaining world leadership--industrially, economically, militarily and politically. They have established a centrally controlled system to formulate and carry out their R&D programs and to manage the flow of research through its various phases-fundamental, exploratory and applied. The Politburo sets broad national R&D policies. Occasionally, it even initiates new weapon programs (e.g., atomic bomb and ballistic missile developments). The Soviets' strategy for the achievement of their R&D goals includes a high and steadily increasing level of resource investment, and encompasses essentially two approaches: (1) the maintenance of a large indigenous technology base to support military and industrial development, and (2) the acquisition and assimilation of Western technologies to reduce the time, cost and risk involved in new programs. The Soviet military RDT&E program is characterized by stability in