lectual qualities of the Hellenic tribes, the signs of the times' as accommodating themselves to his theory. Into the particulars of this deduction we must not permit ourselves to enter; nor can we display, in detail, the arguments and illustrations by which he elucidates the Roman history and character, with reference to the same general views. Much valuable instruction, however, is elicited on all these points; and in particular, the circumstances of the Jewish State, in their connection with the different stages of the world's progress, are set forth with precision and ability.

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Referring, now, to the extract given in a former page, our readers will be able to form some general notion of the Author's hypothesis concerning the fulness of time: That the world, enthralled by sin, was to pass through a peculiar and experimental process, exemplifying, in every stage, the energy of human intellect and will, but their total inefficacy to effect the great moral liberation; and that, precisely at the point of time when the experiment had been completely tried, and had failed signally and hopelessly, God interfered, and the Divine Liberator came.

'Such was the condition and character of man when the Roman empire attained its zenith;-thoroughly matured, and thoroughly corrupted. Short of that point, maturity had not been reached; beyond it, irrecoverable degeneracy must have commenced. Then was the crisis of human destiny; for the growth of the human being had arrived at the ripeness of full manhood; and the sin of his fallen nature had displayed its intense malignity. In that point met all the converging lines of Providential guidance, according to which had been mapped out the various allotments of the race of Adam. To the momentous character of that epoch all the voices of prophecy bore concurrent testimony; because He who knew what was in man foresaw in what manner, and at what time, would be accomplished His own pre-determinate counsel, and thus governed nature and revelation in harmonious agreement with the laws of infinite and eternal Wisdom. Then, when that had been fulfilled which was written, " I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent,"-when "the world by wisdom knew not God," when the last efforts of man had been exhausted, and the last foundation of self-dependence destroyed, and the last hope of selfrecovery passed away,-when the heart of the universe seemed hushed into a dread pause of indefinite forebodings and silently anxious expectation,-then, was it manifest, that "THE FULNESS OF TIME had come; and then, "God sent forth His Son," that the world. through Him might be saved, and "that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life." pp. 369, 370.

"

Mr. Hetherington has, in a note of moderate dimensions, made a spirited effort to solve the great enigma of moral existenceMalum, unde et quare? The essay is compactly and cleverly written; and the result is involved in none of that obscurity

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which metaphysicians appear so marvellously to affect, but which, though it may be a source of the sublime, is quite as commonly the cause of great confusion. The solution is proposed with 'much diffidence'; yet, it is obvious enough, that the Author indulges a little quiet self-congratulation, in the belief that the path of inquiry is henceforward cleared of its most formidable obstructions. For ourselves, we are constrained to say, that we cannot view the matter in the same light; and that, so far as we can see, the entire speculation does but add one more to the already numberless instances that go to prove how easily a theorist can pay himself with words. The great flaw of almost every attempt at effecting this grand demonstration, lies in the substitution of subordinates for primaries: all the solutions that we have seen, deal only with secondary considerations; and perhaps it is not within the range of human intellect to rise higher. Of Mr. Hetherington's notions we cannot say even this: so far as they will bear handling, they belong to the tertiary formations.' He sets out with assuming our absolute ignorance of what con'stitutes the essence of any substantial existence,' and travels on through various illustrations, until he finds it to be the characteristic of human knowledge, that we know substances but by 'their qualities, and qualities but by their opposites;—that we 'do not know what any thing certainly and essentially is ;-and 'that the amount of our knowledge of any substance or its qualities, is an approximation to knowing what it is not.' This view of things is then transferred to the moral world. That combination of mental and moral qualities which we call mind, ' is absolutely unknown to us in its nature or essence; and all ' our knowledge of it is confined to its qualities, which we com'monly term attributes. These qualities or attributes follow the same law already specified in the qualities of material things, and are themselves discoverable only by their contrasts: right is defined and marked out by wrong, justice by injustice, 'evil by good.' The general summary of these views we have in the following paragraph.

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If the preceding view be correct, it will follow that the knowledge of all created intelligence consists in the perception of contrasts; and that the necessary mode of acquiring knowledge is to endeavour to discover what a thing is not, in order to arrive at some approximation of knowing what it is. Our knowledge, therefore, separates itself into two great divisions, namely, negative and affirmative or positive, of which the negative is the prior, and the more suited to the nature of created mind. Hence, in order that good might be known, it was necessary that evil should be permitted to exist. For if evil had not been permitted to enter into the created universe, that universe might have been perfectly good in itself, and also in the eyes of its all benevolent Creator; but it could not have understood or appreciated the

goodness of its own condition. In order to point out the excellence of good, the gracious Creator permitted the existence of its opposite, evil. This dark quality therefore exists, and is valuable not for itself, but for its results; as that method by which alone the spiritual creation could have obtained the intelligent, and consequently the rational, grateful, and adoring perception of good, and of Him who is essential goodness. Instead of being an imputation upon the goodness, or the wisdom, or the power of God, that evil exists in the universe which, for His own glory in the manifestation of His infinite attributes, He created by the word of His Power," it may perhaps be the unavoidable result of the imperfection incident to created existences, and at the same time the wise method by which is displayed the graciousness of His own condescension to the weakness of created intelligence, devised, guided, and overruled by infinite wisdom, mercy, and love.'

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pp. 410, 411. With the sentiments expressed in the closing sentence of this citation, we cordially agree; and we suspect that, independently of any theory, they will be found to include all that we can know, or need be anxious to know, concerning the high and mysterious discipline to which they refer. It does not, however, strike us that they are, morally or argumentatively, either the sequitur or the corollary of what has gone before. Firmly believing that the existence of moral evil cannot, by any fair process of reasoning, be made to bring in question the goodness, or the wisdom, or the power of God,-thoroughly satisfied that its presence in the world is the unavoidable result of the imperfection incident to created existences,' and that it tends to enhance the graciousness and the wisdom of God's dealings with men, we cannot yet think that Mr. Hetherington has succeeded in ascertaining either the best or the most plausible way of arriving at these conclusions, even if the whole of his premises be allowed. To these premises, however, we object-first, that Mr. H.'s doctrine fails in supplying an argument, either adequate or appropriate, for the admission and toleration of what is, to all appearance, a direct invasion of God's supremacy and secondly, that he is apparently in error, when he maintains that all knowledge is relative. may be very unsystematic in our views; but we have not yet. succeeded in making ourselves comprehend how goodness can be less positive, either in itself, or in that happiness which attends its possession and exercise, on the supposition that it has never been disturbed by the presence and temptation of evil. Even on his own shewing, surely the apprehension that evil might be,——— that there were, in the contingencies of moral existence, dark and disastrous possibilities, opposing good, and bringing in misery, -such a knowledge as this, without the actual experience and contact of corruption, would be enough for that comparison and contrast which Mr. H. thinks necessary to the science of good. But we see no necessity even for this concession. It seems plain

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to us, that the knowledge and experience of good are in themselves blessings of the most positive and exalted kind; while the mere knowledge of its opposite can be nothing more than a circumstance, enhancing, it may be, the enjoyment of the former, but making no alteration in its essential qualities.

We cannot dismiss this volume without again speaking strongly in its praise. Were we asked to recommend a brief but well compacted view of the history of the world, we are not aware that we could refer to a better or more interesting book. The composition is animated, and, excepting in a few instances of doubtful taste, as where we are told of the surges of guilt and ruin, 'that gurgle greedily round the perishing race of Adam,'-scholar-like and impressive.

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Art. II. The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, D.D., &c., with an Essay, Biographical and Critical. 3 Vols. royal 8vo. London, 1835.

IFi

F it is true of the mass of writers, that they come into the world like drops of rain into the sea, of which the ocean takes no notice, either of their coming in or their going out, it is yet gratifying to observe that some, at least, are launched like stately vessels, well freighted and manned for a long and prosperous voyage. This has been pre-eminently the case with an unusually large number of the writers that appeared in the seventeenth century. They still ride gloriously and successfully over the wide waste of waters. It cannot be the mere love of what is old, that has secured to them the admiration and longevity which so few of the moderns are likely to enjoy. Horace has well said: Jam Saliare Numæ carmen qui laudat, et illud Quod mecum ignorat, solus vult scire videri; Ingeniis non ille favet plauditque sepultis, Nostra sed impugnat, nos nostraque lividus odit.

Lib. II. Ep. i.

There are undoubtedly valid reasons to be found for that reviving partiality to our older writers, which is evinced by a considerable portion of the reading public in the present day. The very fact of the republication and sale of so many of the old authors, supplies a demonstration that they are deemed at least to possess qualities which entitle them to the admiration of posterity. There may be a diversity of opinion as to the measure of praise to which they are severally entitled; but there seems to be none as to the fact, that they are worthy of being preserved, and in the most honourable manner. Now, without troubling ourselves or our readers with an inquiry into the comparative

merits of the older writers and the moderns, it may be interesting to agitate the question, why so considerable a number of the former happen to be distinguished by those substantial and splendid qualities which are universally conceded to them, and which are allowed to entitle them to pre-eminence in our national literature. How is it to be explained, that the century to which they mostly belonged, shines forth between those which preceded and those which have followed it, like the milky way across the heavens? To us it appears unquestionable, that much is to be attributed to what may be denominated, the romantic character of the age in which they lived. There was a novelty and an excitement in the events of those times, highly fitted to work upon susceptible spirits.

It is a fact sufficiently obvious, and of great interest in the philosophy of mind, that external circumstances possess a mighty influence in giving a permanent direction to the powers of thought, and in calling into operation the various endowments of native genius. Men are, in an astonishing degree, made by circumstances. There are tides and currents in human affairs, which bear them away to their intellectual destiny. The first and chief excitement to human thought is furnished from without. There is the hand which, though it does not make, yet shapes the clay. Just as the climate of a country, which is itself regulated by physical relations, is the principal cause into which must be resolved the varieties of vegetable and animal productions; so, the social relations and the external circumstances of a race of men, an age, or a nation, have a visible and direct influence upon their endowments and mental exercises: these prepare the channel in which their thoughts are to flow, and supply an impetus to the stream, or impart a colouring and impregnation to the waters, as soils usually do to the currents that pass over them. It is from the circumstances in which human beings are placed, that the motives and stimulants to all mental operations are furnished. The intellectual character is formed by the habit of such thinking, and the habit itself is resolvable into the laws of mental association. Without entering further here into the elucidation of this principle, which, we conceive, may be traced in all ages and nations, we pass on to observe, that it is minutely applicable to those smaller sections of human society which are formed by differences of religious opinion and practice.

If it be admitted that nations and ages have a mental type or character determinable by their civil and political institutions, their national transactions, their commercial and domestic habits, or even, to a certain extent, by their geographical situation and local relations to other sections of the great human family, it will equally follow, that the relative circumstances of a sect or religious