when it is made the regulating motive of action, is calculated to control self-love, and preserve the proper harmony between it and the exercise of the affections.

When the principle of self-love becomes deranged in its exercise and objects, it leads to those habits by which a man seeks his own gratification in a way which interferes with his duties to other men. This he may do by an undue pursuit of any of the desires, -whether avarice, ambition, love of eminence, or love of fame; and the desire of knowledge itself may be so indulged as to assume the same character. Even deeds of benevolence and kindness may be performed on this principle,—as when a man, by such actions, seeks only the applause of the public, or the approbation of certain individuals, from whom, it may be, he expects to derive advantage. Hence the value we attach, in the exercise of all the affections, to what we call disinterested conduct,-to him who does good by stealth, or who performs acts of exalted justice, generosity, or forbearance, under circumstances which exclude every idea of a selfish motive, or when self-interest and personal feeling are strongly and obviously opposed to them. Such conduct commands the cordial approbation of all classes of men; and it is striking to remark how, in the highest conception of such a character that fancy can delineate, we are met by the sublime morality of the sacred writings, impressed upon us by the purest of all motives, the imitation of him who is the Giver of all good; "love your enemies,-bless

them that curse you ;-do good to them that hate you,—and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven; for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." "If any man will be my disciple," says the same great Author of Christianity," let him deny himself."

PART II.

OF THE WILL.

WILL, or Simple Volition, is that state of mind which immediately precedes action: we will a certain act; and the act follows, unless it be prevented either by external restraint or by physical inability to perform it.

The actions thus produced arise out of the mental emotions formerly treated of,—the desires and the affections. We desire an object, or we experience one of the affections: the next mental act, according to the regular course of a reflecting mind, is proposing to ourselves the question,-shall we gratify the desire,-shall we exercise the affection? Then follows the process of considering or deliberating. We perceive, perhaps, a variety of motives, considerations, or inducements,—some of which are in favour of gratifying the desire or exercising the affection, others opposed to it. We therefore proceed to weigh the relative force of these opposing

motives, with the view of determining which of them we shall allow to regulate our decision. We at length make up our mind on this, and resolve, we shall suppose, to do the act; this is followed by the mental condition of willing or simple volition.

action.

causes.

In the chain of mental operations which, in such a case, intervene between the desire and the volition, a class of agents is brought into view which act upon the mind as moral causes of its volitions ; these are usually called motives, or principles of When treating of this subject as a branch of the philosophy of the intellectual powers, I endeavoured to show the grounds on which we believe that there are facts, truths, motives, or moral causes which have a tendency thus to influence the determinations of the mind, with a uniformity similar to that which we observe in the operation of physical For the due operation of moral causes, indeed, certain circumstances are required in the individual on whom they are expected to operate, and without these they may fail in their operation. It is necessary that he should be fully informed in regard to them as truths addressed to his understanding,-that he direct his attention to them with suitable intensity, and exercise his reasoning powers upon their tendencies, and that he be himself in a certain healthy state of moral feeling. In all our intercourse with mankind, accordingly, we proceed upon an absolute confidence in the uniformity of the operation of these causes, provided we are acquainted with the moral condition of the individual. We can foretel, for example, the respective effects

which a tale of distress will have upon a coldhearted miser, and a man of active benevolence, with the same confidence with which we can predict the different actions of an acid upon an alkali and upon a metal; and there are individuals in regard to whose integrity and veracity, in any situation in which they can be placed, we have a confidence similar to that with which we rely on the course of nature. In this manner we gradually acquire, by experience, a knowledge of mankind; precisely as, by observation or experiment, we acquire a knowledge of the operation of physical agents. We come to know, for example, that one man is absolutely to be relied on in regard to a particular line of conduct in given circumstances; and that another is not to be relied on, if any thing should come in the way affecting his own pleasure or interest. In endeavouring to excite various individuals to the same conduct in a particular case, we learn, that in one we have to appeal only to his sense of duty; in another to his love of approbation; while on a third nothing will make any impression except what bears upon his interest or his pleasure. Again, when we find that, in a particular individual, certain motives or truths fail of the effects which we have observed them to produce in others, we endeavour to impress them upon his mind, and to rouse his attention to their bearings and tendencies; and this we do from the conviction, that these truths have a certain uniform tendency to influence the volitions of a moral being, provided he can be induced seriously to attend to them, and provided he is in