The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period: An Operational Perspective

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Routledge, 6 déc. 2012 - 324 pages
Joseph Moretz's innovative work focuses on what battleships actually did in the inter-war years and what its designed war role in fact was. In doing so, the book tells us much about British naval policy and planning of the time. Drawing heavily on official Admiralty records and private papers of leading officers, the author examines the navy's operational experience and the evolution of its tactical doctrine during the interwar period. He argues that operational experience, combined with assumptions about the nature of a future naval war, were more important in keeping the battleship afloat than conservatism in Navy.

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Table des matières

1 The Experience of the Late War
1
2 Imperial Naval Policy and the Capital Ship Controversy
32
3 The Influence of Arms Control and the Treasury on the Interwar Royal Navy
65
4 The Evolution of the Capital Ship
103
5 British Interwar Naval Strategy
150
6 The Operational Employment of the Capital Ship
179
7 The Development of Battlefleet Tactics
211
8 Reconsideration
252
Bibliography
267
Index
283
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Joseph Moretz

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