independence of nations has often ceased to exist, long before hostile banners, or the still more dangerous banners of protecting allies, had waved beneath the walls of their capitals.

In what state the science of tactics, the very foundation of the art of war, has, in the face of these truths, been allowed to remain in this country, was shown at length in the foregoing papers. Hundreds of thousands of infantry, the strength of armies, were sent to battle without having been taught the use of arms. These noble soldiers, for so their gallantry, discipline, and high bearing on every occasion well entitle them to be called, possess neither the means of resisting cavalry upon open ground, nor of contending, successfully, in hand-to-hand combat, against bold and energetic enemies; they are not dexterous enough in the use of arms to encounter, on equal terms, adversaries skilful in distant and desultory warfare: and, as far as the development of moral and personal faculties go, the men are as ill prepared for fighting on the day of battle as they were when they left the loom or the plough to enlist in the army. The very weapons placed in the hands of the soldiers are made on principles at variance with good swordmanship, or skilful musket practice.

As a trifling addition to the proofs formerly brought forward to show the value of our system, I may here mention, that the late excellent Mr. Surtees, of the Rifle Brigade, expressly says in his Memoirs, that he did not believe a single shot, out of nearly two hundred which he fired, during the battle of Bergen, took effect; an ignorance in the use of arms, for which, he somewhere else remarks, the Americans very justly laugh at us.

That things have not much mended,—and how indeed should they,— may be seen by the following extract from a late Brighton paper: the statement is probably not much exaggerated." On Saturday week, a certain brigade of fusileers, in the neighbourhood of this town, proceeded to exercise with ball cartridge. An immense quantity of ammunition was expended in the course of the day, at the close of which it was triumphantly announced, that one man (out of sixty) had hit the mark."

If such is your practice in peace, what is it likely to be in war?

The French, whose arming and training is pretty nearly upon a par with our own, expended, by official returns, 3,000,000 of ball cartridges during the operations before Algiers. They estimated the number of Moors killed and wounded at 10,000; so that, without making any allowance for those who fell by the fire of artillery, it requires three hundred musket-shots to put one enemy hors de combat. But we now know that there were not even 5000 Moors killed and wounded; many of those who fell must, of course, have fallen by the fire of artillery; so that it must have taken some six or eight hundred musket-shots to bring down a single enemy! Now, reader, what think you of the system that limits the exertions of bold, active, and energetic men to the use of such an arm?

Perhaps you will appeal against this sweeping condemnation of the system of tactics to the victories achieved, during the war, over some of the bravest nations of the world?-But those nations followed, if any thing, rather a feebler system than your own; and your success may be fairly ascribed to the general knowledge and high character of your

officers, as well as to the stout hearts and strong arms of your men; so that, to render the appeal effectual, you must make it clear that your victories were always gained at the lowest possible expense of blood and treasure; and this will hardly be attempted in the face of the facts stated in the first part of this Essay, that amply prove loss and disaster to have resulted from the system, and from the system alone.

If these, our own disasters, have not yet been so overwhelming as others quoted in the second part of the Essay, to show how often a tenacious adherence to faulty and superannuated practices had occasioned the loss of empires, provinces, and entire armies, they have, nevertheless, been sufficiently marked, clearly to lay bare the causes from whence they sprung. And is not this enough? Must military improvement be constantly purchased by a boundless waste of human blood, instead of resulting from the power of human thought and reflection? Let us hope for the better things that are within our reach; for those who remember the war, and know the materials of which our army is composed, can well picture to themselves a band of British soldiers proudly advancing to battle with the step of victory and glance of defiance, their bodies erect, heads high, and confident in themselves, their leaders, and their arms, already looking upon every inch of ground marched over as so much conquered territory; still counting, like the army of Alexander at the Issus *, more than nine-tenths of the entire number effective in the ranks after years of triumphant progress.

But under the present system, we can look only for a repetition of what the same system produced before. When the war, already raging in the hearts of men, shall break out into open hostility, we must again expect to behold melancholy trains of exhausted stragglers in the rear of every line of march, crowded hospitals, a boundless waste of ammunition, and small results produced; sanguinary combats fought, and few advantages gained; protracted campaigns, and many more thousands destroyed by sickness and suffering than by the weapons of the foe. We shall again see armies raised, fleets assembled, seas traversed, and mountains crossed, in order that we may confront our enemies, not, indeed, to spring upon them as springs the lion in his wrath upon the foe, nor to dart upon them as the eagle in his pride darts down upon the prey; no, but just according to prescribed rule,-to pull a trigger at them!

The system is now, divested of false glitter and in its naked feebleness, brought fairly, I hope, to the bar of professional opinion. Let the officers of the army, who take an interest in the service, compare what skilful and well-armed men have done, and may therefore do again, with all that a tactical soldier is enabled to perform by the aid of his present arming and training: having made this comparison, let them decide accordingly on the value of modern tactics.

* Polybius, book xii.

J. M.

STRICTURES ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMY AND NAVY APPOINTMENTS.

"There is now a Bill in this House appointing a rigid inquisition into the minutest detail of our offices at home. And for what is all this apparatus of bustle and terror? Is it because anything substantial is expected from it? No. The stir and bustle itself is the end proposed. Great difficulties have given a just value to economy, and our minister must be an economist whatever it may cost us. If he does not obtain any public benefit, he may at least make regulations without end. Those are sure to pay in present expectation, whilst the effect is at a distance, and will be the concern of other times and other men." BURKE'S Speeches.

THE Committee of the House of Commons appointed to investigate the general question of naval and military appointments, with all other concerns connected with the expenses of the army, assembled in the month of May last, and proceeded to divide their subject into four separate heads:

1. The Garrison Establishments.

2. The Pay and Allowances of General Officers having regiments. 3. The Pay and Allowances of other General and Staff Officers. 4. The honorary emoluments of officers of high rank in the Navy. Now the first of these heads, the Garrison Establishments, being a matter but little understood by the public, had long furnished an extensive field for every empty and mischievous popular declaimer to utter all imaginable falsehoods and absurdities concerning it, starting always upon principle, by designating the garrison appointments as total sinecures, conferred either by gross misapplication of royal favour, or obtained by intrigue and party management.

The principal evidence before the Committee was in the first instance given by the Military Secretary in person; but as its substance was all recapitulated in a return enumerating every garrison appointment, with columns showing the pay and allowances of each situation itself, and also any other emolument held under government by the same individual, the Committee contented themselves with entering that return upon their proceedings, instead of the whole of the evidence. One thing is very striking on looking through this document, namely, that in order to show the nature and amount of the emoluments above alluded to, it has actually been necessary to introduce into that return in question one column exclusively set apart for pensions for wounds,wounds received by those men who have, in so malignant and scandalous a manner, been held up to reproach as the undeserving plunderers of an impoverished country, and as the idle sinecurists who ought at once to be deprived of their ill-gotten places.

One could almost wish it were possible to make such vile calumniators exchange places with some of these veterans, and let them discover how they would themselves enjoy dragging on an old age of suffering with the renewed pain of some shattered limb at every change of weather, or the often-recurring torture of a musket-ball shifting about among the sensitive nerves and muscles of an exhausted frame. And, for the most part, the sort of men who occupy the subordinate grades of the garrison appointments are sufferers of this description, while the U.S. JOURN. No. 61, DEC. 1833. .

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principal posts are chiefly filled by those general officers, who (to use the Committee's own words), " during a period of unparalleled exertion on the part of the army, and of unexampled glory acquired to the country by the achievements of that army," have been the men to rally and cheer the British soldier in the hour of need, and lead him when rushing to victory.

But to what conclusion have the Committee arrived? They say, "After fully considering the question, and also a paper of the Duke of Wellington, which brings briefly but powerfully into view the whole constitution of the army, with the opinions of other high military authorities in favour of the continuance of these garrison appointments, they are still of opinion that, upon the principle so repeatedly laid down by Parliament, that all sinecure appointments should be abolished, no garrison appointments should be made where no efficient military duty is performed." And they conclude this part of their report by advising that 18,000l. a-year shall be placed at the King's disposal, to be distributed by his Majesty among the officers who may hereafter distinguish themselves, and would have been proper persons for those situations which they now recommend to be abolished as sinecures.

In one respect, as regards the garrison appointments, the Committee appear to have acted with consideration and justice: they have recommended the discontinuance of those civilians who had got into some of these situations, and thus undoubtedly diverted the salaries to other channels than those of military reward, for which they were intended. A circumstance was elucidated in the examination of Major Ebrington, of the Tower, in reference to garrison appointments, which, though lately noticed in some of the newspapers, cannot be made too public both to the army and to the country. After Major E. had previously stated that there were forty warders upon the establishment, the interrogatories and replies proceeded thus:

"No. 2974. Who makes the appointment of warder? The Constable of the Tower, the Duke of Wellington.

"Were not these appointments formerly sold? They were.

"What was usually given for the situation of warder? I think about 3001.

"When was that practice abolished? Since the Duke of Wellington became Constable.

"Then his income as Constable is diminished accordingly by the abolition of this practice? No doubt of it.

"What description of persons have lately been appointed to these situations? Discharged non-commissioned officers and deserving old soldiers of the Guards and other regiments."

Here we have a fact truly characteristic of the Duke of Wellington; for not only had he from his own emolument made this sacrifice, in order to establish a reward for the old soldier, but he had done it so quietly, and so entirely without ostentation or parade, that the fact was unknown except to the few whose department it concerned and the men themselves who benefited by this considerate act of liberality. Not many men would have made the sacrifice; but still fewer would have made it without claiming the applause and popularity which would naturally attach to such conduct.

The second division of the labours of the Committee comprises all

that has reference to the system of clothing and equipment of the army; and after examining half the clothiers in London, and endeavouring by every means to detect some want of economy in the present plan of the General Officers being the undertakers of the equipment, it seems they came to the conclusion, as stated fairly in their Report, that "they are not prepared to suggest any change in this long-established system, which, although it may at first sight appear anomalous, and to involve the objectionable principle of giving profit to the colonels out of monies ostensibly voted for another purpose, secures the responsibility of those officers for the just and punctual distribution of the clothing to the different regiments, dispersed as they are throughout various and distant colonies, and which at the same time protects the public from the losses to which they would be exposed by the accumulation of stores of this description supplied under the management of public boards," &c.

The reasoning is true and correct; but still, notwithstanding the mass of evidence they have called upon this matter, the Committee by no means arrived at all the reasons that might have been well adduced in support of their conclusions. For instance, can there be a more essentially good reason for avoiding public contract than the probability of less durable equipment and clothing being issued in war time? With troops on service it is not a mere question of cheap dress, or whether three suits of clothing may not be purchased by public contract for the game amount as two by private contract, but the duration of whatever is put upon the soldiers' backs, when they disembark on a foreign shore to commence a campaign, has often proved a question, not of mere pounds and shillings, and good or bad cloth, but of life and death to men exposed to wet and cold for days, and nights, and who may be many weeks or months without once getting into a bed. As a matter of mere calculation, and without any consideration of humanity, or the better prospect of success in a foreign contest, it must not be forgotten that the efficiency of one well-trained soldier in the middle of a campaign is often beyond all conjectural value; and therefore even on this ground, nothing that art or care can contribute towards preserving his comfort, health, and constitution, should be withheld or economized. The fastidiousness of the lieutenant-colonels and the diligence of the inspecting-generals as to every point of dress and accoutrement, does not also appear to have sufficiently struck the Committee as a very strong and constantly active check upon any improper management in the supply of clothing. There are some who, captivated by the swagger of the French militaire, maintain that he is a better-dressed soldier than ours; but, putting his conceit and military carriage on one side, and fairly examining the quality, comfort, and make of the British soldier's clothing, it will be found, for the uses and hardships of actual service, superior to that of any soldier of the continental armies, as indeed we find very judiciously stated in Sir II. Vivian's letter in the Appendix of the Report. It would be strange indeed if it were not so; for every one conversant with our system of clothing is aware of the extraordinary care, zeal, and management exercised by the colonels, lieutenant-colonels, inspectors, and all who are in any degree concerned in superintending the outfit of a British regiment.

The Committee conclude this branch of their labours with a proposal of certain reductions, trivial in extent and paltry enough in contrivance,