gerous and hideous form. As long as the Imperial Parliament lets things drift, the Ulster men will remain loyal to the connection with England. The moment, however, the Imperial Government at tempts coercion in earnest, Great Britain will begin the manufacture of the bitterest enemies she has ever had. The English people, as a whole, may not realize what a hostile Ulster would mean, but those who have taken the trouble to acquaint themselves on the spot with the temper of the people of the North can be under no illusions in regard to this matter. The suppression of the Belfast riots of 1886 proved a most difficult task, though on that occasion the municipality, the local magistrates, and all the better citizens worked with the utmost vigor and devotion to stop the fighting. What would be the result of rioting in Belfast when all the leading men in the town and the whole machinery of local government were engaged, not on the side of the soldiers, but of the mob? During the late riots, magistrates and well-known citizens rode with the police because they knew that the rioters, out of liking for them, would not fire, or walked up and down in the crowds persuading the people to keep the peace. If, instead, the Protestant clergy and the leading citizens were helping the people, it would take fifteen thousand troops, batteries on Cave Hill, and gunboats in the Lough, to hold down Belfast alone; while to manage the whole of Ulster, fifty thousand men and a drumhead court-martial and the nearest tree for every rebel would be required. No doubt we could put Ulster down and hold her down, but would the result be worth having, looked at from the least sentimental point of view possible! Granted that Home Rule had pacified the South, and had made the Celtic Irish loyal, it would have made the North bitterly hostile and disloyal, and only to be restrained by military force. We should have shifted the area of rebellion, that is all, and have made the strongest, richest, and most vigorous portion of the Irish people our enemies instead of our friends. Judged, then, on mere grounds of expediency, and even admitting such very doubtful premises as those which assume that Home Rule will pacify the Southern Irish and render them loyal, the proposal to reverse the policy of the Union must be declared

unwise. At its best it would be but a change of enemies. The existence of the two Irelands—the Ireland of the Protestant Teuton and the Ireland of the Catholic Celt-the Ireland of idle thriftlessness and the Ireland of industry and enterprise

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the Ireland of dreams and sentiment and the Ireland of seriousness and common-sense-forbids the dissolution of the Union. In spite of the grumbling and the disaffection, no sincerely minded Englishman, whatever his politics, can fail to admit that the Union is the form of government which divides us least." As long as the Union is maintained there is some hope of the peace being kept. Great Britain under the Union can intervene as a permanent arbitrator between the warring elements. Withdraw that arbitration, and help to hold down one of the combatants while the other tyrannizes over him, and the peace of Ireland is gone.

People sometimes wonder how it is that the North should at present be so devoted to the Union. The Ulster men, as Mr. Gladstone is fond of lamenting, opposed the Union in 1799; why do they prize it so greatly now? In this loyalty of Ulster to the Union is to be found the strongest hope for Ireland? It is often asked, what has the Union done for Ireland? The answer is, that it has converted the most discontented and rebellious province in Ireland into the most prosperous and contented. And be it noted this success has not been won by making a pet of Ulster or by maintaining a Protestant ascendency. All the Imperial legislation for Ireland since the Union has been directed not in favor of, but against, the selfish and purely Protestant interests of Ulster. Ulster has had nothing but bare justice since the Union, while.public works and well-paid offices, legal and administrative, have been showered on the South. Ulster has gone her way without State help or favoritism. like an American city, by the pure energy of its inhabitants, just as Cork has dwindled by the lethargy of hers. But when the Union has done so much for Ulster in some ninety-two years, what may we not hope another century will accomplish in the South? Already the violence of Irish faction and rebellion has abated, and if the Union is only let alone the whole of Ireland may ultimately become reconciled

Belfast has grown,

to the English connection. What, then, the English elector has to remember in deciding how he will vote at the next election is the fact that the whole question pivots on Ulster. Home Rule is intended to pacify Ireland, but it cannot pacify Ireland because of Ulster. If any proof of that is needed, look at the fact that the most religious, the most serious-minded, the most earnest, and the least politi

cal people in the North are quietly deciding that they will take the awful responsibility of resisting the law-a responsibility which may cost them their lives and their worldly goods, and may give over their homes to anarchy and destruction. That is a fact upon which the electors of England and Scotland must think long and think wisely.-Nineteenth Century.

WE are in a better position to consider calmly the state of South-Eastern Europe than we were in last year, when the air was full of disquieting rumors and all Europe in a state of nervous excitement. The importance of the question is undiminished, and the fate of the East may depend upon the knowledge which the people of England have in regard to the interests which are at stake.

A little while ago a distinguished writer in this REVIEW congratulated us upon the fact that, whatever may happen in Europe, England can maintain a strict neutrality, and he was grateful for the fact that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and his policy are both dead and beyond the hope of resurrection. England is never again to prop up the rotten fabric of Ottoman rule.

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Such statements as these are adapted to the purpose of a stump orator, but they seen to me strangely misplaced in an article designed to instruct the people. Things may happen in Europe that would nake neutrality a greater calamity than war, and no great party in England will ever adopt a peace at any price" policy. The question whether England will be drawn into the next great European war is an open question, which can only be decided when the time comes, and it is certain that the Government of that time, whether Liberal or Conservative, will act in view of the circumstances, and, if necessary, go to war to defend the interests and the honor of the Empire, and at the same time the general interests of Europe.

But with this general question I have nothing to do. I am concerned only

with the question of the relation of England to the East. It is easy to abuse Lord Stratford, because he is dead and the world has mostly forgotten what his policy was, and the phrase "propping up the rotten fabric of Ottoman rule" has done service so long in covering up the ignorance of popular writers that it seems almost ungenerous to inquire exactly what it means. The most charitable explanation of the phrase is that at some time the English Government has adopted and carried out a policy of supporting and defending the Turkish Government in its gross abuse of its power over its subjects; or, at least to defend it without taking its rottenness into consideration, and that this was the special characteristic of the policy of Lord Stratford.

Now, I venture to affirm that during the last fifty years no English Government has ever adopted such a policy, and that no English ambassador at Constantinople has ever been farther from acquiescence in such a policy than Lord Stratford. Probably the two most prominent characteristics of Lord Stratford and his policy were his absolute devotion to English in

terests and his intense hatred of all rotten

ness. He was as devoted to England as Bismarck is to Germany; and he would never have sacrificed one British soldier to save the Ottoman Empire for its own sake. If he favored the Crimean war, it was solely because he believed that British interests were at stake. And we may go even further than this. He did not believe that it was possible to save the Turkish Empire in the interest of England, unless it could be radically and thoroughly reformed. His chief work during his last

two missions to Constantinople was to expose and attempt to eradicate the corruption and oppression which reigned there. Had the Congress of Paris adopted his views, and left him here to carry them out, it is possible that the Turkish Empire might have been reformed.

I do not care to defend Lord Stratford. He needs no defence. I wish simply to call attention to the fact that he never upheld rottenness, and that all his energies were devoted to the defence of what he believed to be British interests. And so of the policy of all great English statesmen. I have often had occasion to criticise the actions of the British Government in the East. Many grievous mistakes have been made, through ignorance or misjudgment; but the general policy of all Ministries has been to defend and uphold Turkey no further than was essential to the defence of English interests, and they have done all that seemed to them possible to ameliorate the condition of the people of the country. The apparent exceptions to this rule, such as the action of Lord Beaconsfield at the time of the Bulgarian massacres, all admit of a more or less satisfactory explanation. We know now from the confessions of Sir Henry Elliot, that Lord Beaconsfield was at that time anticipating the deposition of the Sultan, and the establishment of constitutional government at Constantinople under Sir Henry's protégé, Midhat Pasha.

England is sometimes represented as having been the friend of the Turk, while Russia has poured out her blood and treasure for the emancipation of the oppressed Christians. In fact, the English and the Russian people have equally sympathized with the Christians of Turkey, while the Governments have acted for their own interests-the one for defence, and the other for aggrandizement. And it is certainly to the honor of the English Government that, so far as there has been any settlement of the Eastern question, it has been settled in the interest of the people of the East, and in accordance with the principles of England rather than of Roumania, Servia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece are free States where the people rule; they owe their emancipation from Turkish rule in no small degree to Russia, but they owe their liberty and independence in an equal degree to England. Annexed to Russia,

Russia.

they would have been less free than they were under the Sultan.

So much for the past. As to the future, I am quite ready to admit that no policy should be adopted simply because it is traditional. But, on the other hand, a departure from long established principles must be justified by good and substantial reasons, and not simply by an appeal to the ignorance and the prejudices of the people. Lord Rosebery is as little likely to be moved by such considerations as Lord Salisbury. It is in no sense a party question.

The question in its simplest form is this Has England any vital interest in preventing the occupation by Russia of Constantinople and the Balkan Peninsula ; and, if so, how can this interest be best defended? Other Powers may have an equal or greater interest in this question, but that does not diminish in any way the responsibility of England in the defence of her own interests. It is a stimulus to action rather than an excuse for neutrality. Nor is it any answer to this question to show that England and Russia ought to be friends and allies in Central Asia. They ought to be, but they are not, never have been, and never will be until Russia ceases to be what she is, a nation with an insatiable thirst for more land. It is equally aside from the mark to prove that the government of the Sultan is weak and corrupt. It may be, but it does not fol low that the substitution of the government of the Czar would either improve the condition of the people or favor the interests of England.

There are but two probable solutions of the Eastern question, and England has to decide which of these most accords with her own interests, and whether she has any vital interest in securing the one rather than the other. As things now stand in Europe, she certainly has the power to do so if it is worth her while. The one solution is the natural one which has already made great progress, and resulted in the establishment of Greece and the Balkan States. It secures self-government to the people as fast as they are emancipated from Turkish rule. It would soon give it to Macédonia and Crete. It would give it to Egypt as soon as England can safely withdraw her troops. If the Sultan should find it necessary to leave Constantinople, it would make this and

the adjacent territory a free city, under European protection, with the free navigation of the Straits for all nations. It would leave the Turks to rule in Asia Minor, where they constitute three-fourths of the population, but with a reduced power, which would force them to recognize the rights of their Christian subjects. It would perhaps lead to the separation of the Arabs from the Turks, as these nationalities have nothing in common but their religion. It might take fifty years to bring about all these changes, and they might be modified by circumstances now unforeseen, but in general this is the natural and just solution of the question. Thirty years ago it might have seemed absurd to suggest it as possible, but no one who knows the people and is familiar with the events of these years would now think of it as otherwise than rational and probable.

One advantage of this natural solution of the Eastern question is that it involves no infringement upon the rights or legitimate interests of any nation in Europe. It is not an anti-Russian solution. It does not in any way dishonor her or hinder her self-development. For many years she has disclaimed all intention of annexing any more territory in Europe; and however little faith we may have in regard to such declarations, they are so far valuable that Russia has not yet committed herself before the world to any career of conquest in South-Eastern Europe. It is not at all impossible that if she saw clearly that annexation was impracticable, she might heartly join hands with England and other Powers in facilitating the natural solution of the question. There are, and always have been, intelligent men in Russia who regard the conquest of Constantinople as totally opposed to the interests of the Empire, and it must be acknowledged that the present attitude of Russia toward the Balkan States has grown out of wounded pride and jealousy of the influence of other States, rather than out of any immediate desire to annex this territory. Could Russia be brought into harmonious action with other Powers for a prospective settlement of the question, the peace of Europe would be assured.

Another advantage of this natural solution is that it would favor in the highest degree the interests of commerce. I do

not say that England alone would gain by this, but all that England asks in any part of the world is a chance for free competition, and this would be assured. In the progress and prosperity of these new nations she would find an ever-growing market. Constantinople would no doubt suffer for a time, but it would not be long before she would rise again to become a great commercial centre for the East.

But the great argument in favor of this arrangement is that it is the only just and righteous solution of the question, and consequently the only one which can be permanent. What possible justice can there be in condemning these people who are just escaping from the yoke of Turkey to groan under the much heavier yoke of Russia? They have a right to themselves and to work out their own destiny. They have waited long centuries for the opportunity, and those who, of late years, have had the chance have proved to the world their capacity to govern themselves. Even the Turkish Parliament in Constantinople displayed an amount of wisdom and energy which astonished the world, and might possibly have saved the Empire if it had not alarmed the Caliph by its independence and been condemned by him to a violent death.

The other, and the only other, probable solution of the Eastern question is the annexation of Constantinople and the Balkan States to Russia. Roumania would necessarily go with them. It is hardly probable that these States would be ostensibly annexed at first. It would be the old story of Poland or Georgia, but the end would be inevitable and it would come speedily. No one familiar with the history or policy of Russia can have any doubts about this. Nor do I suppose that any doubts that this is the solution of the question at which Russia is now aiming, although she has made no open declaration of this purpose, but rather denied it. If there were no such purpose on the part of Russia, there would be no Triple Alliance and no Franco-Russian alliance. France and Germany would be left to settle their territorial questions as best they could, and the rest of Europe would have no fear of war.

Russia has nothing to fear from Germany and Austria if she is meditating no further annexation in Europe, and she has no interest whatever in the question be

tween France and Germany.

The real danger of the Franco-Russian alliance is that it is essentially aggressive. Neither Power feared any attack, but France hopes to regain her lost provinces, and Russia to acquire new ones by improving the first opportunity to engage Europe in war. This is the plain logic of the situation, and yet when we ask who it is in Russia that cherishes these warlike purposes, we are almost inclined to accept the theory of Tolstoi's "Peace and War," that such events are controlled by blind Fate. The Czar claims to be a man of peace, and those who know him best assure us that he does not desire war. We may admit that this is true, but it is no less true that he is moving steadily on to an attempted conquest of South-Eastern Europe. I do not know a Russian who doubts it. It is the force of what American statesmen used to call "manifest destiny"-the force of a fixed idea-which unconsciously controls subordinate events, and directs them toward an end which men are not quite ready to confess even to themselves. What we have to consider then is the question how far England is interested in this extension of the Russian power over South-Eastern Europe. If England has no interest in preventing it, we may be sure that it will be attempted within the next few years. Supposing Russia to be successful, it is hardly possible to measure the importance of the results which would follow in Europe. The more obvious changes would begin with the Black Sea, which would become a Russian lake, with the Asiatic as well as the European shores under the control of Russia; the Marmora and the Straits also Russian, with a Russian Custom-house at the entrance of the Dardanelles, Constantinople would become the great naval arsenal of the Empire, absolutely secure from attacks, but always ready to send out its fleets into the Mediterranean. Roumania and the whole Balkan Peninsula would be Russian territory, with the Adriatic as its western boundary. This is no fancy sketch. Every one who knows the country knows that there is no possible stopping-place in annexation until the Adriatic is reached. Albania might exist as a separate State after the annexation of Macedonia to a small State like Bulgaria, but not after the annexation of Bulgaria to Russia.

The annexation of these countries to

The

Russia would not be a source of expense and weakness like the wastes of Central Asia. They would add enormously to the wealth and power of the Empire. They could easily furnish and support half a million of soldiers. They abound in wealth of every description, mineral as well as agricultural, and are inhabited by races far superior to the native Russian, although mostly of Slavic origin. possession of these countries, together with Constantinople, their wealth, their population, especially their geographical position, would at least double the military power of Russia in its relations with Europe, and give vast commercial advantages not only in the control of territory, but also of lines of communication between Europe and Asia. She might not improve them very wisely, but she would certainly prevent any one else from improving them.

These are obvious results. There are others equally startling and important, which are not so generally considered. The most serious is the inevitable destruction of the Austria-Hungarian Empire, which must follow the occupation of the Balkan Peninsula by Russia. Statesmen have foreseen this, and that is the reason why they tell us that Austria rather than England is most interested in resisting the advance of Russia. Bismarck saw it at the time when it was his policy to annex an important part of Austria to the German Empire, and he then encouraged Russia. He saw it later when he had abandoned this policy, and then he formed the Triple Alliance to defend Austria against Russia as well as Germany against France. Beaconsfield saw it and realized its full meaning for the rest of Europe, when he favored the idea of annexing the Balkan Peninsula to Austria, and thus transforming her into a great Slave Empire. There was a time when Austrian statesmen thought it possible to protect themselves by dividing the Balkan Peninsula with Russia, but they harbor this delusion no longer. They realize that in defending the independence of Roumania and Bulgaria they are defending themselves.

The destruction of the Austria-Hungarian Empire would follow the advance of Russia, not simply because this advance could only take place after the defeat of the Austrian armies in a great war, and the consequent weakening of her power,