Idealistic Beginnings in EnglandColumbia university., 1910 - 135 pagina's |
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
abstract ideas arise Berkeley Berkeley's Cartesian dualism causal ception Chap clear complex ideas conception Concerning Human Understanding Concerning the Principles creations decay dependent distinction dogmatic emphasis Essay Concerning Human essence of mind exist explanation external object external world fact faculty psychology fancy fundamental habit Hobbistic Human Knowledge Human Nature Hume Hume's Humean ideas of sense impres impressions innate ideas intuitionalism intuitionalists John Locke JOHN PICKETT Kant law of association Leviathan Locke's means mental images merely mind and matter mind's activity natural faculties observation particular perceived physiological psychology present-day primary perception primary qualities Principles of Human psychology Ralph Cudworth Rationale of Principles reason reflection res cogitans rience secondary qualities seen sensation sensationalism sensuous experience significant signs simple ideas sions soul statement stress theory things thinking substance tion Treatise Concerning Treatise of Human true unanalysable universe waking whence words
Populaire passages
Pagina 124 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Pagina 75 - Thus the ideas, as well as children of our youth, often die" before us ; and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching ; where though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away.
Pagina 85 - I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
Pagina 124 - If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable.
Pagina 61 - First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those IDEAS we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities...
Pagina 85 - If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is, that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no.
Pagina 38 - In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the will: the act (not the faculty) of willing.
Pagina 95 - The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature...
Pagina 20 - For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call imagination, from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another.
Pagina 122 - When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connection in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: a conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence.