Testimony of Covernor "chael S. Dukakis Amesbury, Massachusetts November 18, 1986 Page Four Mr. Chairman, we have taken this right and obligation very seriously. My administration spent months analyzing draft plans for Seabrook. We spent many weeks sifting through the evidence from Chernoby! regarding evacuation planning. As most everyone is aware, on September 20 announced my finding that emergency planning for Seabrook simply could not be adequate. As a result, I did not, and will not, submit emergency plans. I released a lengthy statement on September 20 regarding my decision. T have provided copies of that statement to the subcommittee, and I would commend the statement to you for a full explanation of my position. Allow me to reiterate a few key points. First, in instructing the governors to prepare for a wide range of possible accidents the Federal guidelines further instruct us that a major release of radiation can take place thirty minutes after the onset of an accident at a nuclear plant, and that the radiation can reach out to a radius of five miles within two hours. Massachusetts Civil Defense employed a Federal computer model to estimate evacuation times from the Seabrook evacuation zone. New Fampshire has used the same model. Estimates from the computer model indicated that it would take about three hours and forty minutes to evacuate the Massachusetts evacuation zone communities under very favorable circumstances, such as during nighttime, mid-week, during the winter with good weather. Under bad conditions, such as mid-day during a summer weekend, during a sudden rainstorm, when hundreds of thousands of beachgoers are in the area, evacuation from the Massachusetts communities could take nearly eight hours. In both these cases the estimates reflect an assumption that only Massachusetts would order an evacuation from its own communities. In the more realistic case, in which both Massachusetts and New Hampshire ordered an evacuation at the same time, then the evacuation time estimates go up accordingly. Sc evacuation from the Seabrook area will take several hours under the best of circumstances, and under normal weather conditions evacuation it will take even longer. This is the great irony of the Seabrook case. The siting of th's nuclear plant is just not good from an emergency planning standpoint. The transportation difficulties are obvious. The area is marked by some of the most popular beaches in New England, where hundreds of thousands of people go for recreation during the summer months. Many of the beach areas are served by two-lane roads, such as the one out at Plum Island. Of course, much of this has been apparent for years. Our Attorney General, Frank Bellotti, worked very hard ten years ago to have the Nuclear Pegulatory Commission realize the extent of the emergency planning problems that were caused by siting the Seabrook plant at this particular site. The Attorney General's warnings were not heeded, and the ".P.C. allowed the Seabrook plant to go into construction. When the Three Mile Island accident finally compelled the N.P.C. to take heed of emergency planning the Seabrook plant was already several years into construction. Other serious problems with emergency planning at Seabrook were dramatized for us by the Chernobyl disaster. Mr. Chairman, as you know, when the Chernobyl disaster occurred I suspended our emergency planning efforts so that we could learn all we could from this tragedy. Chernoby? was the first major nuclear accident in the nuclear era. Much of our previous planning for response to a nuclear accident was based on modelling or extrapolation from Three Mile Island. When the Chernobyl accident occurred I felt that it was very important for us to stop long enough to examine whether the data from the Soviets would in any way teach us new lessons. Professor Albert Carnesale, who had been President Carter's designee for the chairmanship of the ".P.C., agreed to assist us in weighing the lessons of Chernobyl. As it turned out, quite a bit more information from Chernobyl was released than many of us thought would be the case. Much of what we learned may not be new science, but it does pose troubling lessons for Seabrook. Testimony of Governor Michael S. Pukakis Amesbury, l'assachusetts November 18, 1986 Page Siy We learned that, in many ways, the Soviets were lucky. The Chernoby! accident shot radioactivity up to a high-altitude, where it could be dispersed. The weather was hot and dry, and this aided the dispersion. Prevailing winds blew the radioactivity away from the neighboring population long enough for a massive evacuation to be mobilized. During these critical early hours much of the local population was sheltered in masonry buildings that provided relatively good insulation from radiation. When the time came to evacuate, forty-five thousand people were moved in about two hours. Even with luck on their side, thousands of people within five miles of the Chernobyl reactor received radiation dosages at least eight times greater than the level at which we would order immediate evacuation in this country. Then again, the Soviets must contend with dozens of square miles of land that may remain uninhabitable for years. What strikes us about Seabrook is that, unlike Chernobyl, the weather conditions are not constant. Winds are constantly changing. The air is not often calm and dry. The Seabrook reactor is designed, thankfully, to keep radiation contained which means that after a possible breach of the containment, escaping radiation would be kept close in, subject to the churning of the changeable winds. The nearby population would not be sheltered in concrete construction, for the most part, and in fact many people would not be sheltered at all. When I consider all this, along with the evidence that evacuation from the area wil take several hours even under good conditions, then I conclude that emergency planning for Seabrook cannot be adequate. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Federal regulations mean what they say, that emergency plans must be "adequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency." We have looked hard at emergency planning for Seabrook. We do not believe it can be done in any way that is "adequate" by any sense that would be meaningful to you, me, or the public. The sting of the Seabrook plant creates insuperable difficulties that neither time nor money can correct. We have drawn this conclusion in good faith, and with deep regret that emergency planning issues were not resolved when they should have been, before construction of Seabrook Station was permitted. Be that as it may, the Federal regulations have created a reasonable and appropriate standard for the protection of the public health and safety. I believe my decision has met that standard, and I trust and expect that it will be upheld. Governor of STATEMENT OF GOVERNOR MICHAEL S. DURAKIS REGARDING THE SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION September 20, 1986 Under federal statutes and regulations I am called upon as Massachusetts to play a particular role in the licensing process for the proposed Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. After lengthy and painstaking review of all the pertinent information, and careful analysis of the applicable standards, I have reached a decision, which I am announcing today. The Historical and Regulatory Context ignored issued considerations of public The Commonwealth's involvement in the licensing of Seabrook actually extends back very far. In 1975, when the construction license for Seabrook Station was under consideration, Attorney General Frank Bellotti, appearing in opposition, warnings that have proved prophetic. He first told the federal regulators and then the federal courts that siting a nuclear power plant at Seabrook safety. Pointing to the proposed plant's proximity to the crowded beaches at the New Hampshire and Massachusetts border, the Attorney General argued, as he has for nearly twelve years, that the lack of shelter for the beach population and the inadequate highway system in the area made protection of the public in the case of a serious accident a near impossibility. 2 TO prevent huge financial resources from being irretrievably committed to a plant that might never be licensed, he urged the federal authorities not to proceed. Despite the Commonwealth's strenuous argument that the choice of site was a monumental error in judgment, construction was permitted. At the time, prior to the 1979 nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, the local health and safety concerns raised by the Attorney General were, at best, peripheral factors in the federal licensing equation. Three Mile Island, however, brought a long overdue, rude awakening. It became clear that federally mandated planning for an emergency was wholly inadequate, and that health and safety were being seriously jeopardized. One outgrowth of the accident was reassessment of the prospects for nuclear energy itself in light of the risk. No new plant has been approved for construction since Three Mile Island. Only the few plants already in construction in 1979, of which Seabrook is one, remain to be considered for final operational licensure. It is by now beyond question the escalation in cost and controversy - given that if we were to be given a second chance to avoid construction altogether, no prudent person would in hindsight choose Seabrook. |