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would need to be taken outside the planning zone.'

11)

(NUREC-0654, supra at p.

At Chernobyl, the public was evacuated out to about 18.5 miles. The Soviets were fortunate that the intense heat from the graphite fire carried the radiation very high into the sky and disbursed it over a very large area of the planet

instead of concentrating it closer to the reactor site, which would have necessitated a larger evacuation. Nonetheless, a large area almost twice the size of a 10-mile

emergency planning zone was evacuated.

Any enhanced safety of the Seabrook reactor is not so significant as to justify reducing the emergency planning zone to 2 miles--a reduction of more than 80%. Public Service Company's analysis to justify reducing the emergency planning zone is fatally flawed. ("Seabrook Station Risk Management and Emergency Planning Study," Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc., Dec. 1985; "Seabrook Station Emergency Planning Sensitivity Study," Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc., April 1986) Even though Seabrook has a thicker than average steel and concrete containment structure, several studies using more sophisticated analysis models than Public Service Company's suggest that the asserted containment strength is seriously overestimated, even assuming no substandard materials or construction practices. (Testimony to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, NRC, submitted by Gordon Thompson for the Attorney General of Mass., October 10, 1986) The Public Service Company analysis also fails to account adequately for the possibility of steam explosions from accelerated meltdowns, induced steam generator tube ruptures, direct heating of the containment, sabotage, human error, or the failure of major reactor components. (Id.)

There are so many uncertainties involved in probabilistic risk assessment that public safety demands basing emergency planning zones on very conservative assumptions or on actual accident experiences rather than on any hypotheticals

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at all.

Commissioner Asselstine and others say an American meltdown could be worse than Chernobyl. Since the people were evacuated out to 18.5 miles in the Chernobyl accident, emergency planning areas need to be at least that large. In addition, plans must be made for medical facilities and reception centers located beyond that area; plans must also anticipate that many people outside evacuation areas will also leave on their own (as was the case in the Three

Mile Island accident).

I have co-sponsored legislation in Massachusetts to change our state laws by expanding to 40 miles emergency planning areas for operating nuclear power plants. Expanding the planning zone for operating nuclear power plants could save many lives in case of a meltdown by providing for prior identification of optimal evacuation routes, medical facilities, public shelters and reception centers, training of medical personnel and increased public education about appropriate emergency responses.

California decided that planning for the least serious 70% of core meltdowns was not providing adequate protection for its citizens. California planning zones, therefore, were expanded in 1980 to between 18 to 35 miles, depending upon the reactor. Even then, citizens will not be protected from every type of core meltdown.

In short, it is sheer folly to even consider reducing the size of the emergency planning zone. Overwhelming theoretical and real life evidence suggests that

the emergency planning zone for operating nuclear power plants should be expanded, not reduced. No credible data exist to warrant a special exemption from federal regulations for Seabrook.

Local Determination of Major Issues Affecting Public Health and Safety

Residents and elected officials of Massachusetts have a right to participate in the decision on whether to start up the Seabrook nuclear reactor. The Governor has the authority and responsibility under state law to protect the public health

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and safety. (Mass. Civil Defense Act, statutes of 1950) Even the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which was designed to encourage nuclear power, limited such development "to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and safety of the public." (42 USC §2013(d))

The determination of whether local resources and plans could adequately protect the public against local catastrophes is clearly a local decision. Local and state governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens. Federal regulations provide for a process by which a Governor may submit state and local emergency response plans to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for review and approval. (44 CFR $350.7(a)) If the Governor submits such plans, the Governor must also state that in his or her opinion the plans are adequate to protect the public health and safety.

The NRC sought state and local participation in the development and implementation

of the plans while "recogniz(ing) there is a possibility that the operation

of some reactors may be affected by this rule through inaction of state and local government or an inability to comply with these rules." (45 Fed. Reg. 55404, August 19, 1980)

If a Governor finds no evacuation plan can adequately protect the public's health and safety, the Federal government should abide by that determination. Submission of a utility-developed plan is not a satisfactory substitute for submission of a plan by the Governor. No evacuation plan should even be considered to be a workable plan unless state and local governments have participated in its development and implementation. If state and local governments refuse to

submit evacuation plans because they cannot protect the public health and safety--as

in the case of Seabrook--a nuclear power plant should not be licensed.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should not be an advocate for the nuclear

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power industry. It is totally inappropriate, for instance, for NRC Chairman Lando Zech to urge that 200 more nuclear reactors be operating by the year 2000, since it is up to the states to determine their future power needs and the energy sources from which to derive this power. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the states retain their "traditional authority over the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking, and the like." (Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 213, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1726, 75 L.Ed 2d 752 (1983)) There is no federal law that mandates the construction of additional nuclear power plants, and the NRC should respect states' opposition to the construction of these plants in instances where the states find that the public's health and safety cannot be protected. I support the legislation introduced by Congressman Edward Markey that affirms states' prerogatives in this area.

Low Power Testing Should Be Postponed

Because the controversy over emergency response plans is likely to be tied up in the courts for years, it would be a major waste of money and time to proceed with low-power testing before the court appeals are completed. If low-power testing were performed in the next few months and Seabrook never ultimately receives an operating license, the owners of Seabrook would have wasted well over $60 million and created a high-level radioactive waste dump on the New Hampshire seacoast, at great potential harm to the environment.

According to NRC nuclear engineers, premature irradiation of the fuel during low-power testing would convert the fuel into high-level radioactive waste. This waste would probably have to be stored onsite until a federal repository is opened in 15 or 20 years. There would also be increased worker radiation exposure, and the cost of converting Seabrook to accomodate some other type of fuel, if Seabrook does not receive a license to operate as a nuclear plant, would be

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substantially increased.

A majority of the Massachusetts legislature--103 legislators--have asked

the joint owners of Seabrook to postpone low-power testing until the licensure issue is resolved one way or the other, and I again call upon the utilities

to respect our request.

Seabrook Power Is Not Needed

Given all the health and safety risks associated with operation of the Seabrook nuclear plant, responsible public policy makers must ask whether we can meet our power needs without Seabrook.

On June 26, 1986, the Massachusetts legislature's Joint Committee on Energy addressed that question by conducting a public hearing on the topic, "Can Massachusett Survive Without Nuclear Power?". I came away from that hearing with a firm belief that Massachusetts does not need Seabrook to meet its future energy needs. During that hearing Sharon Pollard, Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy Resources, offered the same conclusion, noting that Massachusetts could meet its power needs from other sources:

"...Many of the participants in the Seabrook project have
available the potential to develop additional electricity
supplies at costs that are substantially less than Seabrook's.'

She added that the Energy Office had developed preliminary estimates of potential for several supply and demand side alternatives to Seabrook which are available in Massachusetts.

These alternatives include:

--Potential for development of 1400 MW of cogeneration and small power
production by the year 2000;

--Implementation of appliance efficiency standards resulting in savings
of several hundred MW by the year 2000; and

--Potential for over 2000 MW of supply through extension of the useful
lives of existing power plants.

The Secretary, in summary, concluded that Massachusetts has the potential