But whatever whispers some politics might make to their princes, as the wisest and holiest did not think it lawful for churchmen alone to do executions, so neither did they transmit such persons to the secular judicature. And therefore when the edict of Macedonius the president was so ambiguous, that it seemed to threaten death to heretics, unless they recanted, St Austin admonished him carefully to provide, that no heretic should be put to death, alleging it not only to be unchristian, but illegal also, and not warranted by imperial constitutions; for before his time no laws were made for their being put to death: but however he prevailed that Macedonius published another edict, more explicit, and less seemingly severe. But afterward, many got a trick of giving them over to the secular power; which at the best is no better than hypocrisy, removing envy from themselves, and laying it upon others; a refusing to do that in external act which they do in counsel and approbation; which is a transmitting the act to another, and retaining a proportion of guilt unto themselves, even their own and the others too. I end this with the saying of Chrysostom, "It is right to refute and to condemn impious and heretical opinions; but in regard to the heretics themselves, we are to spare their persons, and pray for their salvation." j WHETHER IT BE LAWFUL FOR A PRINCE TO GIVE TOLERATION FOR upon these very grounds we may easily give account of that great question, whether it be lawful for a prince to give toleration to several religions. For, first, it is a great fault that men will call the several sects of Christians by the names of several religions. The religion of Jesus Christ is, the form of sound doctrine and wholesome words,' which is set down in Scripture indefinitely, actually conveyed to us by plain places, and separated as for the question of necessary or not necessary by the symbol of the apostles. Those impertinences, which the wantonness and vanity of men hath commenced, which their interests have promoted, which serve not truth so much as their own ends, are far from being distinct religions; for matters of opinion are no parts of the worship of God, nor in order to it, but as they promote obedience to his commandments; and when they contribute towards it, are, in that proportion as they contribute, parts, and actions, and minute particulars, of that religion, to whose end they do or pretend to serve. And such are all the sects and all the pretences of Christians, but pieces and minutes of Christianity, if they do serve the great end; as every man for his own sect and interest believes for his share that it does. Toleration hath a double sense or purpose. For sometimes by it men understand a public license and exercise of a sect: sometimes it is only an indemnity of the persons privately to convene and to opine, as they see cause, and as they mean to answer to God. Both these are very much to the same purpose, unless some persons, whom we are bound to satisfy, be scandalized, and then the prince is bound to do as he is bound to satisfy. To God it is all one : for, abstracting from the offence of persons, which is to be considered just as our obligation is to content the persons, it is all one whether we indulge them to meet publicly or privately, to do actions of religion concerning which we are not persuaded that they are truly holy. To God it is just one to be in the dark and in the light, the thing is the same, only the circumstance of the public and private is different: which cannot be concerned in any thing, nor can it concern any thing, but the matter of scandal and relation to the minds and fantasies of certain persons. So that to tolerate is not to persecute. And the question, whether the prince may tolerate divers persuasions, is no more than whether he may lawfully persecute any man for not being of his opinion. Now in this case he is just so to tolerate diversity of persuasions as he is to tolerate public actions for no opinion is judicable, nor no person punishable, but for a sin; and if his opinion, by reason of its managing or its effect, be in itself or become a sin to the person, then as he is to do towards other sins, so to that opinion or man so opening. But to believe so, or not so, when there is no more but mere believing, is not in his power to enjoin, therefore not to punish. And it is not only lawful to tolerate disagreeing persuasions, but the authority of God only is competent to take notice of it, and infallible to determine it, and fit to judge; and therefore no human authority is sufficient to do all those things, which can justify the inflicting temporal punishments upon such as do not conform in their persuasions to a rule or authority, which is not only fallible, but supposed by the disagreeing person to be actually deceived. But I consider, that, in the toleration of a different opinion, religion is not properly and immediately concerned, so as in any degree to be endangered. For it may be safe in diversity of persuasions, and it is also a part of Christian religion, that the liberty of men's consciences should be preserved in all things, where God hath not set a limit and made a restraint; that the soul of man should be free, and acknowledge no master but Jesus Christ; that matters spiritual should not be restrained by punishments corporal; that the same meekness and charity should be preserved in the promotion of Christianity, that gave it foundation and increment and firmness in its first publication; that conclusions should not be more dogmatical than the virtual resolution and efficacy of the premises; and that the persons should not more certainly be condemned than their opinions confuted; and lastly, that the infirmities of men and difficulties of things should be both put into balance, to make abatement in the definitive sentence against men's persons. But then, because toleration of opinions is not properly a question of religion, it may be a question of policy and although a man may be a good Christian, though he believe an error not fundamental, and not directly or evidently impious, yet his opinion may accidentally disturb the public peace, through the over-activeness of the persons, and the confidence of their belief, and the opinion of its appendant necessity; and therefore toleration of differing persuasions in these cases, is to be considered upon political grounds, and is just so to be admitted or denied as the opinions or toleration of them may consist with the public and necessary ends of government. Only this; as Christian princes must look to the interest of their government, so especially must they consider the interests of Christianity, and not call every redargution or modest discovery of an established error, by the name of disturbance of the peace. For it is very likely that : the peevishness and impatience of contradiction in the governors may break the peace. Let them remember but the gentleness of Christianity, the liberty of consciences which ought to be preserved, and let them do justice to the persons, whoever they are, that are peevish, provided no man's person be overborne with prejudice. For if it be necessary for all men to subscribe to the present established religion, by the same reason at another time a man may be bound to subscribe to the contradictory, and so to all religions in the world. And they only who by their too-much confidence entitle God to all their fancies, and make them to be questions of religion, and evidences for heaven, or consignations to bell, they only think this doctrine unreasonable, and they are the men that first disturb the church's peace, and then think there is no appeasing the tumult but by getting the victory. But they that consider the things wisely, understand, that since salvation and damnation depend not upon impertinences, and yet that public peace and tranquillity may,—the prince is, in this case, to seek how to secure government, and the issues and intentions of that, while there is in these cases directly no insecurity to religion, unless by the accidental uncharitableness of them that dispute: which uncharitableness is also much prevented when the public peace is secured, and no person is on either side engaged upon revenge, or troubled with disgrace, or vexed with punishments by any decretory sentence against him. It was the saying of a wise statesman, I mean Thuanus, that "heretics who in time of peace are divided into factions, are united against the public by persecution." If you persecute heretics or discrepants, they unite themselves as to a common defence: if you permit them, they divide themselves upon private interests; and the rather, if this interest was an ingredient of the opinion. The sum is this: it concerns the duty of a prince, because it concerns the honour of God, that all vices and every part of ill life be discountenanced and restrained; and therefore in relation to that, opinions are to be dealt with. For the understanding being to direct the will, and opinions to guide our practices, they are considerable only as they teach impiety and vice, as they either dishonour God or disobey him. Now all such doctrines are to be condemned; but for the persons preaching such doctrines, if they neither justify nor approve the pretended consequences, which are certainly impious, they are to be separated from that consideration. But if they know such consequences and allow them, or if they do not stay till the doctrines produce impiety, but take sin before hand, and manage them impiously in any sense, or if either themselves or their doctrine do really, and without colour or feigned pretext, disturb the public peace and just interests, they are not to be suffered. In all other cases it is not only lawful to permit them, but it is also necessary that princes and all in authority should not persecute discrepant opinions. And in such cases wherein persons not otherwise incompetent are bound to reprove an error (as they are in many), in all these if the prince makes restraint, he hinders men from doing their duty, and from obeying the laws of Jesus Christ. OF INTERCOMMUNICATING WITH CHURCHES OF DIFFERENT PERSUASIONS. As for the duty of particular men in the question of communicating with churches of different persuasions, it is to be regulated according to the laws of those churches. For if they require no impiety or any thing unlawful as the condition of their communion, then they communicate with them as they are servants of Christ, as disciples of his doctrine and subjects to his laws, and the particular distinguishing doctrine of their sect hath no influence or communication with him, who from another sect is willing to communicate with all the servants of their common Lord. For since no church of one name is infallible, a wise man may have either the misfortune or a reason to believe of every one in particular, that she errs in some article or other, either he cannot communicate with any, or else he may communicate with all that do not make a sin, or the profession of any error, to be the condition of their communion. And therefore, as every particular church is bound to tolerate disagreeing persons in the senses and for the reasons above explicated; so every particular person is bound to tolerate her, that is, not to refuse her communion, when he may have it upon innocent conditions. For what is it to me if the Greek church denies procession of the third person from the second, so she will give me the right hand of fellowship (though I affirm it), therefore, because I profess the religion of Jesus Christ, and retain all matters of faith and necessity? But this thing will scarce be reduced to practice; for few churches that have framed bodies of confession and articles, will endure any person that is not of the same confession: which is a plain demonstration, that such bodies of confession and articles do much hurt, by becoming instruments of separating and dividing communions, and making unnecessary or uncertain propositions a certain means of schism and disunion. But then men would do well to consider whether or no such proceedings do not derive the guilt of schism upon them who least think it; and whether of the two is the schismatic; he that makes unnecessary and (supposing the state of things) inconvenient impositions, or he that disobeys them, because he cannot, without doing violence to his conscience, believe them; he that parts communion because without sin he could not entertain it, or they that have not made it necessary for him to separate by requiring such conditions, which to no man are simply necessary, and to his particular are either sinful or impossible. The sum of all is this: there is no security in any thing or to any person but in the pious and hearty endeavours of a good life, and neither sin nor error does impede it from producing its proportionate and intended effect; because it is a direct deletery to sin and excuse to errors, by making them innocent, and therefore harmless. And, indeed, this is the intendment and design of faith. For (that we may join both ends of this discourse together) therefore certain articles are prescribed to us, and propounded to our understanding, that so we might be supplied with instructions, with motives and engagements to incline and determine our wills to the obedience of Christ. So that obedience is just so consequent to faith, as the acts of will are to the dictates of the understanding. Faith, therefore, being in order to obedience, and so far excellent as itself is a part of obedience, or the promoter of it, or an engagement to it; it is evident, that if obedience and a good life be secured upon the most reasonable and proper grounds of Christianity, that is, upon the Apostles' Creed, then faith also is secured. Since whatsoever is beside the duties, the order of a good life cannot be a part of faith, because upon faith a good life is built: all other articles, by not being necessary, are no otherwise to be required but as they are to be obtained and found out, that is, morally, and fallibly, and humanly. It is fit all truths be promoted fairly and properly, and yet but few articles prescribed magisterially, nor framed into symbols and bodies of confession; least of all, after such composures, should men proceed so furiously as to say, all disagreeing after such declarations to be damnable for the future, and capital for the present. But this very thing is reason enough to make men more limited in their prescriptions, because it is more charitable in such suppositions so to do. But in the thing itself, because few kinds of errors are damnable, it is reasonable, as few should be capital. And because every thing that is damnable in itself, and before God's judgment-seat is not discernible before men (and questions disputable are of this condition), it is also very reasonable that fewer be capital than what are damnable, and that such questions should be permitted to men to believe, because they must be left to God to judge. It concerns all persons to see that they do the best to find out truth; and if they do, it is certain that, let the error be ever so damnable, they shall escape the error, or the misery, of being damned for it. And if God will : not be angry at men for being invincibly deceived, why should men be angry one at another? For he that is most displeased at another man's error, may also be tempted in his own will, and as much deceived in his understanding for, if he may fail in what he may choose, he may also fail in what he cannot choose: his understanding is no more secured than his will, nor his faith more than his obedience. It is his own fault if he offends God in either: but whatsoever is not to be avoided, as errors, which are incident oftentimes even to the best and most inquisitive of men, are not offences against God, and therefore not to be punished or restrained by men: but all such opinions, in which the public interests of the commonwealth, and the foundation of faith and a good life, are not concerned, are to be permitted freely. "Let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind," was the doctrine of St Paul; and that is argument and conclusion too. I end with a story which I find in the Jews' books. "When Abraham sat at his tent-door, according to his custom, waiting to entertain strangers, he espied an old man stooping and leaning on his staff, weary with age and travail, coming towards him who was a hundred years of age: he received him kindly, washed his feet, provided supper, caused him to sit down: but, observing that the old man eat and prayed not, nor begged for a blessing on his meat, he asked him why he did not worship the God of heaven. The old man told him that he worshipped the fire only, and acknowledged no other god. At which answer Abraham grew so zealously angry, that he thrust the old man out of his tent, and exposed him to all the evils of the night, and an unguarded condition. When the old man was gone, God called to Abraham, and asked him where the stranger was he replied, I thrust him away because he did not worship thee.' God answered him, I have suffered him these hundred years, although he dishonoured me; and couldst not thou endure him one night, when he gave thee no trouble?' Upon this," saith the story, "Abraham fetched him back again, and gave him hospitable entertainment and wise instruction." Go thou and do likewise, and thy charity will be rewarded by the God of Abraham. : |