The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good PoliticsPublicAffairs, 27 sep 2011 - 352 pagina's A groundbreaking new theory of the real rules of politics: leaders do whatever keeps them in power, regardless of the national interest. As featured on the viral video Rules for Rulers, which has been viewed over 3 million times. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith's canonical book on political science turned conventional wisdom on its head. They started from a single assertion: Leaders do whatever keeps them in power. They don't care about the "national interest"-or even their subjects-unless they have to. This clever and accessible book shows that democracy is essentially just a convenient fiction. Governments do not differ in kind but only in the number of essential supporters, or backs that need scratching. The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with, and the quality of life or misery under them. The picture the authors paint is not pretty. But it just may be the truth, which is a good starting point for anyone seeking to improve human governance. |
Inhoudsopgave
1 The Rules of Politics | 1 |
2 Coming to Power | 21 |
3 Staying in Power | 49 |
4 Steal from the Poor Give to the Rich | 75 |
5 Getting and Spending | 101 |
6 If Corruption Empowers Then Absolute Corruption Empowers Absolutely | 127 |
7 Foreign Aid | 161 |
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith Gedeeltelijke weergave - 2011 |
The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 2011 |
The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 2022 |
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
Alastair Smith army autocracies autocrats Bell’s better Bruce Bueno Bueno de Mesquita Carly Fiorina Castro citizens coalition members coalition’s Compaq corporate corruption country’s cronies Damasus debt democracy democratic democratic leaders depends dictators disaster donors earthquake economic Egypt election essential backers fight Fiorina foreign aid freedom funds government’s HP’s income incumbent influentials instance interchangeables Iran Israel keep large coalition Liberia look loyal loyalty masses means military million Mobutu Sese Seko nations organize Pakistan party people’s percent political survival politicians poor president private rewards problem protest Rawlings revenue revolution risk Robert Mugabe rule Saddam Saddam Hussein selectorate selectorate theory shareholders small-coalition small-coalition regimes soldiers Soviet spend stay in power success Sun Tzu Taliban threat tion turn United UNSC vote voters wealth welfare winning coalition Zimbabwe