HISTORY OF RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND ARCHAEOLOGY MAX MÜLLER'S "SCIENCE OF THOUGHT" [1888: AET. 24] 1 GEADERS of Professor Max Müller's works-and, in England at least, their name is legion-will perhaps open "The Science of Thought" with some feeling of curiosity. The science of language and the science of religion have been expounded by our author in lectures which, translated into many languages, have made the grand tour of the civilized world; and now, as it seems, a treatise on a third science is offered to the public. Has the professor conquered a new world late in life, and is the volume the record of his achievements? Readers whom such expectations may have induced to plunge into Professor Müller's six hundred pages are doomed to a speedy disappointment. The professor is preaching on texts which were long ago written for our learning, though they have never yet been made the basis of such continuous and copious exposition. We are familiar with the terse paradox which he sets upon his title-page, and with which, as with a magic formula, he expects to smite with sudden ruin the walls of the philosophers' stronghold. His objections to the most characteristic feature of Darwin's teaching are well known; and even Noiré's theory of the origin of language has already been divulged in outline. It is, of course, impossible within the limits of a short review to give any but the most imperfect account of the Professor's wanderings through the vast fields of psychology, philo 1 "Athenæum," February 18th, 1888. logy, and metaphysic; we shall confine our attention to those few points in the orbit which will enable us to determine its genera form. And first to those who are terrified by the statement in the preface-if at this time of day anybody is terrified by a threatened revolution in "philosophy"—the statement that "there is no such thing as intellect, understanding, mind and reason," we have this consolation to offer, that what the professor withholds with one hand he bestows with the other. These venerable terms are consigned by Professor Max Müller, as so much mythology, to the limbo where mythology should be. But his readers soon discover that in the stead of ignotum, which he has abolished, the author sets up ignotius in the shadowy form of a monon conscious of itself and of the impacts made upon it by other mona. As Lagrange said on a certain famous occasion, "C'est une belle hypothèse; ça explique beaucoup de choses!" We cordially agree with Professor Müller that the Sanskrit term antah karana would be the most appropriate expression for the other or inner side of experience, call it mental or what you will. What goes on within commits us to no mythological assumption as to how it goes on within, or who sets it going within. But— seeing that all we know of the mind is that it is a series of perceptions-a monon upon which its fellows impinge, which vibrates, which rejoices in the godlike knowledge not only of itself, but what is other than itself, is no more likely to withstand the application of positive criticism than the time-honoured fictions which Professor Müller discredits. In fact, thinkers of a certain school would be inclined to recognize in it only the latest immigrant from the metaphysical Nephelokokkugia. With respect to the cardinal idea of "The Science of Thought," it is difficult to represent fairly what the professor's teaching actually is. On p. 56 thought is declared to be impossible without words, while as early as p. 51 the important admission is made that thoughts may exist without words, because other signs may take the place of words. The professor can hardly suppose that a deaf mute, for instance, is endowed with thought by the gestures which he learns to imitate. What the deaf mute learns is not to think, but to express his thoughts. If his mind were not already stored with concepts-rudimentary, no doubt, or, as we ought to say, perhaps, if |