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ART. VI.-The Western Luminary, June 2.

THE name of the Bishop of Exeter is one, the bare mention of which brings the recollection of many services done to, and many labours undergone in behalf of, the Church. In the particular sphere of his own diocese, his great knowledge of his clergy, his readiness to assist them with his advice and authority, his protection of them often against hostile lay influence, and his sustained episcopal care and vigilance in general, have made him much looked up to. On the general area of Church politics his Lordship is always ready to come forward and advocate the Church's cause, even where it is most unpopular, and where he has to do so single-handed. It is right to preface any remarks upon any proceeding of the Bishop of Exeter's with this cheerful and hasty acknowledgment; first, because such an acknowledgment is absolutely demanded; and next, because it will give to such remarks, even though they come from an objector, that friendly colour which they are intended to have.

We are alluding now to the late judgment delivered by the Bishop of Exeter, on the Rev. William George Parks Smith, for having placed certain ornaments on the communion table of St. John's Chapel, Torquay, on Easter day of this year; the ornaments in question being two vases with flowers, and a cross which acted as the support of the alms dish. It is not to be supposed that when a prelate of the Bishop of Exeter's general doctrinal views, and tone of mind, comes forward in this way to check the ornamenting of the altar, that he does so on the ground which the ordinary objector to such a proceeding would take. We do not expect him to entertain any opinion against ecclesiastical ornature in general, or against the ornamenting of the altar table in particular. Nor, on looking into his judgment, do we find he does: we see no protest in it against ornament or symbolism in itself. He does, indeed, express an opinion against the propriety of the use of the cross, in connexion with the Lord's table; but it is not as a symbol that he objects to it, but as an unsuitable symbol; one which, ' instead of exciting the mind to due contemplation of the tri'umphant issue of our Lord's sufferings, tends to chain it down 'to the sufferings themselves.' Differing, as we do, from what appears to us rather a hypercritical distinction to draw with respect to the use of the cross as a symbol, we yet see plainly that the objection is only one of detail, and not one of principle. Indeed, his Lordship, throughout his judgment, is very particu

lar in impressing upon us that it is a legal decision which he is delivering on the subject in hand, and not a theological one. He tells us that he has nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of such and such ornaments in themselves, but only with the question of fact, whether our Church allows them or not. To the use of flowers he has no kind of objection on general grounds, asserting it to be sanctioned by the practice of the very earliest and purest ages of Christianity. We are only then concerned with a question of law in the present case; nor, should we have the misfortune to differ from the Bishop of Exeter upon it, shall we differ from him in any other capacity than as an ecclesiastical lawyer.

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After examining, then, the Bishop of Exeter's judgment with all the attention of which we are capable, we must confess ourselves unpersuaded by it. It exhibits great gravity, seriousness, moderation, charity-but not, in our judgment, law. It has all the characteristics of a perfect legal decision except that We have seldom read a document, in point of style, temper, and every external and incidental feature, more worthy of a bishop. If grave and quiet dignity could ever claim the attributes of law, it would do in the present instance. Indeed, the style of the document appears to be the more perfect in consequence of a latent consciousness of something which it is to supply; a sense of the burden which rests upon it, of impersonating that law which it cannot solidly produce; it seems to feel the weight of original legislation. Admiring, we say, as we do, the truly episcopal tone and style of this judgment, we yet cannot allow them to supply that void, which their powerful fascinations cannot wholly conceal; the absence of a strict legal basis; the want of actual support in our ecclesiastical statutes for the judicial conclusion he arrives at. Of the obnoxious ornaments in question we will select one to try the case upon. The cross upon the altar of St. John's, Torquay, (it appears to have been only a cruciform support to the alms dish, and not to have been introduced upon the altar as a cross,) we need not for this purpose include, just at present, in our remarks. The Bishop of Exeter condemns and excludes flowers as absolutely as the cross. The single case of flowers, then, will try the legal character of his decision, just as well as both ornaments together.

It is maintained, then, by the Bishop of Exeter, that, according to the rubrics, canons, and regulations of the English Church, flowers are unauthorised things,' and that to place them either on the altar, or elsewhere in the Church, is an offence against the laws ecclesiastical.' And the ground on which he pronounces this decision is, that there exists nowhere

in the canons or rubrics of the Church' any express or implied 'direction so to do.'·

Now it is obvious, in the first place, that to connect the Bishop's premise with his conclusion, one very large assumption is necessary; the assumption, viz., that whatever is not ordered is prohibited. This assumption, we repeat, is necessary, and it is a very large one. Certainly when we are told positively that such a thing is an offence, we naturally expect to hear some positive ground for calling it so; when it is said that a certain ornament is against the laws ecclesiastical,' the natural question one immediately asks is, What law prohibits it? To this question the Bishop of Exeter is obliged to reply-None. Is this a very satisfactory confirmation of a very solemn charge? Were the Bishop of Exeter even content with calling the use of flowers dubious, and questioning the authority for it, the case would be different; but he calls it positively illegal: this positive illegality being at the same time not caused by any single law being transgressed. The positive charge turns out to be supported by a purely negative premise; and the reason why an act is against a law, is, that no law has commanded it. It is -obvious this kind of law is not that on which ordinary courts of justice proceed. For an act to be a criminal one in the eye of civil justice, it is not enough to say that no law commands it; you must show that some law forbids it.

Indeed, when the Bishop of Exeter comes to explain what the law ecclesiastical, which he speaks of,-the law of which his lordship is the faithful administrant, and which causes all this illegality in flowers,-is, it turns out to be, not actual law, but the strong conviction of the necessity of law, in his lordship's own mind. It turns out not that there is law, but that there ought to be. The judge falls back upon à priori arguments, and asks what is to be done, and how the Church can go on without such law as he is supposing to exist. He argues, we shall be all in confusion, and everybody will do what he likes, unless there is such law; it is impossible that the Church can mean this therefore there must be such law: therefore there is. The nature of the case proves it.

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The very nature of the case, the general requisition of uniformity, and the positive enactment "that no form or order of Common Prayer, administration of Sacraments, Rites or Ceremonies, shall be openly used, other than what is prescribed and appointed to be used," all alike lead to the same conclusion, that it is not lawful for any person whomsoever, to introduce novel ornaments at his own discretion. In truth, where would the claims of such discretion end?

'If one person may at his pleasure decorate the Lord's Table with a cross, another may equally claim to set a crucifix upon it; whilst a third might think it necessary to erect some symbol of Puritan doctrine or feeling, to mark his reprobation of his Romanizing neighbour.'

Whatever may be the force of this reasoning, (for the substance of the passage is its reasoning,) as showing the great need of law, it cannot be said to go far towards demonstrating the fact. We have a positive assertion that such an act is positively illegal; and to prove this, we have first a simple and pure assumption, viz., that everything is illegal which the law does not enjoin; and, secondly, an argument from the necessity of the case to support this assumption. A somewhat aerial proof this of a solid matter-of-fact charge. The truth is, there are not sufficient data in our ecclesiastical law upon which to found such a judgment as this. The law is vague on these points, and vague law cannot be that definite prohibitor which the Bishop of Exeter would make it. Certainly it is always in a judge's power to extract any conclusion out of any premises, to found certainty upon doubt, and decision upon silence; but in that case it is the judgment, and not the rubric or canon, which is the law; and the judge is virtually acting as legislator, and not administrator.

We cannot see, for example, how any candid person could deny that an exactly opposite judgment to the Bishop of Exeter's could be given by any Bishop in his own diocesan court tomorrow on grounds at least as strong, reasonable, and fair as the Bishop of Exeter's. Let us suppose the case of flowers upon the altar brought before any one of the Bishop of Exeter's brethren on the bench, who had less yearning for legal certainty, and was more in favour of open questions than his lordship. He might give some such judgment as this: he might sayHere is a case brought before me of a clergyman placing flowers upon the communion table in his church; the act is stated to be an offence against the laws ecclesiastical;' and I am to decide whether it is such an offence. Now, I look into the laws ecclesiastical of this realm, and I see no law whatever forbidding such an ornament. I cannot, therefore, upon ordinary legal principles, declare that this ornament is against the ecclesiastical laws. Nevertheless, I am willing to admit, that if laws are vague, authority must occasionally step in, give its order, and claim obedience, upon the natural ground that clergymen should obey their bishops in things indifferent. But as the question then becomes not one of strict law, but one of general propriety and decency, I must, before I bring my own episcopal authority to bear, require proof that the ornament was in some way improper, indecent, and unsuitable to one of our churches. I am quite ready to hear evidence on this point; but, till then, I must decline condemning every single ornament which may be used in or about a church, simply because it is not specified in the rubric and canons.-We cannot imagine, we say, how a

candid person could object to these grounds of judgment. The judge proceeds upon acknowledged principles of equity and fairness; nor would it be easy to find fault with him. Here is a judicial line, then, which might be taken to-morrow in any diocesan court in this country, the equity of which people could not deny; and yet the line is exactly the opposite one to that which the Bishop of Exeter has taken. It is a question which naturally suggests itself in this state of the case, whether a judgment can tend much to settle a question which may be met immediately by a perfectly sound and equitable judgment the other way; whether legal indefiniteness should not create to a certain extent legal modesty; and whether, when two opinions can be fairly given, it is for one of them to come forward unnecessarily and monopolise the solemnities of law.

But we must confess we are not content with putting such a judgment as we have been supposing, and the Bishop of Exeter's, on par; and asserting that one has as much to say for itself as the other: for we think the latter would have clearly the superiority, in point of law. For it is expressly declared in our Rubric, that the chancels shall remain as they have done in times past;'-a clause which must certainly be taken to be more in favour of ancient ornaments used in the chancel, than against them. Moreover, although flowers on the altar are nowhere mentioned in rubrics and canons, they are obviously in keeping with, and almost a part of, a whole class of ornaments which our Church has all along, and does now, recognize and use. We decorate our churches with evergreens at Christmas and Easter,—at Christmas the practice is universal, and at Easter it is common in many parts of the country. And in many churches flowers are used as well, by immemorial usage. The flowers,' we read in the Gentleman's Magazine, with which many churches are ornamented on Easter-day, are most probably intended as emblems of the ' resurrection, having just risen from the earth in which, during 'the severity of the winter, they seem to have been buried.' Again, in the account of Queen Elizabeth's progress, in the same Magazine.-'In returning from Woodstock (A.D. 1575), 'the queen passed some days at Reading, and attended Divine Service at the church of St. Laurence, where a seat was fitted up for her in the chancel, with a traverse and 'hangings of arras. The pulpit was then ornamented with new cloth, and the church was strewed with flowers.'

But this is old obsolete usage, it will be said. Let us go, then, into the interiors of some of the London churches of the present day, on the principal Church festivals, and see what is done there. We can assert then, that, unless the custom has altered