The meeting recognized the importance of renewed efforts at all relevant levels in developing the appropriate political climate and, at the same time, underlined the important role of international law in these efforts to safeguard outer space for peaceful uses. In respect of legal measures designed to safeguard outer space for peaceful uses, the participants recalled the applicability of general international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations and the body of law specifically dealing with outer space and emphasized the need to strengthen and supplement existing rules in response to new situations brought about by technological developments and changing circumstances. The meeting analyzed the proposals for new legal instruments submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and noted that these proposals were presented as drafts in the sense that they were negotiable. Consequently, the meeting emphasized the urgent need to move towards actual negotiation, in good faith involving all concerned parties and, in particular, the two major space powers. The objective of developing international agreement and international law for the purpose of maintaining outer space for peaceful uses should be seen in the larger context of working towards the creation of an appropriate legal environment for the future. Within the framework of general international law, two special bodies of law are relevant: international law specifically related to disarmament and international law specifically governing outer space activities. Efforts in each of these areas should be mutually reinforcing. In both scientific and legal terms outer space represents with land, sea and air the fourth realm of earth's environment. Within this general framework, the special body of law which has developed in response to the specific characteristics of outer space activities needs to be strengthened and developed. The meeting stressed the desirability of all countries becoming parties to existing treaties in this area. Further efforts should build on existing agreements and the preferred approach would be to supplement, as required, existing treaties by new legal instruments in appropriate form. The urgency of new agreements had been expressed by the United National General Assembly in resolution 38/70 of 1983 concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space: the Assembly had also requested the Conference on Disarmament to deal with this matter on a priority basis. In keeping with the primary role thus entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament, the meeting emphasized the urgent need for action by the Conference: in addition, the meeting pointed to the important role of other fora such as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. II. Specific issues and proposals The symposium also discussed a number of specific issues and proposals which could assist in the task of elaborating new agreements designed to safeguard outer space for peaceful uses. In particular, the symposium wishes to draw attention to the following: 1. In terms of the method of approach consideration should be given to the advantages of focusing on activities in outer space by strengthening and extending the system of permitted, prohibited and desirable activities. In fact desirable activities in the form of international cooperation in outer space would be an important aspect of confidence building in this area. 2. While recognizing the obvious requirement of agreement by the two major space powers, participants stressed the importance of involving the international community of states so as to gain wide acceptance for new agreements. Also, while recognizing the value of unilateral declarations of intent, the meeting pointed to the importance of unilateral constraint by those countries possessing technological capability for outer space activities. 3. Participants felt that in the work on new legal texts designed to maintain outer space for peaceful uses, the control provisions in the Moon agreements would be a viable alternative for early inclusion in a separate agreement. 4. In relation to verification, the meeting discussed monitoring by satellites as an instrument for confidence building. Participants recognized the problems associated with the proposals for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency but felt that this matter should be kept under review and that consideration might be given to the possiblity of establishing regional monitoring agencies. 5. A special point was made to the effect that new agreements should be formulated so as to ensure the prohibition of antisatellite activities (ASAT's). 6. The participants also discussed certain issues connected with the interpretation of existing treaties and the divergences of interpretation. In this connection atten tion was drawn to the desirability of considering the terminology used in relevant instruments and, as far as possible, providing for a coherent use of definitions and terms. 7. In discussing applicable agreements, participants identified areas where a strengthening of existing rules would be required. Among these areas figured the desirability of strengthening and updating rules concerning information to be provided in connection with registration of space objects, the need for better communications in relation to settlement of disputes. Attention was also drawn to the need for including appropriate procedures for adjustment or rules in keeping with technological developments, scientific research and international cooperation in this field. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 1 1. Professor Priyatna Abudrrasyid, Air & Space Law Research Center, 15, Jalan Banyumas, Jakarta, Indonesia. 2. Ambassador Abdel Abdel-Ghani, Former Deputy Secretary-General of UNISPACE Conference and Former Director of Outer Space Affairs Division, Sh. Osoris, Tagher Bldg., P.O. Box 262, Cairo, Egypt. 3. Mr. Abderrazak Berrada, member, International Frequency Registration Board, International Telecommunications Union, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland. 4. Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Director, Institut fur Luft- und Weltraumrecht der Universität Köln, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 5 Köln 41, F.R. Germany. 5. Ambassador Robert Buchheim, Former Head of U.S. Delegation to U.S.-U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Anti-Satellite Systems and Activities, 312 East State Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85020, U.S.A. 6. Dr. Alexandre Carnelutti, Legal Adviser, French Embassy, 58 Knightsbridge, London SW1X 7JT, United Kingdom. 7. Dr. Carl Q. Christol, Professor of International Law and Political Science, University of Southern California, 1041 Anoka Place, Pacific Palissades, Ca 90272 U.S.A. 8. Prof. Dr. Aldo Armando Cocca, Ambassador-at-large, Juan Francisco Segui 4444, Buenos Aires 25, Argentina. 9. Mr. Sune Danielson, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, 825 Third Avenue, 39th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10022, U.S.A. 10. Prof. Dr. I.H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, President, International Institute of Space Law, Institute of Public International Law, University of Utrecht, Janskerkhof 3, 3512 BK Utrecht, The Netherlands. 11. Prof. Guya Gal, Legal Adviser, Lecturer in Air and Space Law, University of Budapest, Varga J.U.P./8 11.10, 1161 Budapest XVI, Hungary. 12. Mrs. Eilene Galloway, Honorary Director, International Astronautical Federation's, International Institute of Space Law, 4612, 29th Place N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008, U.S.A. 13. Prof. D. Goedhuis, Chairman, ILA Committee on Outer Space, Flat 37, Cadogan Square, London SW1, United Kingdom. 14. Prof. Stephen Gorove, School of Law, The University of Mississippi Law Center, Editor, Journal of Space Law, University, Mississippi 38677 U.S.A. 15. Mr. He Qizhi, Counsellor, Legal Advisor, Department of Treaty and Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, People's Republic of China. 16. Ambassador Peter Jankowitch, Chairman, UN Outer Space Committee, Franziskanerplatz 5, Z-1010, Vienna, Austria. 17. Dr. Bhupendra Jasani, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Bergshamra, S-171 73 Solna, Sweden. 18. Mr. N. Jasentuliyana, Deputy Director, Outer Space Affairs Division, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017 U.S.A. 19. Dr. Vladimir Kopal, Director, Outer Space Affairs Division, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017 U.S.A. 20. Judge Manfred Lachs, International Court of Justice, Peace Palace, 2517 KJ The Hague, The Netherlands. 21. Dr. Nicholas Matte, Director, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, 3690 Peel Street, Montreal, P.Q., Canada H3A 1W9. 22. Mr. B. G. Mayorski, Legal and Treaty Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Smolenskaya-Sennaya Square 32/34, Moscow 121200 U.S.S.R. 1 Participants were present in their personal capacity only. 23. Dr. Ogunsola Ogunbanwo, Co-ordinator, United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme, Department for Disarmament Affairs, Rm D612, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. 24. Mr. G. S. Raju, Deputy Director, Legal & Treaties Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Patiala House, New Delhi-11 00 01 India. 25. Mr. Richard Saint-Martin, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 250, 866 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017 U.S.A. 26. Dr. Paul Stares, Lecturer, University of Lancaster, U.K., Presently at Brookings Institute, 1775 Mass. Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S.A. 27. Mr. Ronald Stowe, Vice-President, Satellite Business System, 8283 Greensboro Drive, McLean, Va 22101 U.S.A. 28. Professor Hubert Thierry, Deputy Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. 29. Mr. Edward W. Ploman, Vice-Rector, Global Learning Division, the United Nations University, 2-15-1 Shibuya, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, Japan. STATEMENT OF THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. STAR WARS: MYTH AND REALITY On the face of it, everyone should welcome the hope held out by President Reagan's Star Wars plan, hope for a world in which nuclear weapons can be rendered "impotent and obsolete." It is imperative, however, that we look beyond the glossy rhetoric and generalities with which Administration spokespeople have been trying to sell this scheme and search out the facts. We must strive to determine what kind of world a Star Wars defense would really bequeath to future generations. Such a searching examination exposes the President's vision as, at best, an appealing illusion. At worst, it is a cynical hoax on the American people. Far from making us more secure, pursuit of a Star Wars defense-estimated to cost between $300 and $1,000 billion-will only spark a new round in an already ruinously expensive and perilously dangerous arms race. Support for the President's ill-considered proposal is founded on at least five pernicious myths. First is the myth of MAD. A sponsor of last year's People Protection Act has claimed that, "What the President has proposed is no less than a moral recovery in American strategic policy which would take us from the horror of MAD [Mutual Assured Destruction] to the promise of mutual assured survival.” This fallacy must be laid to rest, once and for all. There is not, nor ever has been, an official U.S. MAD policy. Assured destruction is not a doctrine which can be discarded at will, any more than it can be replaced with "mutual assured survival." MAD is a tragic technological fact of life, an inescapable consequence of the United States/Soviet nuclear competition. And it is a fact of life Star Wars can do nothing to change. The Defensive Technology Study Team (Fletcher Report) acknowledged this in its statement that the proposed 5-year, $25 billion Star Wars R&D effort "drives [the Soviets] to try and develop possible countermeasures, increase emphasis on their air-breathing forces and conduct research and development on new families of weapons delivery systems." Far from disposing of the nuclear threat, Star Wars would only spur the development of new means of nuclear devastation. The cost of building up our air defenses against new Soviet cruise missiles and bombers, which are immune to space weapons, must thus be charged to the Star Wars account. It would cost more than $100 billion simply to reconstruct air defenses equivalent to those we had in the early 1960's against a relatively small Soviet bomber force. It is more difficult to estimate what it would cost to attempt to counter such other feasible offensive measures as depressed trajectory submarinelaunched missiles. Second is the myth of the last move. It is illogical to assume that either superpower will abandon the capability of inflicting devastating damage on each other. It is naive to assume the means to continue to be able to do so won't be found. And it is insane to assume that a U.S. Star Wars effort will force the Soviets to concede U.S. superiority at the arms reduction table. Rather, as the Future Security Strategy Study (Hoffman Report) acknowledges, "they would be more likely to respond with a continuing buildup of their long-range offensive forces.' A central component of the Strategic Defense Inititiative is research into the means to counter a Soviet Star Wars system. The Soviets will work just as hard to counter ours. Military history, available evidence and simple logic strongly suggest offensive countermeasures will remain cheaper than defensive measures. Third is the myth of technological superiority. Too often in the course of the arms race we have assumed, because we are more advanced in a particular technology, that our lead gives us some concrete advantage. Always, our technological edge proves fleeting and we are soon confronted by the same weapons we train on the Soviet Union. MIRVs are perhaps the most notorious example of this recurring pattern, the long-range cruise missiles that will soon confront us are another. The 1972 ABM Treaty presently prohibits both sides from mounting elaborate missile defenses. But we can't abrogate that treaty without the Soviets doing likewise. How much will it cost us to counter those Soviet defenses? How threatening will they appear to U.S. decisionmakers in the 21st century? Will future members of this Congress feel that we must build up our offensive forces to overcome Soviet space defenses? The future cost of penetrating or overwhelming a Soviet defense should also be charged to the Star Wars account. Fourth is the myth that arms control agreements can be manipulated to our lasting advantage. We can reasonably assume that this Administration is unwilling to resume anti-satellite (ASAT) negotiations with the Soviets, as stated in its March 31 report, because it plans to use ASAT research (such as the Talon Gold experiment scheduled for later this decade) as a cloak for Star Wars field testing, currently banned by the ABM Treaty. The Administration indicates it would be willing to consider an ASAT treaty at some later date, presumably after a Star Wars architecture has been erected which unrestrained Soviet ASATs might threaten. It is difficult to believe we could hope to get away with this sort of sleight of hand. The SALT/START process is already in serious trouble. Tampering with the ABM Treaty will do nothing to shore it up. Quite the contrary, uninhibited defenses will spark equally uninhibited offenses. Even Star Wars advocates acknowledge that the defensive mission will be possible only if coupled with agreements to limit offensive missiles. It is sheer folly, however, to believe that we can discard ABM restrictions and still expect agreement on U.S. START proposals; no superpower is going to bargain away its offensive, retaliatory capability in the face of an adversary's efforts to build a defensive system. We must not rush off into an endeavor that will sabotage the one agreement that has actually limited arms, the ABM Treaty, without carefully considering the longterm consequences. The time for such consideration is now, before it is too late. Likewise, the prospect for an ASAT Treaty is now or never. Once more advanced ASAT technologies have been perfected there will be no squeezing the space-war genie back in the bottle. These treaties are like mutually-supportive building blocks; the policies of this Administration threaten to demolish the arms control edifice that has been carefully built up over the past two decades. It is imperative that we immediately resume space weapons negotiations neglected since 1979. Fifth, last, and most disturbing is the myth that Star Wars is entirely defensive. It can't be emphasized strongly enough that space-based defense is part and parcel of a nuclear warfighting strategy. Far from making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," ABMs in space will render them all the more usable. The difficulty of devising a Star Wars systems absolutely effective against a full first strike is widely acknowledged, even by the scheme's advocates. But this system might be effective enough against the ragged retaliation that would follow such a first strike. And Star Wars weapons would be more effective against the other side's defensive satellites if used in conjunction with that first strike. It is unlikely that either side would have the confidence—or the desire to launch a surprise attack backed up by space defenses in normal peacetime conditions. But in a superpower military emergency, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Star Wars would be one more incentive, in addition to the growing arsenal of highly accurate counterforce missiles, to strike first. The last thing we need in this unsettled world is yet more destabilizing weaponry. For all these reasons, CDI strongly urges the members of this Committee, as you consider the space weapons proposals before you, to discard the myths and carefully scrutinize the realities. As a nation we have difficult decisions to make today that will govern the course of the arms race for decades to come. There have been too many missed opportunities in years past. This time, let us choose wisely and not make space the new battleground while there is still time to bar all weapons in space. [Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.] |