Study Panel Kurt Gottfried, Panel Co-chair; member, Board of Directors, Union of Concerned Scientists; Professor of Physics and Nuclear Studies, Cornell University; former Chairman, Division of Particles and Fields, American Physical Society Henry W. Kendall, Panel Co-chair; Chairman, Board of Directors, Union of Concerned Scientists; Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Hans A. Bethe, Professor of Physics Emeritus, Cornell University; Nobel Laureate in Physics; Chief, Theoretical Division, Manhattan Project; member, President's Science Advisory Committee (1957-60); Strategic Military Panel (1957-69) Peter A. Clausen, Senior Arms Analyst, Union of Concerned Scientists; Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; former political analyst, Department of Energy and Central Intelligence Agency Richard L. Garwin, IBM Fellow at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center; member, President's Science Advisory Committee (1962-65 and 1969-72); member, Defense Science Board (1966-69) Noel Gayler (Admiral, USN, Ret.), former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces in the Pacific; former Director, National Security Agency; former Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Research and Development) Richard Ned Lebow, Professor of Government and Director, Peace Studies Program, Cornell University; former Professor of Strategy, National War College; Scholar-in-Residence, Central Intelligence Agency Carl Sagan, Professor of Astronomy and Space Sciences and Director, Laboratory for Planetary Studies, Cornell University Victor Weisskopf, Institute Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; former Director-General, European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), Geneva; former President, American Physical Society UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 26 Church Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238, (617) 547-5552 Senator PRESSLER. Does minority or majority staff have any further business that I have overlooked? [No response] Senator PRESSLER. With that, I call this hearing to a close. [Additional questions and answers follow:] DR. DRELL'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PRESSLER Question 1. Do you believe that the SDI is a prudent hedge against Soviet ABM breakthrough or breakout? Answer. Not as I understand what is being proposed. A well coordinated and directed research and technology program at the level of (very roughly) 1 to 2 billion a year is a prudent hedge against a Soviet ABM breakthrough or breakout. The SDI goes beyond this calling for an expansion to a spending total of 26B for the next 5 years in order to demonstrate technology toward a Presidentially directed goal of rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". My concern as expressed in my testimony, is that this will be seen-and become a unilateral change in the basis of the United States-Soviet strategic relationship. A political foundation should be built through dialogue with the Soviets before any such major change is implemented as I discussed. Question 2. In your view, could the SDI lead the Soviets to accelerate their BMD efforts? Answer. Yes. Lacking the proper political framework, we are also likely to see a further buildup of offensive forces in order to preserve the deterrent in the face of growing defense capabilities-real or perceived. Question 3. What is your assessment of the Administration's March 31, 1984 ASAT report? Do you believe that the Administration uses a reasonable standard for verification in its assertion that an ASAT ban is unverifiable? Answer. As I testified I disagree with its conclusion that it would not be "productive to engage in formal international negotiations" on ASAT arms control at this time. I believe we can verify appropriate bans on ASAT tests as well as dismantling of launch facilities. On the other hand a ban on existence of all ASAT's would be difficult to verify. However a ban now on testing would prevent the Soviets from developing an effective ASAT capability against important U.S. systems. There are also important unilateral steps that should be taken by the United States, as I testified, to improve our satellite system survivability. Question 4. Do you believe that a ban on dedicated ASATs, such as the Soviet SS-9 interceptor, and strict limitations on other systems with possible ASAT capabilities, such as high powered lasers and the Gallosh ABM, can be effectively verified? Answer. Yes-to a degree of effectiveness appropriate to meet U.S. security needs. Question 5. Do you believe that the Soviet ASAT poses a serious threat to U.S. security? Could the United States prudently forego ASAT flight tests for a brief period in order to test Soviet seriousness on ASAT negotiations? Answer. I do not believe the current Soviet ASAT poses a serious threat to U.S. security for two reasons: its low reliability and the very limited orbital paths and low altitudes against which it can operate. Yes, the United States could prudently forego ASAT flight tests for a brief period. Question 6. If the United States were to continue ASAT flight tests could this add to the difficulty of reaching a verifiable ban on dedicated ASĂT's? Answer. The United States could continue ASAT flight tests for a while before adding significantly to the difficulty of reaching a verifiable ban on dedicated ASAT's. Eventually, however, once the United States has completed tests on its ASAT now under development and has reached a capability for deployment of an effective system, the difficulty will be greater-especially since by then the Soviets will, presumably, have continued testing and also improved their system. OTA'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PRESSLER Question 1. If total defense against nuclear attack is impossible, what other objectives might be served by the ŠDI? Are these other goals worth the huge expense and effort? Answer. The background paper identifies and discusses six such goals: (1) stengthen deterrence by preventing pre-emptive destruction of retaliatory forces; (2) strengthen deterrence by preventing the use of nuclear weapons as decisive military tools for high-confidence "limited" strikes on conventional forces; (3) save lives in the event of a war; (4) shape the course of arms competition and arms control, by obliging the Soviets to alter their present patterns of weapons deployment; (5) respond to Soviet BMD efforts; and (6) protect against accidental missile launches and attack from other nuclear powers. While each of these goals is important, it is not clear that the SDI would necessarily accomplish any of them. OTA's larger study, which began last month in response to your request, will attempt to assess the likelihood of attaining these goals and their significance compared to each other and to the costs of various kinds and sizes of "less than perfect" defense. Question 2. Does the United States require the SDI to keep pace with Soviet BMD programs? Answer. No. Before the SDI began, the United States had an extensive program of BMD research, one of whose purpose was to avert the risk of a Soviet breakout by ensuring that our technology was keeping pace or staying ahead of theirs. Question 3. Do you believe that the SDI will increase stability or might it accelerate the pace of Soviet BMD programs? Answer. The SDI, as a research program, might or might not contribute to stability, depending on how the Soviets reacted. Some people believe that it might disrupt existing Soviet plans for military modernization, and thereby contribute to U.S. security, if not to stability. On the other hand, it would certainly provide the Soviets with a reason to accelerate their own BMD programs, and an excuse to withdraw from the ABM Treaty if they so desire. We are not in a position to judge how the Soviets would actually react if the SDI programs are funded and move ahead. If and when research under the SDI led to testing, this would violate the existing ABM Treaty. This would presumably be destabilizing unless it proved possible to work out with the Soviets a modification of the treaty that permitted such testing without jeopardizing the objectives of the treaty. This would be, at best, a severe challenge to U.S. diplomacy. If and when the SDI led to deployments, its impacts on stability would be very complex. This is an issue we will address in some depth in the larger study you have requested. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS ON OTA'S BACKGROUND PAPER ON "DIRECTED ENERGY MISSILE DEFENSE IN SPACE," MAY 8, 1984 STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. JAMES A. ABRAHAMSON, JR. On April 24, 1984 the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment released a background paper prepared by Ashton Carter under the auspices of the Office of Technology Assessment. Although the press has described the report as critical of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the paper actually addresses neither the goals nor the merits of the SDI research program. Furthermore, independent authorities have found that the paper contains technical errors, unsubstantiated assumptions, and conclusions that are inconsistent with the analysis in the body of the report. It is basic to any assessment of the Strategic Defense Initiative to evaluate it as a research program exploring technologies that are not intended to be exploited for many years. Yet the paper challenges the SDI based on the capability of current defense technologies to counter offensive capabilities that are at least 20 years in the future. It also misleads the reader concerning the goals of the current research program, which are to provide future leaders with options for decisions they may have to make to strengthen deterrence with effective strategic defenses. While the body of the report repeatedly stresses the importance of a vigorous research and technology program as a hedge against unilateral Soviet exploitation of new technologies, the conclusions do not address the consequences of current and possible future Soviet efforts. It fails to consider the conclusions of the large body of national security experts who have studied the strategic implications of the SDI and judged that it can have great promise for strengthening deterrence and enhancing stability. TECHNICAL REVIEW OF ASHTON CARTER'S BACKGROUND PAPER “DIRECTED ENERGY MISSILE DEFENSE IN SPACE" The background paper by Ashton Carter entitled “Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space" was released on April 24, 1984. The report has been used by some opposed to efforts to explore and develop possibilities for effective ballistic missile defenses to attack the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This summary was pre pared based on reviews of the Carter paper conducted by those organizations and many individuals whom Mr. Carter consulted in preparing his report. This summary covers both areas where the report has made significant errors and also where there is substantive difference of opinion among the experts. The reviewers agreed that errors were present in the report but different individuals had varying opinions on the seriousness of these errors. However, all individuals, including Mr. Carter, in conversations with the SDI staff agree on the need for a focused research and technology_program. Although Mr. Carter has indicated that his report does not relate to the SDI nor judge the merits of that program, it does state in the introduction that the paper deals with a "long-term research and developmentStar Wars" program. This summary intended to note some of the fundamental errors and misinterpretation of data inherent in the report. BOOSTER CHARACTERISTICS The report stresses that new ballistic missile threats constructed as a Soviet or other nation's response to a US defensive system might look considerably different. Much attention is given to the possibility that the Soviets could develop a "fastburn" booster which would finish its boost phase while still within the outer reaches of the Earth's atmosphere. It is true that such fast burn boosters are technically credible and could defeat or complicate the task of boost-phase intercept. Those who reviewed Mr. Carter's paper make three key points about fast burn boosters. First, it will be well into the first decade of the next century before the Soviets could develop and deploy, at significant cost, a large fraction of their reentry vehicles onto such boosters. Second, the fast burn boosters would result in significantly reduced payloads, less warheads, have less accuracy, and be less capable of countermeasuring against later phases of the ballistic missile defense. The reduction of 70-90 percent in total RV payload and greatly reduced decoy payload is equivalent to a 70-90 percent effective boost-phase defense against current boosters! This means that a fast-burn booster attack could be adequately handled by the midcourse and terminal phases. Thus, forcing the Soviets to go to fast burn boosters is the same as deploying a highly effective boost-phase system. Third, there are a number of new technologies with considerable potential against fast-burn boosters. The SDI is designed to fully investigate these technologies. BOOST-PHASE TECHNOLOGIES The report provides an excellent review of how various technologies work, however, it does not do a satisfactory job in explaining how they might be employed. The analysis of the number of laser platforms needed to destroy a given number of boosters is seriously in error. The choice of laser weapon parameters is such that the result is an extremely short lethal range. This error causes the number of laser weapons to be so large as to raise questions on the practicality of this approach. The fact is that the weapon parameters would be optimized to result in the minimum number of weapons necessary to provide the coverage and target handling capability required. The report's analysis of ground-based lasers used in a relay mode both misstates current technology capabilities and uses inappropriately pessimistic input numbers. Although is it acknowledged that "impulse-kill" lasers can destroy boosters via a different mechanism than thermal lasers, it does not acknowledge that recent advances in the free-electron and excimer lasers may make this possible. Further, the report fails to acknowledge that considerably lower power levels are required to effect this kill mechanism. The arbitrary, but poor, choice of parameters for a ground-based laser/space relay mirror system results in a system which is at least an order of magnitude worse than optimum. Thus, the report's failure to consider efficient systems based on known technology could result in erroneous or misleading conclusions. The analysis of the X-ray laser concept is also flawed. Although the progress and status of concept development in this area is highly classified, there are features of such systems which make them both applicable over much longer ranges and capable of attacking targets much deeper in the atmosphere than stated. When these errors are corrected the X-ray laser concept shows great potential. For neutral particle beams the comments on accelerator status and ultimate beam divergence are wrong, as is their estimate of how deep these devices can penetrate into the atmosphere. Contrary to the statements in the report, neutral particle beams with achievable beam energies can penetrate any conceivable ballistic missile target. When these errors are corrected, a very modest constellation of such devices could negate most ballistic missile threats. This technology is advancing very rapidly and is comparable to laser technologies in promise. The skepticism concerning the feasibility of charged particle beam devices in space, as opposed to the neutral particle beams, does not consider new and innovative applications and is based on information which is very much out of date. The assessments of the feasibility of space-based kinetic kill vehicles is based on the same mistakes made in analyzing the laser weapons. The research and technology objectives of the SDI program are focused on developing considerably smaller interceptor weights than assumed in the report. When these errors are corrected the number of systems required is 4-5 times less than reflected in the report. Moreover, total orbital weights become modest and well within current and anticipated US launch capabilities. Furthermore, contrary to assertions in the report, "electromagnetic guns" show great promise in increasing interceptor velocities so that kinetic intercepts can be accomplished even against “fast-burn” boosters. OTHER ELEMENTS OF BOOST PHASE DEFENSES The report correctly stresses the importance of surveillance, acquisition, pointing and tracking, battle management and communications and control systems. The SDI has been formulated to focus and emphasize research on these elements. Indeed, over one half of the total SDI resources will be devoted to technologies in those areas. However, experts in each area do not concur with the report's pessimism on the potential for solving the technical issues in each area. COUNTERMEASURES The issue of defensive systems and their vulnerability to passive and active countermeasures is a crucial one. The statement that "vulnerability of these satellites is a cardinal concern because . . . they are impractical to harden, conceal, or proliferate to any significant degree" is not correct. Although it is true that very little has been done in the past to reduce the vulnerability of space systems, technologies and techniques have been identified that will insure survivability. Although there are many potential threats to space-based assets, we believe that space assets can be made survivable. To provide just one example, Mr. Carter proposes that pop-up Xray lasers would be extremely effective against satellites. However, there are also statements in the report that a suitably constructed shield could defend ballistic missiles against X-ray lasers. The application of this shielding technique is more practical for satellites and spacecraft than for ICBMs! With regards to other suggested countermeasures reviewers have made two comments. First, many of the countermeasures, such as fast burn boosters are as effective in enhancing possibilities for intercept in midcourse and terminal phases as a highly effective boost phase intercept system might be. Second, the Fletcher panel has identified ways to counter every countermeasure the offense may choose to make. Whether these defensive measures are cost-effective or technically feasible is a major research objective of the SDI. To provide just one example, the proposed "booster decoys" which would proliferate targets for a boost phase defense are neither cost effective nor likely. The primary cost for an ICBM is the booster and silo, not the precision guidance and warheads. A plausible decoy would therefore be nearly as costly as real boosters, and thus an unappealing countermeasure. HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES The proposed "system" discussed in the report is poorly conceived. As already mentioned the number os space-based weapons systems discussed is wrong by factors of from 5-10. Thus, it is projected that a few hundred lasers or less could "handle" the entire attack without resorting to X-ray lasers at all. Similarly the number of required sensor platforms is in error. The report contains two fundamental errors in sizing the midcourse intercept system. First, the midcourse interceptors could be constructed so that only one launch site could cover the entire United States, rather than the two assumed in the report. Second, the Fletcher study concluded that effective discrimination of decoys from warheads could be accomplished in midcourse. These result in more than a factor of ten error in midcourse interceptor required. Even greater errors were made in the number of terminal interceptors required. These errors resulted in a gross overestimate in the required number of terminal interceptors and associated radars. |