When calling verification "impossible" the administration often refers to a "comprehensive" ASAT ban. Even the most ardent ASAT foes don't demand a total ban because they know it can't be achieved. But there are ways to address the problem short of that as even Mr. Reagan noted. Congress must continue to press him to negotiate on ASATs before the race for satellite killers moves beyond control.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 4, 1984]

INFINITE SHOOTING GALLERY

President Reagan says that he will go ahead with plans to turn outer space into a shooting gallery. His casual rejection of pleas to keep violence out of space is foolhardy in and of itself. What it suggests about the Administration's real views on controlling arms of any kind may be worse.

Reagan told Congress this week that he will not even discuss a proposal by the Soviet Union to negotiate ways to keep satellite-killers out of space. That is no surprise; a Pentagon official said as much two weeks ago. But it is a blow to those who see a virtually clean slate on which to write a two-way prohibition on violence in outer space, a far different picture from the nuclear standoff on Earth and the deadly silence at other arms-control bargaining tables.

The President keeps saying that the United States is willing to resume talks on controlling short- and long-range missiles, of which there now are thousands deployed by both major nuclear po ers. His refusal to talk about controlling a handful of weapons that either do not work very well as in the case of the Soviet Union's onagain-off-again anti-satellite program, or have not been fully tested, as with the American satellite-killer, raises serious doubts about the value that the Administration places on arms control of any kind.

The U.S. system, which is about two years from deployment, involves launching small rockets at targets in space from high-flying F-15 fighter planes. The Soviet satellite-killer is more cumbersome, using the space equivalent of floating mines that pull along side targets and blow up, taking the targets with them. Soviet test have not been spectacularly successful.

Reagan's argument for his program depends heavily on a number of straw men. Reagan told Congress that the United States will press ahead with its satellite-killer program in part because there are "significant" difficulties with verifying Soviet compliance with a treaty that would ban weapons capable of destroying satellites— notably those used by both countries for military reconnaissance.

But nobody else is talking about an absolute ban. Even the strongest advocates of arms control in space acknowledge that no treaty could ban research or possession of such weapons. Without on-site inspection, it would indeed be impossible to know who was designing and building what weapons in secluded laboratories. And there are as may good reasons for our not wanting Soviet inspectors tramping around our bases as there are for their not wanting to let American inspectors in.

But a treaty that banned testing could be effective. One trademark of Soviet military research and development is cautious, plodding progress, never deploying anything new until it has been tested over and over. A ban on tests, which could be spotted from U.S. satellites, could keep Soviet weapons out of space, even if Moscow went ahead with research, as this country undoubtedly would.

The President said that Soviet proposals for a ban on satellite-killers are full of "ambiguities and loopholes." But nobody wants him to whip out a pen and sign the Soviet draft. They want him to try to negotiate a treaty without loopholes.

The message says that the United States must continue to "protect against threatening measures." Again, the Administration system is not designed to fend off Soviet statllite-killers but to kill Soviet satellites. America already is trying to make U.S. satellites less vulnerable—the only way to protect them against threatening

measures.

Congress appropriated $19 million for further work on the U.S. system last year, but there were two strings attached. One required the Administration to spell out its plans to negotiate an arms-in-space treaty before it could spend the money. Even the rejection puts Reagan in technical compliance with that part of the law. The other string, which passed the Senate on a 91-0 vote, requires the Adminsitration to start negotiations on a treaty before it test-fires any missile at a target in space. Reagan obviously will try to cut that string.

Congress must stick with its position. The fact that the President brushed aside the doubts of Congress about satellite-killers this week sets the stage for a full

debate not only on weapons in space but also on arms control generally. No issue in this election year is potentially more important.

[From Science, Oct. 28, 1983]

ADMINISTRATION RESISTS DEMANDS FOR ASAT BAN

ARGUMENTS FOR A BAN ON ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS GAIN AN INCREASINGLY SYMPATHETIC HEARING IN CONGRESS, BUT REAGAN'S APPOINTEES SHOW LITTLE ENTHUSIASM

(By R. Jeffrey Smith)

Five years ago, for principally selfish reasons, the United States proposed to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union that would have stymied the development of weapons capable of efficiently destroying satellites in outer space. The general idea was that such a treaty was needed-in light of technological developments then on the horizon-to ensure the continued survival of satellites that form the basis of strategic deterrence and arms control verification. A subsidiary motivation was economic: such an agreement would close off costly and unnecessary competition in a challenging area of weapons design.

Despite the considerable appeal of such a treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union were unable to come to a quick agreement, and the talks petered out in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a result, the development of efficient satellite killers is now nearly at hand, and no agreement on their abolition is within sight. This autumn, the United States will conduct the first space test of a device that can potentially kill critical early warning and military communications satellites orbited by the Soviet Union (Science, 14 October, p. 140). The Soviets, meanwhile, are experimenting with new kill mechanisms on their existing antisatellite weapon, and are threatening to develop an ASAT identical to that now under construction by the United States. Both nations are also working aggressively on more advanced ASAT's, which could in theory use laser beams to destroy orbiting satellites from a great distance. This contest will cost the United States tens of billions of dollars.

A growing number of scientists have become concerned about the size of these expenditures and fearful about where these endeavors will lead. "We believe that the testing or deployment of any weapons in space-in part by threatening vital satellite assets-significantly increases the likelihood of warfare on earth," says a petition circulated last spring by Richard Garwin of IBM and Carl Sagan of Cornell University. "We join in urging the United States, the Soviet Union and other spacefaring nations to negotiate. . . a treaty to ban weapons of any kind from space, and to prohibit damage to or destruction of satellites of any nation." The petition has been signed by 36 scientists and retired military officers, including Lee Dubridge, science adviser to President Nixon; Noel Gayler, former director of the National Security Agency; James Van Allen, president of the American Geophysical Union; Thomas Donahue, chairman of the Space Science Board at the National Academy of Sciences; and Margaret Burbidge, chairman of the board of AAAS.

Congress is also becoming interested in stemming the migration of weapons to outer space. Lst July, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a resolution, introduced by Senator Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), urging the Reagan Administration to negotiate a prompt moratorium on ASAT tests, followed by a "mutual and verifiable ban" on ASAT's, and then by a more general prohibition on all spacebased or directed weapons systems. "This is a unique opportunity to halt a major arms race before it gets off the ground," says committee chairman Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill.). "Once started, it may prove nearly impossible to stop." A similar resolution introduced in the House by Representative Joe Moakley (D-Mass.) has garnered 124 cosponsors.

So far, these pleas have gone unheeded by the Reagan Administration, which harbors considerable skepticism that a verifiable ASAT ban is possible, much less desirable. Kenneth Adelman, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), noted last May, for example, that "there are difficult technical problems, including verification problems, that constitute fundamental obstacles to progress in this area. These daunting problems have not been resolved, and we should not rush into negotiations on these subjects until we are ready with verifiable proposals that will enhance national security." He also noted that an ASAT ban would severely limit the Pentagon's ability to destroy Soviet satellites that are used to direct weapons against the U.S. forces. "I am not saying there is an overriding concern but

there is a concern. Thus, there is a dilemma as to whether arms control agreements that would restrict our ability to deal with such satellites are in our national interest."

To date, the Administration has refused to conduct either bilateral or multilateral negotiations on ASAT's, despite the repeated urgings of various European alliesled by Italy-whose own satellites would be endangered by a shooting war in space. Until recently, it was opposed even to the establishment of a formal working group on outer space arms control under the auspices of the United Nations Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. "We want to ensure that, if established, it could usefully undertake full discussion of the relevant issues," Adelman explained last May. This task is of course complicated by the fact that, after studying the matter for several years, the Administration says that it remains unsure what the relevant issues are. The Soviet Union, in contrast, has recently expressed enthusiasm for space arms control negotiations, and has presented a draft treaty to the United Nations that would require the dismantling of existing ASAT systems and prohibit the development of any future spacebased weapons. In August, at a meeting in Moscow with a delegation from the U.S. Senate, Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov also promised to suspend tests of the Soviet ASAT so long as the United States refrains from "stationing in outer space antisatellite weapons of any type"-an ambiguous phrase that may refer to scheduled testing of the new U.S. ASAT stationed on F-15 jet fighters.

Independent analysts such as John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists say that these initiatives go a long way toward satisfying earlier U.S. complaints. During the formal negotiations in 1978 and 1979, for example, U.S. negotiators were angered by the Soviets' refusal to include satellites orbited by third countries (such as China or the members of NATO), within the scope of a treaty. They also were upset by a Soviet claim that any nation could act against satellite engaging in "hostile or pernicious acts"-a phrase that was generally considered dangerously ambiguous. The United States had also objected to language in a previous draft Soviet treaty that could be interpreted as permitting the use of force against space objects unilaterally regarded as out of compliance with the treaty provisions. None of these objectionable ideas survived in the latest Soviet draft, which states clearly that "it is prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force against space objects in orbit around the earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner." Apart from any other considerations, Pike says, "the scope of the new proposals seems to suggest a very real Soviet interest in dealing with the major issues posed by the space weapons competition."

Despite the apparent improvements, the Administration responded negatively to the diplomatic initiative at a State Department press conference on 25 August. Spokesman Alan Romberg noted that, although it was being given careful study, "our preliminary examination. suggests that inadequate verification is one of its major weaknesses.” In particular, he said it would be “nearly impossible to verify through national technical means alone the dismantling and destruction of the Soviet ASAT system" because it sits atop a rocket booster, the SS-9, that is frequently used for other missions. "We do not know how many ASAT interceptors have been manufactured, and it would be relatively easy for the Soviets to maintain a covert supply of interceptors for use in a crisis. Since satellites which serve U.S. and allied national security are very few in number, any Soviet cheating on an ASAT agreement, even on a small scale, could pose a prohibitive risk."

Pike responds by acknowledging that verification of a ban on possession of ASAT's would indeed be difficult, if not impossible. "Clearly, they are correct," he says. "Even if all the personnel of the CIA, the FBI, and even the Post Office were loosed upon the Soviet Union to roam the country at will, the task of hiding a handful of satellites no larger than a small car would still be child's play." But this is a bogus issue, he suggests, because there is actually no need to seek a ban on ASAT possession. Verifiable restrictions on use, testing, and deployment would be sufficient to undermine confidence that even hidden ASAT's could be effectively used, he says.

Kurt Gottfried, a physicist at Cornell who recently directed a lengthy study of ASAT's for the Union of Concerned Scientists, makes a similar argument. "A treaty that forbids possession presents knotty problems of verification that would require lengthy negotiations," he told a congressional hearing last May. Along with nine other scientists and weapons experts who worked on the UCS report, Gottfried recommends a more modest goal: the United States and the Soviet Union should agree merely to halt all testing of "weapons that can destroy, damage, render inoperable, or change the flight trajectory of space objects."

As explained in the report, such an agreement would immediately freeze ASAT technology at current levels. The Soviets would be permanently limited to their existing system, which works only half the time and is incapable of threatening the communications and early warning satellites necessary for nuclear retaliation by the United States. Any attempts to improve the device or to build something sharply different would be seriously if not fatally handicapped by enormous operational uncertainties. "Tests or use of lasers or high-powered transmitters to damage satellite sensors or to burn out satellite receivers would [also] be banned." Verification will be straight-forward, according to the UCS report, because the United States has in place or under development a worldwide network of sophisticated cameras, radars, and infrared sensors capable of peering deep into outer space; and also because any illegal ASAT tests would create "a host of telltale signs," including an observable launch; transmissions to and from the test vehicle; and possibly some target debris, heating, or displacement.

One aspect in particular of the UCS proposal sticks in the craw of Reagan Administration weapons officials. As even the UCS acknowledges, a prompt ban on ASAT tests leaves the United States without any data on the success of its fancy new device, while the Soviets would be left with useful results from several years of testing its device. As Adelman noted last spring, "it is an asymmetrical relationship and it becomes a serious obstacle at achieving an equitable space arms control agreement. . . . [We cannot] eliminate the decade of Soviet ASAT experience." UCS panelists respond by noting first that the Soviet tests have hardly been a smashing success, and second that a new and even worse asymmetry will be created if tests of the U.S. ASAT are allowed to proceed, due to its vastly superior capabilities (it is smaller, faster, and capable of hitting more important satellites). Garwin predicts that "the Soviets involved in building their own ASAT's will say . . . 'we have to go one more round' " in order to match the U.S. system, and a new arms race will be under way.

Despite the appeal of this argument to some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the cosponsors of the House resolution, Congress as a whole has listened harder to repeated Administration statements about the disparity in existing U.S. and Soviet ASAT testing experience. During the summer, for example, the House rejected by a wide margin a proposal to delay the initial U.S. test. It also rejected, by a slightly smaller margin, a proposal to delay the purchase of ASAT parts and testing equipment that require a long time to produce. Due to the concerted efforts of a few ASAT opponents, however, both the Senate and the House were persuaded to accept a provision in the annual defense authorization bill_that_requires a special presidential certification before the U.S. ASAT can be tested against an object in space. Specifically, President Reagan will be required to certify that the United States is endeavoring in good faith to negotiate an ASAT ban and that the initial test is "necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security."

Although this is clearly not a high hurdle for Reagan to leap, it has had the effect of forcing his appointees to develop some evidence that negotiations on ASAT's are actually under consideration. Consequently, there has recently been a flurry of activity in quarters where the topic previously excited little interest. ACDA, for example, has begun to talk up a study of ASAT arms control options being prepared by a group of scholars under the direction of William Durch a research fellow at Harvard University. Durch says that ACDA acceded to his request for research funding last July and that a copy of his report is due on 1 February, shortly before the date of the second ASAT test, which involves a space-based target. ASAT arms control options are also under consideration by a formal interagency government working group, which is chaired by a Pentagon official. Measures under discussion reportedly include a treaty that bans only the use of ASAT's, not their testing or deployment, and a treaty that would limit both countries to systems now in advanced stages of development. Administration critics assert that the former would of course be meaningless in the event of U.S.-Soviet hostilities, and the latter would, for reasons already described, give the United States a substantial strategic advantage. Hardly anyone who desires an ASAT treaty attaches much significance to the working group activity. General Charles Gabriel, the Air Force chief of staff, and Robert Cooper, the director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, have both publicly expressed opposition to an ASAT ban. A former ACDA official who has been following the issue closely asserts that virtually any significant treaty would conflict with the President's desire to conduct research on space-based antiballistic missile systems, which use similar technology. “It will require, at a minimum, a change in administrations" to achieve an ASAT ban, he says.

The proponents of such a ban believe that the United States is now at a critical juncture in its weapons invention, because successful tests of the U.S. ASAT will soon shatter any realistic opportunity for space arms control. Kurt Gottfried says there is a parallel between today's competition in ASAT's and the development of multiple independently targeted warheads, or MIRV's in the 1970's. MIRV's were developed by the United States in order to counter a primitive Soviet antiballistic missile system, and they provided temporary strategic advantage. But the Soviets soon developed MIRV's of their own, which made U.S. land-based missiles vulnerable to preemptive attack. "Today, at long last, there is general agreement that we would have been far better off had we abstained from introducing MIRV's", Gottfried says. "This lesson applies directly to antisatellite weapons. The Soviets have been both foolish and reckless to spend some 15 years nurturing a clumsy threat against a rather small portion of our satellites. Their major accomplishment has been to provoke us into building a far more sophisticated system. Our ASAT, if deployed, will give us a temporary advantage. But as with ballistic missiles, an ongoing competition in space weaponry will, inexorably, reduce the security of both sides. That should be clear to all by now. Or must we wait a decade hence [to learn] that in 1983 the United States blundered once again by upping the ante in this deadly poker game?"

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 4, 1984]

QUEST FOR NUCLEAR SANCTUARY

It is no surprise to find that, a year after its unveiling, the president's bold proposal for a space-based defense against nuclear attack is under fire. The basic charges are that it would make the Soviets fear the United States intended to attack, that the irreducible weak points in even the most successful imaginable system would leave the country devastated and that the eventual costs would be in the hundreds of billions. What is a surprise is that the informed support for the proposal, in the defense bureaucracy and among defense thinkers, is so qualified. This bears on the current question of the direction and pace of research.

It helps to recall how President Reagan defined his goal a year ago. He urged a quest for a shield so effective as to render offensive weapons obsolete. "I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities," he said. “If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that." The secretary of defense and the White House science adviser continue to enunciate the initial goal to move from deterrence to defense so as to afford the country nuclear sanctuary.

But the Pentagon's research chief has testified he cannot foresee the day that defensive weapons will not be "paired with offensive systems." Both blue-ribbon panels appointed by the White House to study the idea concluded that since perfect protection cannot be assured, offensive weapons will remain essential.

As a result, in place of a claim that eventually missile defense will be foolproof, the claim is now made that anyway it will strengthen deterrence by imposing new uncertainties on a would-be attacker. The president's goal of ending the current risk to military targets and civilian populations is being eased offstage. Now the research money is being tipped to lesser "intermediate" objectives-guarding against accidental launches, protecting MX holes, reducing casualties, and so forth

It is widely granted that an American move will induce a Soviet move. The Soviets, one of the reports says, are "better prepared than we" to proceed

"We have a nation that can indeed produce miracles," the new head of the program said the other day. Precisely so. If you believe in miracles, you may wish to consider supporting the president's five-year $18-to-$27 billion research program. Otherwise, you will want to take it easy.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 10, 1984]

COURTING A NEW ARMS RACE

(By Peter A. Clausen)

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.-President Reagan began the year with professions of good faith on arms control. But on a key test of this new conciliatory tone-the control of space weapons-he continues to stonewall.