Senator PELL. Thank you very much, and I must ask the chairman to excuse me at this point. But before going, I wanted to congratulate Dr. Gibbons on his report and say how valid I thought were the eight points that he made in it. I would ask, unless it has already been done, that at least those eight points be included in the record.1

Senator PRESSLER. Let me say also that I think Senator Pell's suggestion for us to prepare a draft treaty would be a very good thing.

Senator PELL. If the chairman will forgive me for a moment, I remember doing this with the Environmental Modification Treaty. By doing a draft treaty and sending it up to the executive at the time, it stimulated their thinking. A few years later we saw the treaty signed at the U.N. and ratified.

It is by actually putting down on these pieces of paper these kernels of thought that could help our negotiators when and if they do negotiate.

Mr. CARNESALE. Senator, there already exist several draft treaties, one of which——

Senator PELL. That shows my ignorance.

Mr. CARNESALE [continuing]. Has been under negotiation with the Soviet Union. That is the one that Ambassador Buchheim has worked on.

Senator PELL. That is right.

Mr. CARNESALE. Second, there is a Soviet proposal made more recently at the U.N. Third, the Union of Concerned Scientists has prepared a draft treaty.

Fourth, I doubt the utility of floating more of them. We should not detract too much from the one that has been negotiated with the Soviets and on which there apparently remain not too many differences.

Senator PELL. Is this a classified document or not?

Mr. CARNESALE. I believe it is, but we could work on that.

Senator PELL. That is the problem, you see. I think it is classified.

Ambassador BUCHHEIM. Yes, it is.

Mr. CARNESALE. It is available to the Soviet Government and to parts of the U.S. Government, but not to the U.S. public and Congress.

Senator PELL. That is right.

But what I would appreciate is if you could, maybe cribing a little bit from the classified one, give us one that could be in the public domain.

Ambassador BUCHHEIM. I will not do it, sir.

Senator PELL. No. no, you cannot do it, but the other two gentlemen might give consideration to that. [General laughter.]

Senator PRESSLER. Let me say something before you leave, Senator Pell. As you know, during floor debate of Senate Joint Resolution 129, the opposition has asked for a closed session. Now, granted, a lot of this is closed, but there is this image being portrayed to the public that there is something very mysterious here. Too much of this information is classified, I think, without reason to be classi

fied. I am certainly not going to ever make public any classified information. But by virtue of having a closed session, the opponents wish to imply that they know something that the public does not know. A great deal of classified material I have seen should not be classified. It would seem that this information is of the type that might fall into that category.

But anyway, be that as it may, I have a few more questions to submit for the record for this panel, and I want to call the last panel forward: Dr John H. Gibbons-and by the way, thank you very much. I thank you very much indeed.

Mr. CARNESALE. Thank you.

Senator PRESSLER. Dr. John H. Gibbons, Director, Office of Technology Assessment; Dr. Ashton B. Carter, OTA consultant, MIT; and Dr. Peter Sharfman, Manager, Office of Technology Assessment.

Also, I would like to insert into the hearing record certain editorials. If we could maintain order in the room, I want to read through the list of editorials I am submitting while the panel is getting into position.

First, from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch "Is Verification Impossible?"; from the Los Angeles Times "Double Standard in Space."

I wish to ask unanimous consent to insert them in the record. From the Los Angeles Herald, "Satellite Destroyers"; from the New York Times, "Hephaestian Folly in Space"; from the Philadelphia Inquirer, "Stop Satellite Killers at the Negotiating Table"; from the Los Angeles Times, "Infinite Shooting Gallery," from the October issue of Science, an article on ASAT's by Jeff Smith and several other articles and editorials. I have asked to place them in the record.

[The articles referred to follows:]

[From the St. Louis-Dispatch, Mar. 21, 1984]

IS VERIFICATION IMPOSSIBLE?

Speaking before a congressional committee last week Richard Perle, an assistant secretary of defense and one of the hardest of the administration's hardliners, said that he believed that it would be "extremely difficult, if not impossible" to verify any arms control treaty banning anti-satellite weapons.

Mr. Perle's dismissal of the verification issue is but part and parcel of the Reagan administration's drive to block congressional efforts to stop the Pentagon's mad rush to build a new space war capability. The fact of the matter is that, while it may be difficult to verify such a treaty now, it is certainly not impossible to do so. The Soviets' current anti-satellite, or ASAT, system is a crude, operationally limited device using a few old SS-9 ICBMs. Monitoring its dismantling would be fairly simple. Similarly, a treaty that would ban all ASAT development would greatly simplify verification-any test would be a violation

Mr. Perle's hint that the Soviets may have already deployed some sort of antisatellite "space mines" is a crude smokescreen. there is no indication that the Soviets have done this and-more importantly-why would Moscow trust such an untested system in a crisis?

However, verification of an ASAT treaty could well become impossible if Washington and Moscow delay on this issue even for a few years. Once the new U.S. ASAT system-a small, operationally flexible aircraft-launched homing missile—is deployed and the Soviets rush to copy it, the ability to verify any treaty banning ASATS will become next to impossible.

The time to ban anti-satellite weapons is now; we cannot afford to wait.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 9, 1984]

DOUBLE STANDARD IN SPACE

President Reagan set two different standards in as many days last week for deciding whether it makes sense to attempt to write arms-control treaties.

On Wednesday he offered to negotiate a worldwide treaty that would prohibit the "production or possession" of chemicals that can kill or cripple soldiers or civilians. Nerve gases and other deadly chemicals can be produced in garden-variety pesticide plants and probably packed around in canisters the size of basketballs. Making sure that nobody in the world produces or possesses such chemicals is a monumental task-one in which mankind surely has a life-and-death stake but one that the President scarcely mentioned.

Two days earlier he rejected proposals to negotiate a treaty to ban the use of weapons in outer space, saying that verification was virtually impossible, "if not actually impossible." Yet making certain that the Soviet Union does not test a new generation of satellite-killer—and therefore would not be in a position to use onewould be child's play compared with suppressing the production or possession of deadly chemicals.

The President has awesome responsibilities as commander-in-chief, not the least of which is to steer a steady course in matters as important as arms control.

Arms control is not, nor was it ever intended to be, a substitute either for arms that hostile nations need to maintain a relatively peaceful standoff in a dangerous world or for efforts to resolve conflicts short of battle.

The intellectual underpinnings of arms control remain what they were 20 years ago-an extension of security policy designed to reduce the chance of war, reduce the damage of war if the world fails short of the first goal, and reduce the burden of arms on a nation's economy.

In recent years these worthwhile goals have too often been brushed aside by strategic planners who seem to argue that the most important goal of arms control is verification of compliance-no small order, to be sure, in a society as tightly closed as that of the Soviet Union.

Still, giving up the possible benefits of arms control for that reason is like refusing medical treatment unless your doctor signs a written guarantee that you will live forever.

Applying the more rigid standard of compliance to weapons in space means that the United States will proceed with tests of an anti-satellite system far more sophisticated than one that the Soviet Union has tested periodically since the early 1970s, with mixed results. If history is any guide, further U.S. testing will lead the Soviets to start working on a second generation of their own satellite-killer, trying to match or outperform the American version.

The horrors of chemical warfare have been known and feared since World War I, and civilized nations have forsworn the use of chemicals since then. The dangers of weapons in space may seem more remote, but the possibility of a space weapon's accidentally triggering a nuclear confrontation are no less real.

The President's attitude toward verification of compliance with a chemical-warfare treaty is sound. Verification is a matter for negotiation, not a barrier to negotiation. His insistence on a written guarantee in the matter of satellite-killers is not sound. If he were to apply a single standard to arms control, he could direct negotiations on weapons in space to begin tomorrow. If he chooses not to do so, Congress must.

[From the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Apr. 4, 1984]

SATELLITE DESTROYERS-WE MUSTN'T FALL BEHIND-OR GIVE UP ON NEGOTIATING At first glance, President Reagan seems to have compelling reasons for his skepticism about the possibility of negotiating a ban on anti-satellite (ASAT) systems with the Soviet Union. In a report to Congress this week, the administration claimed that verifying Soviet compliance would be impossible and asserted that Moscow already has a technological edge.

Ominous as that may sound, it hardly justifies the administration's refusal even to talk with Moscow about a treaty. The Soviets are known to have developed at least one ASAT System-a booster-launched vehicle intended to track and destroy orbiting U.S. satellites. But intentions do not always match performance, and the Soviet system reportedly has failed 11 of its 20 tests. Moreover, even if one assumes the worst-that the Soviets are further along than anyone suspected and may now

have one or two other systems (as Sen. John Warner asserts, based on classified reports) that would seem to be all the more reason for us to negotiate.

The U.S., of course, has been doing more than refusing to talk where ASATs are concerned. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown announced back in 1977 that the Soviets had attained a limited anti-satellite capacity. Since then, we've developed and successfully tested (against imaginary points in space, not actual targets) an anti-satellite missile mounted on an F-15 fighter. So far, many experts, impressed with the weapon's mobility and technology, rate it superior to the Russian system.

The fact that the Soviets use the same facilities for ASAT testing as for their nonmilitary space program lends credence to the administration's concerns about the difficulty of verifying compliance with an ASAT treaty. But verification problems are inherent in all arms-control negotiations. The point is that it makes sense, as we proceed with our own development, to make a good-faith effort to keep the arms race out of space, provided that a mutually acceptable method of verification can be found.

The result of refusing to take this two-track, develop-and-negotiate approach would probably be the same as has been the case with other strategic systems, from submarine-launched ballistic missiles to MIRVS. Time after time, we thought we could attain superiority; and, time after time, the Soviets responded to a U.S. advantage by seeking to catch up.

It may be possible to avoid this cycle in the ASAT race. The Soviets have suggested that an attempt be made, and, with no illusions at all about the purity of Kremlin motives, we think the president should take them up on the idea.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 16, 1984]

HEPHAESTIAN FOLLY IN SPACE

When Hephaestus forged a cunning net to catch one of his fellow Greek gods in bed with the wrong goddess, the technology was successful-but the embarrassed victim was so enraged he threw the technologist down from heaven, leaving him with a permanent limp.

The Reagan Administration has its share of overweening technologists who cannot foresee the consequences of their actions-most notably, those bent on building a device to shoot down Soviet satellites. They are renewing a race that will eventually destroy the vital sanctuary now enjoyed by American satellites used for military communications and early warning of attack.

American surveillance satellites compensate for the grave disadvantage of an open society menaced by a militarized closed society. They monitor Soviet activities and compliance with arms control treaties. At present the Soviet Union's erratic antisatellite rocket can't reach the most vital American satellites, all in high orbit. Development of a better rocket would give the Russians an important edge.

Fortunately, they now seem of a mind to quit the race. They have offered a moratorium on further antisatellite tests and have proposed an antisatellite treaty that, while unacceptable in present form, provides a basis for serious discussion.

No doubt they've been brought to the table by a novel antisatellite device being developed by the Air Force. So ingenious is the technology of the new weapon that it can be delivered in an 18-foot missile launched from a plane. The antiquated Soviet device is a 150-foot rocket.

Yet instead of seizing on this opening, the Administration, in a rambling report to Congress, asserts that treaty talks would be unproductive because the problem needs more study. The American ambassador to the Geneva disarmament conference last week accused the Soviet Union of trying to preserve a one-sided military advantage in space.

The Air Force, however, is nearing a point of no return. Once its tests are completed, its antisatellite missile will be so far in advance of its Soviet counterpart that the United States will possess a onesided advantage. Soviet interest in a treaty will probably dry up and the race resume.

An agreement that halted further testing of antisatellite weapons would leave the Russians with a cumbersome weapon that threatens only low-orbit photoreconnaissance satellites. That threat could easily be countered, and the vital high-altitude satellites would keep their sanctuary.

Some may oppose a ban on further tests of antisatellite weapons because it would also curtail certain tests needed to develop a Star Wars defense shield against ballistic missiles. That's a foolish reason to put American satellites in jeopardy. The Air

Force says its weapon would be needed to destroy the Soviet satellites that spy on the American fleet. But even if the satellites cannot be countered otherwise, that hardly outweighs the advantage of keeping American satellites inviolate.

High technology can improve or impair defense, depending on the nature of the race. The Air Force's clever new missile for shooting down satellites, and the Administration's refusal to negotiate, threaten to leave American security with a permanent limp

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 13, 1984]

STOP SATELLITE KILLERS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

The world stands at a crossroads in its uses of outer space. Decisions the United States and the Soviet Union make now will dictate whether this frontier can be protected or turned into earthlings' next battleground.

One such decision came early this month when President Reagan told Congress he would press ahead with development of weapons, called ASATs, designed to destroy satellites.

Previous U.S.-Soviet talks on ASATs halted in 1979 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1983, the Soviets, despite the breakdown on nuclear arms talks, proposed a treaty dismantling existing ASATS and banning new ones. Congress had required the administration to show "good faith" efforts to negotiate a ban on ASATS, which the Soviets have and the United States is testing. But Mr. Reagan said the United States would not negotiate on an ASAT ban because it would be virtually impossible to verify.

This decision must be reconsidered. For one thing, the impossibility of verification is sharply disputed: Many leading American scientists say a workable ASAT treaty could provide adequate verification safeguards. More important, the very real difficulties of verification should be addressed at the bargaining table, not used as an excuse to avoid it.

Attention has focused on development of satellite-killer weapons because it is at a critical stage. Space satellites have become the nerve center of superpower military operations. But so far neither the Soviets nor the Americans can threaten satellites in high earth orbits where the most important early warning and communications systems are based.

The Soviet anti-satellite weapon at present is slow, ground-based and rather crude; most U.S. satellites are above its range. The United States is developing a swifter, much more sophisticated weapon, launched from an F-15 fighter plane. At its present stage of development the U.S. ASAT would not threaten high orbit satellites but it has the potential to do so. Many experts fear that perfection of the U.S. weapon will spark an unchecked race with the Soviets for better satellite killers. Why is the administration so determined to press ahead with ASAT development? First, because it believes the United States must have a fully tested ASAT to deter the Soviets from using theirs. Second, because it says a ban cannot be verified.

Some experts contend an unmentioned third reason for the administration's push on ASATs is that a treaty banning them would hinder work on President Reagan's equally controversial "star wars" space defense plan.

The merits of tit-for-tat countering an inferior Soviet ASAT (as opposed to blocking its potential use through other forms of military threat), must be measured against the danger of space weapons race. The United States has the most to lose in such a race. America depends on its more technologically advanced satellites more heavily than does the Soviet Union, both for peaceful scientific and commercial uses, and to provide communications, navigation, intelligence and targeting information for the military.

Moreover, while the United States has a lead in space technology, it could evaporate under a determined Soviet effort, as has happened before.

As for verifying a ban, no one would deny the difficulties. Nor can verification ever be perfect. But claims that reasonably effective verification is impossible are challenged by experts like the Union of Concerned Scientists, which includes former top CIA, military and intelligence figures. They say that any secret attempts by the Soviets to upgrade or add to its present system would require testing that would be detectable. They also believe that use of non-ASAT weapons or space vehicles to threaten satellites would be detectable and that a Soviet "breakout" (breaking the treaty and quickly assembling an illegal ASAT system) would be much harder than the administration asserts.